G.R. No. 271701 - Separate Concurring Opinion

G.R. No. 271701, May 6, 2025,
♦ Decision, Zalameda, [J]
♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Leonen, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Caguioa, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Lazaro-Javier, [J]
♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Inting, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Lopez, [J]

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, PETITIONER,
vs.
NIPPON EXPRESS PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.

The present case presents a procedural question as to which judicial body has jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 challenging an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). I concur in the result reached by the ponencia that such petitions do not fall within the primary jurisdiction of the CTA En Banc. Instead, it is this Court—the Supreme Court—that is properly vested with the power to review such matters. I write separately to emphasize and expand on the rationale supporting this conclusion.

The CTA, like the Court of Appeals (CA) and the Supreme Court (Court), is a single body, the Divisions of which are mere iterations of itself and are not considered, as they cannot be considered as, inferior courts. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a remedy available only against lower courts—not within the same judicial entity. The proper recourse for challenging a CTA Division's interlocutory orders is to elevate the matter to the Court, which exercises supervisory authority over the CTA as part of the Philippine Judiciary.

It bears emphasis that the precise question in this case has already been directly addressed—and resolved—by the Court in a consistent line of decisions. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals and CBK Power Company Limited1(CBK), Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals (First Division) and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation2 (PSPC), and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals-Third Division and Citysuper, Inc.3 (Citysuper) the Court ruled that petitions for certiorari assailing the interlocutory orders of CTA Divisions are cognizable only by the Court, and not by the CTA En Banc. This limitation reflects a long-standing and principled understanding of certiorari as an extraordinary remedy available only against a lower tribunal.

In this case, there is no question that the July 21, 2021 and November 17, 2021 Resolutions of the CTA Division are interlocutory orders. These orders did not finally dispose of the case on the merits but simply declared the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) in default for its failure to file a hard copy of the Answer to the petition filed by respondent Nippon Express Philippines Corporation (Nippon Express) and allowed Nippon Express to present evidence ex parte.4

While the present case has been rendered moot due to developments in the main case, a clarification on which court has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 challenging the interlocutory orders of a CTA Division remains necessary due to its recurring nature and importance in preserving the integrity of the judicial process.

The CTA En Banc's jurisdiction is strictly appellate. It has no certiorari power over its own divisions

The amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 92825 to Republic Act No. 11256 elevated the rank of the CTA to a collegiate court, with the same rank as the CA, and increased the number of its members to one Presiding Justice and five Associate Justices. The CTA is now allowed to sit En Banc or in two Divisions with each Division consisting of three Justices.7

In 2008, Republic Act No. 95038 was enacted which further expanded the CTA's organizational structure and jurisdiction. This law established a third Division and added three more Associate Justices, increasing the CTA's total composition to one Presiding Justice and eight Associate Justices. With this expansion, the CTA now operates either En Banc or in three Divisions, each consisting of three Justices.

The CTA En Banc exercises appellate jurisdiction over decisions rendered by the CTA Division. This authority is explicitly provided under Republic Act No. 1125, as amended by Republic Act No. 9282, which reads:

Corollarily, Section 2, Rule 4 of A.M. No. 05-11-07-CTA,9 otherwise known as the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals (RRCTA), summarizes the jurisdiction of the CTA En Banc as follows:

Based on the foregoing, the CTA En Banc exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions rendered by the CTA Division, whether in the exercise of their original and appellate jurisdiction in both civil and criminal actions.

