G.R. No. 271701, May 6, 2025,
♦ Decision,
Zalameda, [J]
♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion,
Leonen, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion,
Caguioa, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion,
Lazaro-Javier, [J]
♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion,
Inting, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion,
Lopez, [J]
EN BANC
G.R. No. 271701, May 06, 2025
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, PETITIONER,
vs.
NIPPON EXPRESS PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
LEONEN, SAJ:
I concur with the majority that the Petition for Review on Certiorari should be denied since its subject matter has already become moot. However, I maintain that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging an interlocutory order of a Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) division, falls under the jurisdiction of the CTA En Banc.
The CTA, which was created through the enactment of Republic Act No. 1125, is the tribunal with specialized competence over tax and tariff matters.1
Republic Act No. 9282 then enlarged the CTA's membership, expanded its jurisdiction, and elevated its level to a collegiate court with special jurisdiction. Section 11 states that "[a] party adversely affected by a resolution of a Division of the CTA on a motion for reconsideration or new trial may file a petition for review with the CTA en banc."2
Republic Act No. 9503 further enlarged the organizational structure of the CTA, increasing its membership to a Presiding Justice and eight Associate Justices.3 Now, the CTA may sit in three divisions.4
The following are the cases within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CTA En Banc. Among these are decisions, resolutions or orders of the CTA division in the enumerated cases:5
SEC. 2. Cases within the jurisdiction of the Court en banc. – The Court en banc shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal the following:
(a) Decisions or resolutions on motions for reconsideration or new trial of the Court in Divisions in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction over:
(1) Cases arising from administrative agencies – Bureau of Internal Revenue, Bureau of Customs, Department of Finance, Department of Trade and Industry, Department of Agriculture;
(2) Local tax cases decided by the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their original jurisdiction; and
(3) Tax collection cases decided by the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their original jurisdiction involving final and executory assessments for taxes, fees, charges and penalties, where the principal amount of taxes and penalties claimed is less than one million pesos;
(b) Decisions, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction;
(c) Decisions, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax collection cases decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction;
(d) Decisions, resolutions or orders on motions for reconsideration or new trial of the Court in Division in the exercise of its exclusive original jurisdiction over tax collection cases;
(e) Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals (CBAA) in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and taxation of real property originally decided by the provincial or city board of assessment appeals;
(f) Decisions, resolutions or orders on motions for reconsideration or new trial of the Court in Division in the exercise of its exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving criminal offenses arising from violations of the National Internal Revenue Code or the Tariff and Customs Code and other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue or Bureau of Customs;
(g) Decisions, resolutions or orders on motions for reconsideration or new trial of the Court in Division ·in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction over criminal offenses mentioned m the preceding subparagraph; and
(h) Decisions, resolutions or orders of the Regional trial Courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over criminal offenses mentioned in subparagraph (f).6
Notably, the law neither expressly grants nor prohibits the CTA En Banc from issuing writs of certiorari over cases that it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over.
In collegiate courts, such as in the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, the adjudication of its division is regarded as the decision of the Court itself. The Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals sitting En Banc have no appellate jurisdiction over their respective divisions and there is no hierarchy of courts within them:7
It is the same situation among other collegial courts. To illustrate, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals may sit and [adjudicate] cases in divisions consisting of only a number of members, and such adjudication is already regarded as the decision of the Court itself. It is provided for in the Constitution, Article VIII, Section 4(1) and BP Blg. 129, Section 4, respectively. The divisions are not considered separate and distinct courts but are divisions of one and the same court; there is no hierarchy of courts within the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, for they each remain as one court notwithstanding that they also work in divisions. The Supreme Court sitting en banc is not an appellate court vis-a-vis its divisions, and it exercises no appellate jurisdiction over the latter. As for the Court of Appeals en banc, it sits as such only for the purpose of exercising administrative, ceremonial, or other non-adjudicator/functions.8 (Citations omitted)
However, this is not the case with the Court of Tax Appeals. As pointed out by the majority, it is the only collegial court that sits en banc to review the decisions, resolutions, or orders on motions for reconsideration or new trial of its own divisions.9 Although the explicit grant of exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the CTA. En Banc does not make it a separate and superior court, it creates a semblance of hierarchy that enables it to take cognizance of a petition for certiorari challenging the interlocutory orders of the CTA divisions.
