G.R. No. 271701 - Dissenting Opinion

G.R. No. 271701, May 6, 2025,
♦ Decision, Zalameda, [J]
♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Leonen, [J]
♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Caguioa, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Lazaro-Javier, [J]
♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Inting, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Lopez, [J]

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, PETITIONER,
vs.
NIPPON EXPRESS PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.

I agree with the finding that the present petition for review on certiorari1 is already moot.2 The records bear out that the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) Division promulgated its Decision on September 28, 2023, which denied the petition for review filed by respondent Nippon Express, Inc.3 Subsequently, in a Resolution dated January 29, 2024, the CTA Division denied the respondent's motion for reconsideration.4 With the final resolution of the main case before the CTA Division, the present petition, which assails an interlocutory order, has indeed been rendered moot.

However, I must respectfully register my dissent from the majority's core ruling: that the jurisdiction of the CTA En Banc is strictly appellate, that it cannot issue a writ of certiorari against an interlocutory order of a CTA Division, and that the exercise of such power is precluded by the absence of a hierarchical relationship.

With due respect, the majority's reasoning is built on an untenable legal premise, misconstrues the very nature of the CTA's judicial power, and creates a procedural framework that is both inefficient and contrary to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

The CTA En Banc's Certiorari Power is an Inherent Component of its Judicial Power and Appellate Jurisdiction.

It is undisputed that the CTA En Banc has appellate jurisdiction over decisions, resolutions, or orders of its Divisions under Section 2, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals (RRCTA):

It is equally settled that interlocutory orders are not subject to appeal. However, Section 1,5 Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. Given that Rule 65 is the exclusive remedy for challenging a non-appealable interlocutory order, the inquiry necessarily shifts to jurisdiction. The critical question is: which court has jurisdiction over such a petition against an interlocutory order of a CTA Division?

Despite the CTA En Banc's clear appellate jurisdiction over decisions, resolutions, or orders of its divisions, the ponencia opined that it does not have certiorari jurisdiction over the interlocutory orders of its divisions. The ponencia posits that because the law creating the CTA does not expressly grant the CTA En Banc certiorari jurisdiction over interlocutory orders of a CTA Division, such power does not exist.6 This interpretation, with respect, is unduly narrow.

The power to issue a writ of certiorari is not a mere statutory creation; it is a constitutional grant. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution unequivocally vests courts with judicial power not only to settle actual controversies but also "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."

Stated differently, the power to review for grave abuse of discretion—the very essence of certiorari—is inherent in judicial power itself. As the CTA En Banc is a court of law established by statute, it is vested with this fundamental power. To deny the CTA En Banc the power to correct a grave abuse of discretion by one of its Divisions simply because the words "certiorari jurisdiction" are absent from its enabling act and the RRCTA is to deny it a fundamental judicial power that emanates not from the statute, but from the Constitution itself.

Moreover, as aptly pointed out by Our esteemed colleague, Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, a court or judicial officer vested with appellate jurisdiction may employ all auxiliary writs, processes, and other means necessary to carry it into effect. Thus, it can be reasonably inferred that the vesture of exclusive jurisdiction to the CTA En Banc over decisions, resolutions, or orders of its divisions "carries with it such other power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, to the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, including the authority to issue writs of certiorari."7

Compelling jurisprudence already recognizes and affirms the CTA En Banc's certiorari jurisdiction over its Divisions' actions, whether interlocutory or final, particularly when such jurisdiction is in aid of its appellate power.

The landmark case of City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo8 specifically recognized the CTA En Banc's inherent power to issue writs of certiorari against interlocutory orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in aid of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions of RTCs in local tax cases:

Considering that aggrieved parties have a right to appeal final orders or judgments of the CTA Divisions to the CTA En Banc, the certiorari power over interlocutory orders of the divisions logically follows.

Indeed, in Garcia v. De Jesus10 and Dept. of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica,11 the Court held that the grant of appellate jurisdiction does not immediately carry with it the grant of certiorari jurisdiction; however, this doctrine finds no application to a judicial body such as the CTA En Banc.