In this connection, the Court, speaking through then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Diosdado M. Peralta, already held in the 2015 case of CBK that while the CTA En Banc has jurisdiction over a final judgment or order, it does not have jurisdiction over an interlocutory order issued by the CTA Division, thus:

It is essential to highlight that the circumstances of the present case are identical to those in CBK, both in terms of the nature of the assailed orders and the appropriate legal remedy available. In CBK, the Court unequivocally held that an order declaring a party in default and allowing the opposing party to present evidence ex parte is an interlocutory order, as it does not resolve the case on the merits.11 Likewise, in the present case, the Resolutions of the CTA Division are interlocutory, as they only declared the CIR in default and allowed Nippon Express to present evidence ex parte. Thus, following CBK, the proper remedy of a party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued with grave abuse of discretion by a CTA Division is to file a petition for certiorari before the Court, not the CTA En Banc. Such a remedy is consistent with Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court,12 which states that a party is only allowed to appeal a judgment or a final order which completely disposes of the case. Conversely, no appeal may be taken from orders or resolutions which are interlocutory in nature, and the remedy of the aggrieved party in such instance is to file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.

Since the present case involves the same procedural posture as CBK—where the CTA Division's interlocutory orders are being questioned—the Court's ruling in CBK must be applied consistently. The principle in CBK has been adopted in a number of cases, including Citysuper, PSPC, and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals Second Division and QL Development, Inc.,13 all of which clarified that that the CTA En Banc only has jurisdiction over a final judgment or order, but not over an interlocutory order of the CTA Division. Thus, the Court has already spoken definitively on this precise issue.

Grecia-Cuerdo does not authorize the CTA En Banc to exercise certiorari over interlocutory orders of CTA divisions

In the 2014 case of City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo14 (Grecia-Cuerdo), the Court En Banc, also speaking through Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Peralta, declared that the CTA has appellate jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case. The Court explained:

To better understand the limits of this authority, it is necessary to return to the general principles that govern the writ of certiorari. A writ of certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.16 Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court reads:

SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari.— When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his [or her] jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46. (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, a writ of certiorari cannot be used for any other purpose, as its function is limited to keeping the inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction.17 In our judicial system, the writ is issued to prevent lower courts and tribunals from committing grave abuse of discretion in excess of their jurisdiction.18 Over a certiorari, the higher court uses its original jurisdiction in accordance with its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts.19

The context and reasoning of Grecia-Cuerdo do not justify—and in fact preclude—its application to situations where the writ is sought against an order issued by a division of the very same tribunal. The context of that case is markedly different from the present case.

First, the Court's ruling in Grecia-Cuerdo was based on the principle that an appellate tribunal must have the authority to issue writs of certiorari against the lower courts whose decisions are subject to its review. Grecia-Cuerdo does not support the proposition that the CTA En Banc may issue writs of certiorari against its own Divisions.

Grecia-Cuerdo involved a hierarchical relationship between two distinct courts—the RTC as the court of origin, and the CTA as the reviewing appellate court. That relationship is what justified the issuance of a writ of certiorari in aid of the CTA's appellate jurisdiction. That rationale applies only when the interlocutory order comes from a court that is subordinate to the appellate tribunal. That is not the case here. The CTA En Banc and the CTA Divisions are part of a single collegiate court. A division's ruling is not that of a lower court but of the same tribunal operating through a different panel. The CTA En Banc cannot therefore act as a reviewing court over its own internal units via certiorari without violating the basic premise of Rule 65—that it is a remedy to be addressed to a court of higher rank. This limitation was further emphasized in Mactel Corp. v. City Government of Makati,20 where the Court categorically stated that the ruling in Grecia-Cuerdo applies only if the interlocutory order was issued by the RTC in a local tax case in order for the CTA to take cognizance of a petition for certiorari.

Second, as stated in Grecia-Cuerdo, "a court may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if it has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions of the lower court."21 This statement underscores that the authority to issue a writ of certiorari is tied to a court's ability to review the decisions of a lower court or tribunal, not those of an entity within the same judicial structure. The writ of certiorari may be issued only against a tribunal whose final acts are appealable to the issuing court. This condition is not satisfied as the CTA Division and CTA En Banc are not separate courts, but two configurations of the same body. The CTA Division is the CTA itself, acting through fewer members.

