DISSENTING OPINION
CAGUIOA, J.:
I respectfully disagree with the ponencia in finding petitioner Hector Aguirre Casidsid (Hector), then the Barangay Chairperson of Barangay Yapak, Boracay Island, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 48(9), in relation to Section 37, Republic Act No. 9003,1 otherwise known as the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000.
To recall, the Information filed against Hector charged him with committing the crime in the following manner:
"That on or about the 16th day of March 2012, and . . . sometime prior and subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Malay, Province of Aklan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above named accused HECTOR CASIDSID, a public officer, being the Barangay Captain of Barangay Yapak, Boracay Island, Municipality of Malay, Province of Aklan, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, taking advantage of his official functions, with deliberate intent, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally establish, operate and use an open clump site on a parcel of land owned by Leo Neil G. Tirol in Sitio Ilig-Iligan, Barangay Yapak, Boracay Island, Municipality of Malay, Province of Aklan, and dumped therein mixed garbage and solid wastes without the knowledge and consent of the owner, to the damage and prejudice of the environment, Leo Neil G. Tirol and the public service.
CONTRARY TO LAW."2 (Emphasis supplied)
The case stemmed from a Complaint-Affidavit filed by private complainant Leo Neil G. Tirol (Leo) before the Office of the Ombudsman, alleging that a substantial portion of his titled property was being used as a dump site without his consent. Leo claimed that the property had become uninhabitable, had substantially depreciated in value, and could no longer be used without health risks due to the dumping and burning of garbage on the site. The Office of the Ombudsman found Hector administratively liable for simple misconduct and, in the same proceedings, found probable cause to indict him for violation of Republic Act No. 9003.3
Hector denied criminal liability. He claimed that it was D.M. Consunji, Inc. (DMCI), a private entity, that was responsible for the dumping pursuant to an arrangement with Roberto Tirol, whom he described as a co-owner of the property.4
The Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) nonetheless convicted Hector, ruling that Republic Act No. 9003 penalizes the use, establishment, or operation of an open dump site, and that Hector remained liable even if a private entity dumped the garbage because he did nothing to prohibit, disallow, or discontinue DMCI's garbage disposal activities.
The Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the MCTC's Judgment and findings of fact, holding that the totality of the circumstances showed that the barangay used the property as a dump site.
The ponencia sustains the conviction on the view that Hector allowed the operation of the dump site and effectively admitted this in his Reply-Counter Affidavit before the Office of the Ombudsman.5
I totally disagree with the foregoing ruling. There is simply not enough evidence to prove Hector's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The courts a quo relied more on presumptions and inferences drawn from his position as barangay captain than on proof of the specific acts punished by the statute.
Hector's guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
As a rule, questions of fact are proscribed in Rule 45 petitions. A question of fact exists when doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the resolution of the issue raised requires a calibration of the whole evidence. As a trier of laws, the Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh anew the evidence already considered in the proceedings below.6 As an exception, however, the Court may resort to a factual inquiry in case the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures,7 as in this case. For this reason, the Court should give due course to the Petition and re-examine the evidence on record.
Proceeding to the substantive issue, Sections 37, 48, and 49 of Republic Act No. 9003 provide, thus:
Section 37. Prohibition Against the Use of Open Dumps for Solid Waste. – No open dumps shall be established and operated, nor any practice or disposal of solid waste by any person, including LGUs, which constitutes the use of open dumps for solid waste, be allowed after the effectivity of this Act: Provided, That within three (3) years after the effectivity of this Act, every LGU shall convert its open dumps into controlled dumps, in accordance with the guidelines set in Section 41 of this Act: Provided, further, That no controlled dumps shall be allowed five (5) years following the effectivity of this Act.
. . . .
Section 48. Prohibited Acts. – The following acts are prohibited:
. . . .
(9) Establishment or operation of open dumps as enjoined in this Act, or closure of said dumps in violation of Sec. 37[.]
. . . .
Section 49. Fines and Penalties. –
. . . .
(c) Any person who violates Sec. 48, pars. (8), (9), (10) and (11) for the first time shall, upon conviction, pay a fine of Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) plus an amount not less than five percent (5%) but not more than ten percent (10%) of his net annual income during the previous year.
(d) The additional penalty of imprisonment of a minimum period of one (1) year, but not to exceed three (3) years at the discretion of the court, shall be imposed for second or subsequent violations of Sec. 48, paragraphs (9) and (10).
. . . .
If the offense is committed by a corporation, partnership, or other juridical entity duly organized in accordance with law, the chief executive officer, president, general manager, managing partner or such other officer-in-charge shall be liable for the commission of the offense penalized under this Act.
If the offender is an alien, he shall, after service of the sentence prescribed above, be deported without further administrative proceedings.
The fines herein prescribed shall be increased by at least ten percent (10%) every three (3) years to compensate for inflation and to maintain the deterrent function of such fines. (Emphasis supplied)
The acts defined to be punishable under Sections 37 and 48 of Republic Act No. 9003 are the following: (a) establishment and operation of open dumps; or (b) any practice or disposal of solid waste by any person which constitutes the use of open dumps for solid waste. Meanwhile, an open dump is a "disposal area wherein the solid wastes are indiscriminately thrown or disposed of without due planning and consideration for environmental and health standards."8
Republic Act No. 9003 does not define the terms "establish" and "operate," and they must therefore be understood in their ordinary meaning. To establish means to make, form, or bring about into existence.9 To operate means to manage a service and make it work or cause something to work.10 In the context of a violation under Republic Act No. 9003, both terms denote affirmative or positive acts that either bring a dumpsite into being or cause it to function as a disposal facility.