In Garcia, the Court held that the COMELEC does not have the power to issue writs of certiorari over interlocutory orders of the RTCs despite its appellate jurisdiction over electoral contests concerning municipal and barangay officials.12 It must be noted, however, that the pivotal reason for this ruling is that while the COMELEC exercises quasi-judicial powers, it is neither a judicial tribunal13 nor a "superior court" vis-à-vis the RTC, considering that RTCs have jurisdiction to review the actions taken by the COMELEC in criminal prosecutions for violations of election laws.14

Similarly, in Lubrica, the Court held that the grant of original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), a quasi-judicial agency, is not implied, viz.:

In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency. The grant of original jurisdiction on a quasi-judicial agency is not implied. There is no question that the legislative grant of adjudicatory powers upon the DAR, as in all other quasi-judicial agencies, bodies and tribunals, is in the nature of a limited and special jurisdiction, that is, the authority to hear and determine a class of cases within the DAR's competence and field of expertise. In conferring adjudicatory powers and functions on the DAR, the legislature could not have intended to create a regular court of justice out of the DARAB, equipped with all the vast powers inherent in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The DARAB is only a quasi-judicial body, whose limited jurisdiction does not include authority over petitions for certiorari, in the absence of an express grant in R.A. No. 6657, E.O. No. 229 and E.O. No. 129-A.15 (Emphasis supplied; citation omitted)

Evidently, the power to review grave abuse of discretion—the very essence of certiorari jurisdiction—is strictly a judicial power. The 1987 Constitution vests this power exclusively in the Court and the lower courts established by law. Consequently, this power cannot be wielded by quasi-judicial agencies such as the COMELEC and the DARAB, which belong to the Executive branch.

In sharp contrast to the COMELEC and the DARAB, the CTA En Banc is a judicial tribunal vested with inherent judicial powers. Therefore, its power to issue writs of certiorari is undeniable, rendering the established doctrine in Garcia and Lubrica inapplicable to the case at bar.

The Supreme Court's ruling in People of the Philippines v. Court of Tax Appeals – Third Division (Ligot)16 unequivocally establishes that the CTA En Banc has jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari against a judgment of acquittal issued by its Division.17 If the CTA En Banc can review a final and unappealable judgment of acquittal via certiorari (an extraordinary remedy for jurisdictional error), there is no logical or principled reason why it cannot review interlocutory orders of its Divisions which, as Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court expressly states, are subject to a Rule 65 petition. The distinction drawn by the majority is arbitrary and lacks basis in the consistent application of the Rules of Court and established jurisprudence.

The stance of the majority of the Court leads to an illogical splitting of certiorari jurisdiction over non-appealable orders or judgments of the CTA Divisions: final judgments of CTA Divisions alleged to be tainted by grave abuse would be brought to the CTA En Banc, while interlocutory orders also alleged to be attended by grave abuse would bypass the CTA En Banc and proceed directly to the Court.

As held in Grecia-Cuerdo, the splitting of jurisdiction between two judicial bodies over basically the same subject matter is anathema to the orderly administration of justice, to wit:

If this Court were to sustain petitioners' contention that jurisdiction over their certiorari petition lies with the CA, this Court would be confirming the exercise by two judicial bodies, the CA and the CTA, of jurisdiction over basically the same subject matter — precisely the split-jurisdiction situation which is anathema to the orderly administration of justice. The Court cannot accept that such was the legislative motive, especially considering that the law expressly confers on the CTA, the tribunal with the specialized competence over tax and tariff matters, the role of judicial review over local tax cases without mention of any other court that may exercise such power. Thus, the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that since appellate jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint for tax refund is vested in the CTA, it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the same court. To rule otherwise would lead to an absurd situation where one court decides an appeal in the main case while another court rules on an incident in the very same case.18 (Emphasis supplied; citation omitted)

To deprive the CTA En Banc of its certiorari powers with respect to interlocutory orders of its Divisions is not only procedurally inefficient but also violative of the well-established doctrine of hierarchy of courts. The principle of judicial hierarchy dictates that recourse must be had to the CTA En Banc first before allowing the invocation of the Court's certiorari jurisdiction.19

The CTA En Banc, as the immediate reviewing body for its Divisions, is the proper forum for addressing jurisdictional errors and grave abuses of discretion, regardless of whether they arise from an interlocutory order or a final judgment. To mandate direct recourse to the Court for interlocutory matters would unduly burden the Court and disregard the CTA's own internal appellate mechanism.