Third, while Grecia-Cuerdo recognized that a court with appellate jurisdiction may issue writs of certiorari "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction," this does not mean the writ ceases to be an exercise of original jurisdiction, nor does it authorize a tribunal to issue writs against its own components. A Rule 65 petition remains an original and independent remedy. To restate, in Grecia-Cuerdo, the CTA exercised certiorari over an RTC—a lower court over which it has appellate jurisdiction.

To interpret Grecia-Cuerdo as authorizing the CTA En Banc to exercise original jurisdiction over interlocutory orders of its own Divisions would be to misconstrue the doctrine. Under the present framework, the CTA En Banc is granted only exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final decisions, orders, or resolutions of the CTA Division. It is not vested with original jurisdiction to entertain special civil actions for certiorari arising from interlocutory matters within the same tribunal.

Rule 65, by its very nature, is a remedy anchored in original jurisdiction. A petition for certiorari is not a continuation of the proceedings below, but an independent and original action questioning a tribunal's grave abuse of discretion. The case of Public Estates Authority v. Sy, Jr.22 is instructive:

In contrast with an appeal which is a continuation of the proceedings, a petition for certiorari is "an original and independent action that [is] not part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of judgment or order complained of." "Over a [certiorari], the higher court uses its original jurisdiction in accordance with its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts."23 (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, Grecia-Cuerdo does not authorize the CTA En Banc to exercise certiorari over the CTA Divisions.

In fact, in the later cases after Grecia-Cuerdo,24 the Court expressly declined to extend Grecia-Cuerdo to such intra-tribunal arrangements. The Court in CBK—decided a year after Grecia-Cuerdo-squarely rejected this extension. It held that the CTA En Banc has no jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari questioning interlocutory orders of the CTA Divisions. That both decisions were authored by the same Member of the Court underscores that Grecia-Cuerdo was never intended to support the proposition that the CTA En Banc may act on petitions for certiorari directed at the CTA Divisions.

Thus, Grecia-Cuerdo is properly read as affirming the authority of the CTA to issue writs of certiorari only in relation to lower courts, such as the RTC, in cases where the CTA exercises appellate jurisdiction. It does not authorize—and cannot be invoked to justify—the exercise of original certiorari jurisdiction by the CTA En Banc over the CTA Divisions. In line with this clear doctrinal framework, the proper forum for petitions for certiorari assailing interlocutory orders of the CTA Divisions remains to be this Court-consistent with Rule 65 and with longstanding jurisprudence.

Legislative intent does not support granting the CTA En Banc certiorari jurisdiction. over interlocutory orders issued by the CTA Divisions

During the deliberations for this case, a question was raised as to whether the CTA Divisions are to be regarded as lower courts in relation to the CTA En Banc. To this, I submit that they are not.

While the CTA En Banc exercises appellate jurisdiction over the CTA Divisions, this does not automatically make it a "higher" or "superior" court in the traditional judicial hierarchy. The legislative intent behind Republic Act No. 9282 does not support the characterization of the CTA En Banc as a superior tribunal over the CTA Divisions. Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, in his sponsorship speech before Republic Act No. 9282 became a law, clarified the purpose of the amendment:

A significant procedural reform introduced by Republic Act No. 9282 was the modification of the appellate process for tax cases—shifting appellate review from the CA to the CTA En Banc. Prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 9282, appeals from the CTA were directed to the CA.26 This meant that tax cases were subject to review by a general appellate body, despite the specialized nature of tax cases.

Under Republic Act No. 9282, decisions rendered by a CTA Division are now subject to appeal before the CTA En Banc, replacing the previous practice of elevating such cases to the CA. Rulings of the CTA En Banc may then be appealed directly to the Court, but only on pure questions of law.

The CTA En Banc was created as the exclusive appellate body for decisions rendered by the CTA Divisions to ensure that tax cases remain within a specialized tribunal before they reach the Court. This change was meant to prevent conflicting tax rulings among multiple Divisions of the CTA. The legislative intent was to establish a clear appellate process within the CTA, but not to turn the CTA En Banc into a supervisory body with certiorari jurisdiction over its own Divisions. To hold otherwise would contradict the specialized appeal structure envisioned by Republic Act No. 9282.