Rule 65, Section 1 of the Rules of Court regulates the exercise of the power to issue the writ of certiorari:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.10
Being an extraordinary writ, it should only be issued when a tribunal acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is a remedy to ensure that the lower courts and tribunals stay within the bounds of their jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion is the "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law:"11
The writ of certiorari is not issued to correct every error that may have been committed by lower courts and tribunals. It is a remedy specifically to keep lower courts and tribunals within the bounds of their jurisdiction. In our judicial system, the writ is issued to prevent lower courts and tribunals from committing grave abuse of discretion in excess of their jurisdiction. Further, the writ requires that there is no appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available to correct the error. Thus, certiorari may not be issued if the error can be the subject of an ordinary appeal. As explained in Delos Santos v. Metrobank:
….
An essential requisite for filing a petition for certiorari is the allegation that the judicial tribunal acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion has been defined as a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law." In order to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari for being the wrong remedy, it is necessary to find out whether the Regional Trial Court acted with grave abuse of discretion as to warrant the filing of a petition for certiorari against it.12 (Citations omitted)
The origins of the writ of certiorari from common law jurisdiction and its evolution and application in our jurisdiction are expounded in Spouses Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company:13
We remind that the writ of certiorari – being a remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in character, whose purpose is to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction, or to prevent an inferior court from committing such grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction, or to relieve parties from arbitrary acts of courts (i.e., acts that courts have no power or authority in law to perform) – is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop, and cannot be issued to correct every error committed by a lower court.
In the common law, from which the remedy of certiorari evolved, the writ of certiorari was issued out of Chancery, or the King's Bench, commanding agents or officers of the inferior courts to return the record of a cause pending before them, so as to give the party more sure and speedy justice, for the writ would enable the superior court to determine from an inspection of the record whether the inferior court's judgment was rendered without authority. The errors were of such a nature that, if allowed to stand, they would result in a substantial injury to the petitioner to whom no other remedy was available. If the inferior court acted without authority, the record was then revised and corrected in matters of law. The writ of certiorari was limited to cases in which the inferior court was said to be exceeding its jurisdiction or was not proceeding according to essential requirements of law and would lie only to review judicial or quasi-judicial acts.
The concept of the remedy of certiorari in our judicial system remains much the same as it has been in the common law. In this jurisdiction, however, the exercise of the power to issue the writ of certiorari is largely regulated by laying down the instances or situations in the Rules of Court in which a superior court may issue the writ of certiorari to an inferior court or officer.14 (Citations omitted)
In City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo,15 petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which granted respondent's application for a writ of preliminary injunction in a local tax case. The Court ruled that the CTA's authority to take cognizance of petitions for certiorari questioning interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in a local tax case is included in the powers granted by the Constitution and is inherent in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.16
In ruling as such, this Court explained that the exercise of a court's appellate jurisdiction should include the authority to control all auxiliary and incidental matters necessary to the efficient and proper exercise of that jurisdiction. When needed, it should be able to prohibit or restrain any acts that might hinder the proper exercise of its jurisdiction in ongoing cases. Thus, the power to issue writs of certiorari complements the exercise of a court's appellate jurisdiction.17 It further discussed:
Indeed, in order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law intended to transfer also such power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the transfer should only be considered as partial, not total.
Consistent with the above pronouncement, this Court has held as early as the case of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al. that "if a case may be appealed to a particular court or judicial tribunal or body, then said court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." This principle was affirmed in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals, where the Court stated that "a court may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions of the lower court." The rulings in J.M. Tuason and De Jesus were reiterated in the more recent cases of Galang, Jr. v. Geronimo and Bulilis v. Nuez.