A closer examination of the cases cited by the ponencia, i.e., Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Kepco Ilijan Corp.20 and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals and CBK Power Company Limited,21 suggests that these precedents may not be squarely applicable to the precise issue at hand.22

The statement in Kepco that there is "no hierarchy within a collegial court"23 was an obiter dictum.

The Kepco ruling hinged on the silence of the laws creating the CTA and expanding its jurisdiction (Republic Act Nos. 1125 and 9282), as well as the RRCTA, regarding the CTA En Banc's power to set aside a final and executory judgment of its division via Rule 47 of the Rules of Court on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, an extraordinary remedy that carves an exception to the doctrine of immutability of judgment, should be strictly construed.

The Court's statement in Kepco that "there can be no hierarchy within a collegial court between its divisions and the en banc,"24 was, respectfully, an obiter dictum as it is not essential to the core ruling on the unavailability of a Rule 47 petition. As such, it lacks the binding force of stare decisis .25

Furthermore, a key point of distinction in Kepco is its analogy between the CTA En Banc, the Court En Banc, and the CA En Banc. This comparison is not precise as the Court and the CA En Banc do exercise appellate jurisdiction over their respective divisions, whereas the CTA En Banc was granted an adjudicatory function26 and appellate jurisdiction over resolutions of its divisions on a motion for reconsideration or new trial.27 The CTA En Banc's appellate jurisdiction establishes a clear hierarchy of review within the CTA itself, where the CTA sitting en banc acts as a reviewing body for its Divisions. This fundamental difference renders the comparison made in Kepco untenable.

Similarly, the ponencia's reliance on CBK Power may warrant a more nuanced interpretation.

The statement in CBK Power, that "the CTA en banc has jurisdiction over final order or judgment but not over interlocutory orders issued by the CTA in division"28 is based on an incomplete interpretation of Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

For context, the private respondent in CBK Power argued that the proper remedy to assail the order declaring petitioner in default issued by the CTA division is a petition for review to the CTA en banc. Ruling in the negative, the Court explained that a petition for review under the RRCTA is akin to appeals in courts of general jurisdiction; thus:

While the Court correctly held in CBK Power that a petition for review is unavailable for interlocutory orders, its reasoning did not fully account for the explicit qualifying clause in the last paragraph of the same rule: "[i]n all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65." This crucial last paragraph demonstrates that non-appealability is not synonymous with being unreviewable. Instead, the Rules of Court provides a distinct and specific remedy for such non-appealable orders—a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.

Given that subsequent rulings have been built upon these precedents, it is imperative for the Court to re-examine them now to prevent the perpetuation of a procedural framework that is at odds with the constitutional grant of judicial power. To continue down this path is to disregard the clear import of Grecia-Cuerdo, which affirmed that the grant of appellate jurisdiction carries with it the power to issue a writ of certiorari when necessary in aid of such jurisdiction. The logic is inescapable: if the CTA En Banc has appellate jurisdiction over the final orders of its Divisions, it must also have the certiorari power over their interlocutory orders to make its appellate jurisdiction effective.

The ponencia insists that there can be no hierarchy within a collegial court, and thus, the CTA En Banc cannot exercise supervisory correction over its Divisions.30 This view is overly simplistic and ignores the functional reality of the CTA's structure as intended by the legislature.