Consistent with this rationale, the legislative intent affirms that the CTA En Banc functions as an appellate body within the CTA, not as a superior or distinct court. The CTA En Banc and the CTA Divisions together function as components of the same tribunal—a collegiate court created with a unique structure and jurisdiction. Republic Act No. 9282 did not create a hierarchy between the CTA En Banc and the CTA Divisions. It simply granted the CTA En Banc an exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final decisions or resolutions issued by the CTA Divisions. In essence, Republic Act No. 9282 established an appellate structure that allows the full court to collectively review rulings of its Divisions.

The foregoing understanding is consistent with the design of the CTA as a collegiate court. The CTA, like the Court, operates as a singular judicial body regardless of whether it is sitting En Banc or in Divisions. To emphasize, CTA Divisions are not lower courts in relation to the CTA En Banc. This principle has been recognized in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Suntay27 (Suntay), where the Court rejected the argument that the Court's Divisions operate as separate and distinct courts from the Court En Banc, emphasizing that the actions taken and the decisions rendered by any of the Divisions are those of the Court itself. This means that while the Court works in Divisions, the Court remains one unit, and no hierarchy exists between the Court En Banc and the Divisions of the Court.

Although Suntay addresses the Court's structure, the same logic should apply to the CTA. The CTA, like the Court, is a collegiate body that functions either En Banc or in Divisions.

The Court further clarified the limits of the CTA En Banc's authority in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Kepco Ilijan Corp.28 (Kepco) where it refused to recognize the CTA En Banc's power to annul a ruling of one of the CTA Divisions. The Court reasoned that neither Republic Act No. 1125, as amended by Republic Act No. 9282, nor even the RRCTA, contemplates such a scenario. Simply put, no law or rule grants the CTA En Banc the power to invalidate the final and executory rulings of the CTA Divisions, thus:

The Court's ruling in Kepco affirms that the CTA is a collegiate court where no hierarchy exists between the En Banc and its divisions, and to rule otherwise would distort the tribunal's structure and contradict established jurisprudence.

Kepco further recognized that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 against a CTA Division's ruling must be filed directly with the Court, not with the CTA En Banc, as certiorari is an independent action that requires review by a higher tribunal, not the same court whose ruling is being questioned, thus:

Instead, what remained as a remedy for the petitioner was to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, which could have been filed as an original action before this Court and not before the CTA En Banc. Certiorari is available when there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, such as in the case at bar. Since the petition below invoked the gross and palpable negligence of petitioner's counsel which is allegedly tantamount to its being deprived of due process and its day in court as party-litigant and, as it also invokes lack of jurisdiction of the CTA First Division to entertain the petition filed by private respondent since the same allegedly fails to comply with the reglementary periods for judicial remedies involving administrative claims for refund of excess unutilized input VAT under the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), which periods it claims to be jurisdictional, then the proper remedy that petitioner should have availed of was indeed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, an original or independent action premised on the public respondent having acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction. However, since a certiorari petition is not a continuation of the appellate process borne out of the original case but is a separate action focused on actions that are in excess or wanting of jurisdiction, then it cannot be filed in the same tribunal whose actions are being assailed but is instead cognizable by a higher tribunal which, in the case of the CTA, is this Court. In the case involving petitioner, the petition could have been filed directly with this Court, even without any need to file a motion for reconsideration with the CTA division or En Banc, as the case appears to fall under one of the recognized exceptions to the rule requiring such a motion as a prerequisite to filing such petition.30 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

While the CTA En Banc may reverse or modify the decisions of the CTA Divisions, this authority does not contradict the principle that they are co-equal components of the same court. The CTA En Banc's appellate jurisdiction over the judgment of the CTA Division stems not from a position of superiority but from its role as a specialized tribunal with expertise in tax and customs cases. The CTA is dedicated exclusively to the study and consideration of revenue-related problems and has necessarily developed an expertise on the subject.31

