G.R. No. 271701 - Dissenting Opinion

G.R. No. 271701, May 6, 2025,
♦ Decision, Zalameda, [J]
♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Leonen, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Caguioa, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Lazaro-Javier, [J]
♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Inting, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Lopez, [J]

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, PETITIONER,
vs.
NIPPON EXPRESS PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.

The core issue: which court has jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari over interlocutory orders of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) Division?1 The ponencia rules that this Court has primary jurisdiction to resolve petitions for certiorari filed assailing the interlocutory orders issued by the CTA Division and not the CTA En Banc.2

To recall, the CTA En Banc dismissed the Commission on Internal Revenue's (CIR) petition for certiorari under Rule 65 for lack of jurisdiction. The said petition was directed against the resolutions of the CTA Division declaring the CIR in default for its failure to file a hard copy of its Answer and allowing respondent Nippon Express Philippines Corporation to present its evidence ex parte. In the draft Decision, the ponencia agrees and holds that the CTA En Banc cannot take cognizance of a petition for certiorari assailing interlocutory orders of the CTA Division.

The ponencia ratiocinates that from a reading of Republic Act No. 1125,3 as amended by Republic Act No. 92824 and Republic Act No. 9503,5 the CTA En Banc exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions rendered by the CTA Division, whether in the exercise of its original and appellate jurisdiction in both civil and criminal actions. This is supported by A.M. No. 05-11-07-CTA, or the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals (RRCTA). However, the laws creating the CTA do not expressly grant the CTA En Banc original jurisdiction over interlocutory orders issued by the CTA Division. Too, the RRCTA is silent as to the CTA En Banc's original jurisdiction over such interlocutory orders.6

The ponencia further affirms that the CTA is a collegial body where no hierarchy exists between the CTA En Banc and the CTA Division. Pursuant thereto, the ponencia thus holds that the CTA En Banc cannot issue a writ of certiorari over decisions and resolutions issued by the CTA Division. With this ratiocination vis a vis the definition and nature of certiorari, "for a writ of certiorari to issue, the court granting the writ must be superior to the tribunal, board, or officer against whom the writ is directed." There being no hierarchy between the CTA En Banc and the CTA Division, the former has no jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders of the latter through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.7

Too, the authority of the CTA En Banc "to review final decisions, resolutions, or orders of a CTA Division does not make it a separate or higher court, nor does it give supervisory power to issue a writ of certiorari against its Divisions." The ponencia stresses that "the CTA En Banc's appellate jurisdiction is limited to decision or resolutions resolving motions for reconsideration or new trial filed before the CTA Division, which presupposes that the case subject to appellate review involves a judgment on the merits or a final disposition."

First. True, Republic Act No. 9282 does not explicitly provide that the CTA En Banc has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari against interlocutory orders of a CTA Division.(awÞhi( Likewise, nowhere in the RRCTA provides that the CTA En Banc may take cognizance of petitions for certiorari against judgments, orders, or resolutions of a CTA Division. But the Rules of Court, which has suppletory application to the RRCTA, provides that when by law, jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes, and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer; and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of the said law or rules.8

More, as ruled by the Court in City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo,9 for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. When the law vests exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases upon the CTA En Banc, it carries such other power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, to the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction,10 including the authority to issue writs of certiorari. Otherwise, there would be split-jurisdiction between two tribunals over basically the same subject matter.11

Here, it is undisputed that the questioned resolutions of the CTA Division are interlocutory in nature. The CTA Division declared petitioner in default for its failure to file a hard copy of its Answer to the petition filed by respondent; and allowed respondent to present its evidence ex parte.12 The Court has previously explained that the word interlocutory refers to something intervening between the commencement and the end of the suit which decides some point or matter but is not a final decision of the whole controversy. An interlocutory order is an order that does not finally dispose of the case and does not end the Court's task of adjudicating the parties' contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court.13 An interlocutory order may only be questioned through a petition for certiorari as it is not a proper subject of appeal.14

Second. Although a petition for certiorari is an original and independent action and is not a part of the proceedings in the main case, the subject matter of a petition for certiorari must be directly and intimately connected to the subject matter of the main case, i.e., the resolution of the petition for certiorari assailing the interlocutory order would greatly affect the resolution of the main case. In other words, the disposition of the issue raised in the main case here is dependent on the disposition of the issue raised in the assailed interlocutory orders. In such a case, the CTA En Banc should take cognizance thereof instead of the Supreme Court.

Third. Notably, the petition for certiorari in Grecia-Cuerdo15 was directed against an RTC disposition concerning a local tax, while People v. Ligot16 was a petition for certiorari directed against a verdict of acquittal rendered by the CTA Division in a criminal case. In the aforementioned cases, the Court recognized that the CTA En Banc had the authority to resolve petitions for certiorari against the decisions, resolutions, or orders of the CTA Division. There is no cogent reason why the other cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CTA En Banc under Section 2 of the RRCTA,17 should be excluded from the certiorari jurisdiction of the CTA En Banc whenever grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction taints the dispositions of the CTA Division, as in this case.

Finally. Recognizing the authority of the CTA En Banc to resolve petitions for certiorari against interlocutory orders of CTA Divisions would be more in keeping with the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Under this doctrine, direct recourse to this Court is limited to questions of law, notwithstanding the invocation of paramount or transcendental importance of the action. This doctrine is not a mere policy, rather, it is a constitutional filtering mechanism designed to enable the Court to focus on the more fundamental and essential tasks assigned to it by the highest law of the land.18 The Court's strict adherence to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts is not merely due to judicial economy but also to ensure that every level of the Judiciary performs its designated roles in an efficient and effective manner. The Court is one of last resort, and direct recourse to it is not proper unless it is shown that there are special and important reasons.19 It cannot and should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious and important reasons exist therefor.20

Indeed, resolution of the assailed interlocutory orders issued by the CTA Division, being directly and intimately related to the issues raised in the main case, should be resolved by the CTA En Banc itself, and no other. This not only allows the CTA itself to exhaustively study the cases before it but also pass judgments on issues within its specialized competence over tax and tariff matters.