While the CTA Divisions and the En Banc constitute a single judicial entity, they are organized to facilitate a clear division of labor and an internal process of review. The very raison d'être of the CTA En Banc is to act as a reviewing body for the decisions or resolutions of the Divisions. As then Senate President Franklin M. Drilon articulated during the deliberations for Republic Act No. 9282, the CTA En Banc was created to ensure "less divisive rulings on tax matters"; thus:

Mr. President, another important feature of this measure is that appeals from decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals are no longer appealable to the Court of Appeals. Under the modified appeal procedure, the decision of a division of the Court of Tax Appeals may be appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals en banc. The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals en banc may in turn be directly appealed to the Supreme Court only on a question of law. This is expected to facilitate court proceedings in tax cases since the Court of Tax Appeals has admittedly the necessary expertise in tax matters. Moreover, there will be less divisive rulings on tax matters since appeal shall be made only to the Court of Tax Appeals en banc instead of the Court of Appeals with its many divisions. 31

Evidently, an internal review structure was created within the CTA to allow the CTA En Banc to review the rulings of its Divisions, specifically to ensure "less divisive rulings on tax matters." In other words, the CTA En Banc was established precisely to maintain consistency in court rulings on tax matters. Surely, this consistency was not solely aimed at final orders but logically extends to interim rulings, such as denials of motions to dismiss, motions to lift default orders, or demurrers to evidence. This legislative intent establishes a functional hierarchy where the En Banc is designed to oversee and correct the rulings of the Divisions to ensure consistency and correctness.

The power of the En Banc to review and reverse final judgments of the Divisions is the ultimate exercise of this functional superiority. It is therefore illogical in the extreme to suggest that a body empowered to overturn the final outcome of a case is somehow incapable of addressing and correcting a grave procedural error in an interlocutory order that could lead to a fundamentally flawed process. To deny the CTA En Banc this power is akin to arguing that the Court can reverse a final, erroneous judgment from a lower court on appeal but cannot issue a writ of certiorari to correct a grave abuse of discretion in an interlocutory order that deprived a party of due process. An unchecked interlocutory order, such as one improperly denying a motion to lift an order of default, can cause irreparable harm that cannot be remedied on final appeal.

The ponencia expresses concern with justices sitting in review of their own actions, a situation contrary to the principle of nemo debet esse judex in propria causa (the nemo judex principle).32 This concern, while valid in principle, is misplaced here.

The very structure of the CTA, as amended by Republic Act No. 9282, was deliberately designed by Congress for the CTA En Banc to perform a review function over its divisions. Section 233 of Republic Act No. 9282, first establishes the court's dual structure, allowing it to sit en banc or in divisions. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9282, amending Section 18 of Republic Act No. 1125, then defines the relationship between them, granting the En Banc the specific power to act on petitions for review filed against a Division's resolution on a motion for reconsideration or new trial, to wit:

This clear statutory path confirms that Congress intentionally designed the CTA En Banc to perform a vital check on the actions of its Divisions. Notably, the phrase "resolution of a Division of the CTA on a motion for reconsideration or new trial" makes no distinction whatsoever between final orders that completely dispose of a case and interlocutory orders that resolve incidental matters. This broad, unqualified grant of jurisdiction signifies the legislative intent for the CTA En Banc to act as a comprehensive review mechanism. By empowering the CTA En Banc to review all decisions or resolutions of a Division (upon the filing of a motion for reconsideration), the legislature has institutionalized a seamless, two-tiered adjudicative process within a single court. This structure is fundamentally at odds with the premise of the principle of nemo judex.

This two-tiered adjudicative process is determinative. The legislative intent was not to create three separate and independent courts but a single, collegial CTA that operates in two tiers: the Division level for initial adjudication and the En Banc level for appellate review. The "cause" before the CTA En Banc is not the Division's "own cause" in the sense contemplated by the maxim. Rather, it is the exercise of an appellate mandate conferred by law upon the Court as a single, unified judicial body. Applying the nemo judex principle in this context would not only contravene the plain language of Republic Act No. 9282 but would also paralyze the CTA and render its prescribed judicial structure meaningless.

The position that En Banc review by fellow Justices would "erode the principle of collegiality"34 and turn "judicial dialogue into judicial surveillance"35 is, with all due respect, a fundamental mischaracterization of the nature of a collegial court.

Collegiality is not synonymous with passive unanimity or an absence of disagreement. On the contrary, the strength of a multi-member court lies precisely in the crucible of intellectual debate, mutual scrutiny, and the challenging of judicial reasoning among its members. This internal dynamic is what refines legal arguments, uncovers overlooked facts, and ensures that the final decision is robust, well-reasoned, and legally sound. It is the very engine of judicial excellence.