Given the complexity of tax laws and the technical nature of tax assessments, the CTA En Banc review mechanism ensures uniformity and consistency in tax adjudication by providing an additional layer of scrutiny within the same tribunal. This is in line with the legislative intent behind Republic Act No. 9282, which sought to streamline tax appeals and reduce the backlog in the CA by directing tax-related appeals to the CTA En Banc. The CTA En Banc's power to review a division's judgment does not transform it into a higher court, as the CTA En Banc is merely exercising its appellate function as prescribed by the law.

In support of the proposition that the CTA En Banc and the CTA Divisions were intended to function as separate and distinct courts, attention has been drawn to the following excerpts from the House of Representatives Committee Hearing relative to the passage of Republic Act No. 9282. These excerpts have been interpreted to justify the CTA En Banc' s exercise of certiorari jurisdiction over interlocutory orders of the CTA Divisions. One such exchange from then CTA Presiding Judge Ernesto D. Acosta reads:

However, the terminology used in the above exchange is ambiguous. It refers to "appeal" being taken to the CTA En Banc on the ground of "abuse of discretion." However, such a ground is not ordinarily associated with appeals but with petitions for certiorari. The use of the term "appeal" in that context appears to be imprecise. It conflates two conceptually and procedurally distinct remedies—appeals from final judgments and original certiorari proceedings under Rule 65.

A similar point arises from the remarks of Representative Exequiel B. Javier, a co-author of the bill:

... Under my bill, of course, once the Court of Tax Appeals is constituted as a collegiate court with 9 divisions, the appeal will go to the Court of Appeals on questions of fact, questions of law and so forth. Of course, only questions of law will be elevated to the Supreme Court. But I understand that, according to Judge Acosta, who is the presiding judge of the Court of Tax Appeals, we may have to eliminate the appeal to the Court of Appeals because it's quite illogical that a collegiate court with an expertise on tax matters... tax matters so they appealed to the Court of Appeals and no offense to Justice Agcaoili. The Court of Appeals is a court of general appellate jurisdiction under all cases. So it not also help [sic] de-clog the dockets of the Court of Appeals. So the appeal would be from the division of the Court of Tax Appeals to the Court of [Tax] Appeals [en banc] and whatever decision [en banc] reaches then it goes to the Supreme Court for appeal on [certiorari] only on three grounds. Abuse of discretion, serious errors of facts and question of law.33 (Emphasis supplied)

The foregoing statement cannot be read as establishing doctrinal authority for the view that the CTA En Banc and the CTA Divisions were intended to be institutionally separate courts. The clear thrust of the exchange concerns the re-routing of appeals. It reflects the intent of Congress to reorganize the CTA as a collegiate court, composed of multiple Divisions, with the CTA En Banc acting as an internal reviewing body in place of the CA. The statement that "appeals would be coursed through the Court of Tax Appeals en banc" pertains to appellate review of final decisions, not to the creation of independent courts within the same institution.

There is no language in the Committee Hearing indicating that Congress viewed the CTA Division and the CTA En Banc as institutionally independent courts. On the contrary, the deliberations point to a single specialized court, structured internally into Divisions and En Banc for functional efficiency. To infer otherwise from generalized remarks is to read more into the record than its text or context permits.

In sum, the legislative deliberations do not support the proposition that the CTA En Banc was meant to exercise certiorari jurisdiction over interlocutory orders issued by the CTA Division. What they confirm is the realignment of appellate functions and the desire for review of final judgments within the CTA before proceeding to the Court. There is no indication that Congress intended to create two distinct courts within the CTA. What the deliberations instead reveal is a structural realignment such that appeals from CTA Divisions, which would previously have been brought to the CA, were to be resolved by the CTA En Banc to promote judicial specialization and efficiency in tax adjudication.