. . . .
A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power necessary to exercise it effectively, to make all orders that will preserve the subject of the action, and to give effect to the final determination of the appeal. It carries with it the power to protect that jurisdiction and to make the decisions of the court thereunder effective.(awÞhi( The court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has authority to control all auxiliary and incidental matters necessary to the efficient and proper exercise of that jurisdiction. For this purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit or restrain the performance of any act which might interfere with the proper exercise of its rightful jurisdiction in cases pending before it.
Lastly, it would not be amiss to point out that a court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction should have powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction. These should be regarded as powers which are inherent in its jurisdiction and the court must possess them in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of such process.
. . . .
Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on them. These inherent powers are such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or are essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as well as to the due administration of justice; or are directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted powers; and include the power to maintain the court's jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the litigants.18 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
The ruling in City of Manila is subsequently applied in CE Casecnan Water and Energy Company, Inc. v. Province of Nueva Ecija19 and Republic v. City of Surigao.20
In CE Casecnan, the Court affirmed the CTA's authority to issue a writ of certiorari and reiterated that "if a case may be appealed to a particular court or judicial tribunal or body, then said court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction."21
In City of Surigao, a case involving local taxation, this Court affirmed that the CTA's exclusive appellate jurisdiction over a decision of the RTC necessarily includes the authority to determine whether the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing an interlocutory order relative to the main action.22
Meanwhile, the power of the CTA En Banc to issue a petition for certiorari over cases resolved by its division in criminal cases was settled by this Court in People v. Court of Tax Appeals.23
In People v. Court of Tax Appeals, the CTA Third Division acquitted the accused of several criminal charges of failure to supply correct and accurate information in their joint Income Tax Return (ITR) for taxable year 2001 and failure to report their income in their ITRs for taxable years 2002, 2003, and 2004. The petitioners in this case filed a petition for certiorari before this Court, alleging that the acquittal is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction.24
The Court applied the ruling in City of Manila by analogy and made a pronouncement that "the CTA En Banc's exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions, resolutions, or orders of a division of the CTA under Section 2(f) of the CTA Rules includes the authority to resolve petitions for certiorari assailing the decision, resolution, or order of a CTA division."25
Citing the case of City of Manila, the Court reiterated in The Philippine American Life and General Insurance Co. v. Secretary of Finance, that the CTA has the power of certiorari in cases within its appellate jurisdiction, viz.:
Evidently, City of Manila can be considered as a departure from Ursal in that in spite of there being no express grant in the law, the CTA is deemed granted with powers of certiorari by implication. Moreover, City of Manila diametrically opposes British American Tobacco to the effect that it is now within the power of the CTA, through its power of certiorari, to rule on the validity of a particular administrative rule or regulation so long as it is within its appellate jurisdiction. Hence, it can now rule not only on the propriety of an assessment or tax treatment of a certain transaction, but also on the validity of the revenue regulation or revenue memorandum circular on which the said assessment is based[.]
By analogy, the CTA En Banc's exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions, resolutions, or orders of a division of the CTA under Section 2(f) of the CTA Rules includes the authority to resolve petitions for certiorari assailing the decision, resolution, or order of a CTA division.
The Court is mindful that City of Manila and the aforementioned cases echoing the CTA's jurisdiction in certiorari cases were civil actions—assailing either an interlocutory order or the validity of a revenue regulation or memorandum circular—while the present petition involves multiple criminal actions against accused-respondents. The rationale, however, in City of Manila likewise applies here. It is an "anathema to the orderly administration of justice" if there will be a split jurisdiction between the CTA En Banc and the Court over petitions for certiorari. There is no justifiable reason for the Court to exclude criminal cases from the certiorari jurisdiction of the CTA En Banc.