Far from fostering a "climate of internal scrutiny and distrust,"36 this process embodies true judicial dialogue. It is a testament to the institutional maturity and intellectual humility of the Justices, who accept that their reasoning at the Division level is subject to further review and refinement by the court as a whole. This is not "surveillance"; it is collaboration. It is not "distrust;" it is a shared commitment to the administration of justice. The ultimate loyalty of every Justice is not to their own previously-held opinion, but to the law and to justice itself. The En Banc review process is the ultimate expression of that collective loyalty.

To conclude, applying the nemo judex maxim would dismantle the very legal structure the legislature created for the CTA. The legislative mandate is clear and its jurisdictional grant is broad; the internal procedural safeguards are effective; and the philosophical foundation of collegiality supports, rather than condemns, this form of internal review.(awÞhi( When the CTA En Banc reviews a ruling from one of its Divisions—whether final or interlocutory—it is not a separate entity judging another. Rather, it is the court in its highest form, employing a statutorily designed, two-tiered process to refine and perfect its own work. This is not an act of self-interest, which the nemo judex principle prohibits; it is an act of institutional integrity, which the law demands. The system is designed to promote the highest standards of judicial review within a specialized field, and it should be allowed to function as the legislature intended.

Direct Recourse to the Supreme Court is Procedurally Unsound and Violates the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts

The ponencia's ultimate conclusion—that petitions for certiorari against interlocutory orders of a CTA Division must be filed directly with this Court37—is a direct assault on the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

As the Court emphatically declared in GIOS-SAMAR, Inc. vs. Dept. of Transportation and Communications, et al.,38 this doctrine is "not mere policy[;] rather, it is a constitutional filtering mechanism designed to enable the Court to focus on the more fundamental and essential tasks assigned to it by the highest law of the land."39 Its purpose is to prevent the inundation of the Court's dockets and to allow the Court to focus on the essential tasks of resolving novel constitutional questions and settling significant issues of law.

Mandating that all petitions assailing interlocutory orders of the CTA Divisions be brought directly to the Court would create the very evil the doctrine seeks to avoid. It would force the Court to micromanage the trial proceedings of a specialized court, opening our docket to a flood of petitions questioning every interlocutory order by the Divisions of the CTA. This leads to the absurd and inefficient splitting of jurisdiction, where the CTA En Banc reviews final judgments while this Court reviews the interlocutory incidents of the very same case—precisely the "split-jurisdiction situation which is anathema to the orderly administration of justice" that the Court condemned in Grecia-Cuerdo.

This is not the first time the Court has been called upon to clarify a procedural pathway to prevent such jurisdictional confusion. In the landmark case of St. Martin Funeral Home v. National Labor Relations Commission,40 the Court was confronted with a similar procedural gaffe in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which created an illogical and impracticable appellate route from the NLRC. Recognizing the imperative need for expeditious action and the fact that the Court is not a trier of facts, the Court decisively intervened:

The instant case presents a perfect parallel. The ponencia, in effect, creates a procedural anomaly as disruptive as the one corrected in St. Martin. Instead of an unsound jurisdictional leap to this Court, the Court should follow the wisdom of St. Martin.

The judicial policy is clear: the Court will not entertain direct resort to it when redress can be obtained in the appropriate courts, both to preserve our precious time and to avoid the delays inherent in remanding cases. The CTA En Banc, as the immediate reviewing body for its Divisions, is the proper and most efficient forum for addressing jurisdictional errors. It is the constitutional filter that stands between the Divisions of the CTA and the Court. To bypass it is to violate a fundamental principle of our judicial structure. This case is an opportunity to provide clear, prospective guidance and definitively declare that the proper recourse against an interlocutory order of a CTA Division is a petition for certiorari with the CTA En Banc.

For the foregoing reasons, while I concur that the petition must be dismissed for being moot, I dissent from the ponencia's restrictive reasoning that, in my view, unduly limits the CTA En Banc and undermines the orderly administration of justice and the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.