Policy concerns and implications of extending certiorari jurisdiction to the CTA En Banc over interlocutory orders issued by the CTA Divisions

The rationale advanced in favor of allowing the CTA En Banc to issue writs of certiorari against interlocutory orders of the CTA Divisions is to prevent "split jurisdiction," where one court resolves the appeal in the main case (the CTA En Banc) while another rules on procedural incidents (the Supreme Court). It was argued that this arrangement would result in inefficiency, delay, and increased litigation costs.

However, these concerns are more apparent than real. To my mind, there has been no showing of any failure in the current system that would justify a change. The present framework ensures both judicial hierarchy and procedural order. When interlocutory orders arise, a Rule 65 petition may be filed with the Court, which carefully applies the standard of grave abuse of discretion. In the meantime, proceedings before the CTA Division continue. Given that a Rule 65 petition does not automatically stay the trial, this setup discourages dilatory tactics while preserving the Court's ability to intervene where necessary. In this way, appellate review before the CTA En Banc is reserved for completed records, and interlocutory order challenges remain confined to questions as to whether there is grave abuse of discretion.

In any case, the fear of split jurisdiction is dispelled by the well-settled doctrine that an "[a]ppeal renders superfluous a pending petition for certiorari, and mandates its dismissal."34 In Enriquez v. Rivera,35 the Court held that by the plain terms of Section 1, Rule 65, certiorari cannot be granted where there is an appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It further explained that to persevere in the pursuit of the writ would be to engage in an enterprise which is unnecessary, tautological, and frowned upon by the law.(awÞhi( This principle was echoed more recently in Guialani v. Court of Appeals,36 where the Court affirmed that once an appeal is filed, the earlier Rule 65 petition "has ceased to be legally viable."37

Furthermore, while I fully recognize the importance of procedural coherence and administrative efficiency in the judicial process, these policy considerations, however compelling they may appear, cannot override the jurisdictional boundaries established by law and settled jurisprudence. Judicial efficiency cannot justify jurisdictional overreach. Indeed, the Court already recognized that petitions for certiorari against interlocutory orders of the CTA Division should be brought directly before the Court. Allowing the CTA En Banc to assume original certiorari jurisdiction over interlocutory orders issued by the CTA Division would amount to a judicial reallocation of power that properly belongs to the legislature.

In fact, as I see it, any change in the current structure invites a number of complications.

First, if an interlocutory order is made subject to certiorari before the CTA En Banc, it will overburden the CTA En Banc. The CTA En Banc was not designed to function as a court of first instance for procedural disputes arising during trial. Its role is to serve as the appellate body for final judgments38 issued by the CTA Divisions. Rather than fostering efficiency, the proposed change risks congestion of cases.

Second, allowing the CTA En Banc to resolve interlocutory orders during trial creates a risk of prejudgment. In the ordinary course, the CTA En Banc reviews the final decision of a CTA Division only after trial has concluded. However, if the CTA En Banc is permitted to take cognizance of petitions for certiorari while the main case is still pending before the CTA Division, it will become involved in the proceedings before the factual and legal issues have been resolved. Then, once the CTA Division issues its final judgment, the same case may be elevated to the CTA En Banc again on appeal. The result is that the CTA En Banc may effectively be asked to review legal or procedural issues it has already addressed in a different capacity. This creates at least the appearance that the CTA En Banc is no longer a neutral arbiter, but a tribunal with a prior stake in the outcome. That appearance alone may compromise confidence in the fairness of appellate review.

The concern becomes even more serious in light of the CTA's institutional composition. The CTA is a collegial body of nine Justices, and any given Division is composed of three of those same Members. If a petition for certiorari challenges an interlocutory order issued by a CTA Division, and the same three justices later sit in the CTA En Banc to resolve the petition, the CTA En Banc is placed in the uncomfortable position of assessing its own conduct. In effect, the CTA En Banc may be asked to determine whether a ruling issued by one of its own Divisions—comprised of its own Members—was arbitrary or issued with grave abuse of discretion.