It is also worthy to note that under Section 2(f), Rule 4 of the CTA Rules, there is no distinction between a judgment of conviction and acquittal. "Where the law does not distinguish, we should not also distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus." Thus, the CTA En Banc similarly have jurisdiction over the present Rule 65 petition assailing the CTA Third's Division judgment of acquittal.26 (Citation omitted)
This Court also declared that a petition for certiorari should be filed first with the CTA En Banc in line with the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Only after the CTA En Banc renders its decision or resolution that the party adversely affected may appeal by filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court before this Court.27
A deviation from the ruling in City of Manila and People v. Court of Tax Appeals is not warranted. Since the power to issue a writ of certiorari is not only necessary but is indispensable in the effective and efficient exercise of appellate jurisdiction, the CTA En Banc should also have the authority to take cognizance of a petition for certiorari challenging an interlocutory order of a Court of Tax Appeals division.
Aside from this, the rule that the authority to issue writs of certiorari must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the grant of appellate jurisdiction only applies to quasi-judicial tribunals or bodies:28
The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of certiorari involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the mere existence of appellate jurisdiction. Thus, in the cases of Pimentel v. COMELEC, Garcia v. De Jesus, Veloria v. COMELEC, Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica, and Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, this Court has ruled against the jurisdiction of courts or tribunals over petitions for certiorari on the ground that there is no law which expressly gives these tribunals such power. It must be observed, however, that with the exception of Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, these rulings pertain not to regular courts but to tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers. With respect to the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 8249 now provides that the special criminal court has exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
In the same manner, Section 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution grants power to the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. With respect to the Court of Appeals, Section 9 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129) gives the appellate court, also in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the power to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. As to Regional Trial Courts, the power to issue a writ of certiorari, in the exercise of their original jurisdiction, is provided under Section 21 of BP 129.
The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant of such power, with respect to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law and that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly interpreted that the power of the CTA includes that of determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases.29 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Considering that the CTA En Banc is not a quasi-judicial tribunal but a collegiate court, the lack of express grant of the power to issue writs of certiorari over the acts of the CTA division should not preclude it from exercising such authority.
Lastly, just as the grant of the exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the CTA En Banc did not make it a separate and superior court to its divisions, the grant of the authority to take cognizance of a petition for certiorari will not cause this perceived effect. If the CTA En Banc is given the authority to review the decisions or resolutions of its divisions and reverse them on appeal, there is no reason to say that they lack the authority to determine whether any of its divisions exceeded their jurisdiction in issuing interlocutory orders.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DENY the Petition.
Footnotes
1 Bureau of Customs v. Honorable Agnes VST Devanadera, 769 Phil. 231, 254 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc], Republic Act No. 1125 (1954).
2 Republic Act No. 9282 (2004), sec. 11.
3 Republic Act No. 9503 (2008), sec 1.
4 Republic Act No. 9503 (2008), sec 2.
5 CTA RULES, Rule 4, sec. 2.
6 Id.
7 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Kepco Ilijan Corporation, 787 Phil. 698 (2016) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
8 Id. at 705-706.
9 Ponencia, pp. 13-14.
10 RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, sec. 1.
11 Cruz v. People, 812 Phil. 166, 173 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division]. (Citation omitted)
12 Id. at 171-173.
13 698 Phil. 1 (2012) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].
14 Id. at 14-15.
15 726 Phil. 9 (2014) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
16 Id. at 27-28.
17 Id. at 24-27.
18 Id.
19 760 Phil. 835 (2015) [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division].
20 929 Phil. 255 (2022) [Per J. M.V. Lopez, Second Division].
21 760 Phil. 835, 843 (2015) [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division]. (Citation omitted)
22 929 Phil. 255, 263 (2022) [Per J. M.V. Lopez, Second Division].
23 932 Phil. 139 (2022) [Per J. Inting, Third Division].
24 Id. at 140, 150.
25 Id. at 154.
26 Id. at 153-154.
27 Id. at 154.
28 City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo, 726 Phil. 9, 28 (2014) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
29 Id. at 23-24.
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