Thus, there is no legal basis and no demonstrated necessity to reinterpret the appellate jurisdiction of the CTA En Banc as carrying with it the power to exercise original jurisdiction over Rule 65 petition involving interlocutory orders issued by its own Division.

On the proper process for seeking reconsideration of interlocutory orders issued by the CTA Division

Given the foregoing, it is also essential to highlight the proper process for challenging interlocutory orders issued by a CTA Division, particularly on whether a motion for reconsideration should first be filed, and whether such a motion should be brought before the CTA Division or the CTA En Banc.

Under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioners must be able to show, among others, that they do not have any other "plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law" before a petition for certiorari can prosper.

Thus, a petition for certiorari is available only when there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Relevantly, a motion for reconsideration is recognized as an adequate remedy against a decision, resolution, or order of a lower court, as it provides the court the opportunity to correct any error it might have committed. The availability of the remedy of reconsideration generally precludes immediate recourse to a certiorari petition.39 Jurisprudence is replete with decisions which reiterate that before filing a petition for certiorari in a higher court, the attention of the lower court should first be called to its supposed error and its correction should be sought. Failing this, the petition for certiorari should be denied.40

In line with this, it becomes necessary to determine the proper forum before which a motion for reconsideration must be filed.

Except for the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), which is uniquely governed by an express constitutional provision directing COMELEC En Banc to resolve motions for reconsideration rendered by COMELEC Divisions,41 the fundamental rule is that a motion for reconsideration must be filed before the same court or tribunal that issued the order or ruling.42 The reason for this is to afford the issuing court the opportunity to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it through a re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case.43 This principle is firmly rooted in our procedural system and applies squarely to the CTA Divisions.

In the context of the CTA, this means that a motion for reconsideration directed at an interlocutory order issued by a CTA Division must be addressed to the CTA Division that rendered the ruling, not the CTA En Banc. It is the CTA Division that rendered the questioned order, and therefore it is the only proper body that can meaningfully revisit and, if warranted, modify its ruling. To allow the elevation of the matter to the CTA En Banc on motion for reconsideration would be to bypass the requirement of first exhausting remedies before the issuing court, in this case, the CTA Division that rendered the ruling involving an interlocutory order.

Further, a plain reading of Section 18 of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended by Republic Act No. 9282 reveals that a motion for reconsideration shall still be resolved by the CTA Division. The CTA En Banc will only take cognizance of the matter if the same is appealable, and the aggrieved party did so by petition for review. The entire provision is restated thus:

SECTION 18. Appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc. — No civil proceeding involving matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code, the Tariff and Customs Code or the Local Government Code shall be maintained, except as herein provided, until and unless an appeal has been previously filed with the CTA and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

A party adversely affected by a resolution of a Division of the CTA on a motion for reconsideration or new trial, may file a petition for review with the CTA en banc. (Emphasis supplied)

The foregoing provision is clear—the jurisdiction of the CTA En Banc is limited. The law permits a petition for review only from a resolution of a CTA Division issued on a motion for reconsideration or new trial. To my mind, this presupposes that the resolution being reviewed is final in nature, typically disposing of the substantive issues in the case. It does not speak of interlocutory orders, which do not finally dispose of the case, but leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits.44

Moreover, the law authorizes a petition for review as the proper remedy to the CTA En Banc and not a motion for reconsideration. It does not mention filing a motion for reconsideration with the CTA En Banc from a ruling of the CTA Division, nor does it permit such a remedy by implication. Instead, it clearly outlines that the only procedural vehicle by which a party may bring a case before the CTA En Banc from the CTA Division is through a petition for review.

To interpret Section 18 of Republic Act No. 9282 as allowing interlocutory orders to be reviewed by the CTA En Banc on a motion for reconsideration would be to read into the law a remedy that was not granted. Such a reading would improperly expand the appellate jurisdiction of the CTA En Banc beyond the scope allowed by statute, which only Congress may define. It would effectively create a nonexistent appellate layer by allowing the CTA En Banc to act as a reviewing body even in the absence of a final judgment, which is contrary to the limited and specific appellate jurisdiction granted to it by statute.

Given the statutory text and structure, interlocutory orders issued by a CTA Division must first be subject of a motion for reconsideration before the CTA Division that issued them, as the alleged error pertains to that Division. Only after the denial of the motion for reconsideration before the CTA Division may an aggrieved party challenge the ruling of the CTA Division before the Court through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Any attempt to involve the CTA En Banc in the reconsideration of interlocutory rulings departs from established rules of procedure.

I acknowledge the ruling in People of the Philippines v. Court of Tax Appeals-Third Division, Jacinto C. Ligot and Erlinda Y Ligot45 (Ligot) which held that the CTA En Banc has jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 challenging the CTA Division's judgment of acquittal. Section 2(f), Rule 4 of the RRCTA states that it is the CTA En Banc which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions, resolutions or orders of the CTA Division involving criminal offenses arising from violations of the NIRC, among others:

At first blush, it might seem that Ligot is inconsistent with CBK and the conclusion reached in the present case. However, a closer examination reveals that Ligot does not contradict CBK, as Ligot pertains specifically to a judgment of acquittal, which is fundamentally different from the interlocutory orders at issue in CBK and the present case.

In our jurisdiction, we adhere to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, which holds that a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. This doctrine is rooted in the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy. The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions, which are: (1) where there has been deprivation of due process and where there is a finding of a mistrial, or (2) where there has been a grave abuse of discretion under exceptional circumstances. Thus, a judgment of acquittal may only be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.46

Thus, in Ligot, where the assailed ruling was a judgment of acquittal issued by the CTA Division, the proper remedy was indeed a petition for certiorari filed before the CTA En Banc rather than directly with the Court. This is because the CTA En Banc has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final rulings of CTA Divisions in criminal tax cases. As such, it follows that the CTA En Banc may issue a writ of certiorari in cases where a judgment of acquittal by the CTA Division was rendered in excess of jurisdiction.

The ruling in Ligot does not apply to the present case, as the resolutions assailed here are merely interlocutory orders issued by the CTA Division. As established in CBK, it is the Court—not the CTA En Banc— that has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari challenging interlocutory orders of CTA Divisions. The fundamental distinction between Ligot, CBK, and the present case is that Ligot involved a final judgment of acquittal, while CBK and the present case concern interlocutory orders that do not finally dispose of the case.

As pointed out by CTA Associate Justice Jean Marie A. Bacorro-Villena in her Concurring Opinion in the proceedings below, the proper reading of Ligot is that the CTA En Banc's jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is confined to cases involving final judgments or orders of a CTA Division that cannot be appealed before the CTA En Banc, such as judgments of acquittal in criminal tax cases.47 However, the same rationale does not extend to interlocutory orders, where the main case continues and remains subject to appeal before the CTA En Banc.

Given the foregoing, there is no reason to depart from the established rulings in CBK, Kepco, and subsequent cases, which confirm that it is the Court which has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari against interlocutory orders of the CTA Divisions. Likewise, there is no basis to extend Grecia-Cuerdo to justify granting the CTA En Banc certiorari jurisdiction over the interlocutory orders issued by CTA Divisions.

In sum, I concur with the conclusion that the CTA En Banc cannot be granted the authority to take cognizance of petitions for certiorari involving interlocutory orders issued by the CTA Divisions, as doing so would disregard the collegiate nature of the CTA. A writ of certiorari is meant to keep the lower courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction, and the CTA Divisions are not lower courts in relation to the CTA En Banc. To hold otherwise would contradict the specialized appeal structure envisioned by Republic Act No. 9282.