Measured against these terms, the evidence on record utterly fails to show that Hector performed either act. No evidence was established that Hector "established" or "operated" an open dump site or "disposed of solid waste using an open dump site." The only thing established was the presence of garbage and a pit on the property. Proof that a dumpsite exists is not synonymous with proof of who established or operated it.
In concluding that Hector was liable, the MCTC relied primarily on two circumstances: first, that an open dump site existed at the time of the ocular investigation by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR); and second, that Hector gave inconsistent explanations regarding the site. It treated these as sufficient to hold him criminally responsible:
In fact in the . . . Reply-Counter Affidavit executed by accused Hector Casidsid submitted before the Office of the Ombudsman he reiterated this purpose of the law that is the protection of the public health and the environment- "To avert and arrest the proliferation of sickness of our constituents in Yapak, the Brgy. Council was constrained to look for a suitable site far from the residents and the Hotels in the Brgy. Yapak. After a suitable place was located the Brgy. Council sought the permission of the caretaker who in turn sought the permission of the alleged claimant of the area who also allowed its use. This was used as temporary dumpsite until such time that the MRF is fully operational." However in his Judicial Affidavit accused alleged that "he did not used (sic) the property of Leo Neil G. Tirol located at Sitio Ilig-Iligan. Barangay Yapak, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan as open dump site for Barangay Yapak; it was in fact DMCI who dumped the garbage in the property as per inquiry from one Otelo Casidsid who is the caretaker of the alleged property of Leo Neil G. Tirol and Roberto Tirol; Roberto Tirol had a contract with DMCI for the dumpsite of their garbage and for reasons known only to Roberto Tirol, the latter pointed the property subject of this case, allegedly owned by Leo Neil G. Tirol to DMCI as the property to be used as its dumpsite."
From these two (2) conflicting claims/defenses of the accused, the fact remains that an open dumpsite was existing at the time of the conduct of the ocular investigation made by Engr. Ricardo Benjamin, Jr. of the CENRO-DENR who acted on a written complaint made by herein private complainant Leo Neil G. Tirol. Whether or not the garbage dumped on the property was from DMCI or from the Barangay itself, accused remains responsible for allowing the same. Moreso, he even alleged in his Reply-Counter Affidavit that he only allowed the use of the property as a temporary dumpsite while their Materials Recovery Facility (MRF) was not operational. He even went on to alleged (sic) that when he was suspended for two (2) months by the Office of the Ombudsman, OIC Barangay Captain Reggiel Sacapano continuously dumped garbage on the property and that after he resume[d] his office, he ordered the closure of the area as an open dumpsite.11 (Emphasis supplied)
Despite the conflicting allegations thus made, the MCTC still found Hector liable and concluded:
With these conflicting defenses of [Hector] and [the] prosecution having successfully proven the presence of assorted garbage in the area which was now being used as an open dump site, this Court ha[s] no other recourse but to impose the penalty provided for by the Act for such violation.12
A careful reading of the MCTC Judgment reveals that the prosecution only established that an open dump site was existing at the time of the ocular investigation, and that Hector allowed it despite knowing about it. In fact, after acknowledging conflicting defenses, the MCTC concluded that because garbage was present and the site was being used as an open dump, it had justification to find Hector guilty.
The MCTC's analysis, however, improperly shifts the inquiry from determining who the author of the prohibited act is to the mere existence of a prohibited condition. In doing so, it reverses the burden of proof, as it is not for the accused to prove that he did not commit the act, but for the prosecution to establish beyond reasonable doubt that he did. This error becomes more apparent when the very evidence relied upon by the MCTC is examined. Pertinent portions of the ocular investigation report read:
FINDINGS/OBSERVATIONS:
1. The [area] is located at Sitio Ilig-Iligan, Brgy. Yapak, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan. It is bounded by open grassland and tree species on its Northern, Southern, Western and Eastern boundaries and approximately situated 150 meters more or less at the famous Bat cave in Boracay Island situated in its eastern boundary.
2. Heaps of mixed garbage such as plastics, Styrofoam, bottles, food waste, fishscales (sic), chicken bones, newspapers and sachet products were visible in the [area] during the time of investigation.
3. Deep excavation area, approximately 4 meters in depth, and 2 meter by 8th wide intended as dumping site for biodegradable garbage, and traces of wastes covered with soil are also visible in the [area], indicating that dumping of garbage is already on-going at the area for a longer time now.
4. The subject lot, though considered as timberland area in Proclamation No. 1064 signed by then Pres. Gloria M. Arroyo is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-2546 registered in the name of heirs of Demosthenes Tirol[,] represented by Sylvia G. Tirol.
5. Per [private complainant], the project is operated by the Barangay Council of Barangay Yapak, Malay, Aklan even without their consent so they file (sic) this complaint as their opposition to such.
6. Investigation Officer/Undersigned twice tried to contact Hon. Hector Casidsid but he was always not available or perhaps very busy in his area.
7. The project is operating without securing "Notice to Proceed" from DENR[,] Regional Office 6, Iloilo City.13 (Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing report merely described the physical condition of the property at the time of inspection. But these observations prove only the existence of a dumpsite condition, not the identity of the person who established or operated it. The DENR investigator did not witness any dumping activity, did not identify who directed or supervised the disposal of garbage, and did not state that Hector was present, involved, or exercising control over the site. Criminal liability cannot rest on environmental condition alone. There must be proof linking the accused to the act of establishment or operation, and that link is missing here.
The statement in the report that the project was operated by the Barangay Council was not even based on the investigator's personal knowledge but on information supplied by private complainant Leo. Such second-hand attribution cannot substitute for proof of the essential element that the accused himself established or operated the open dump. In other words, other than the bare allegations of Leo, no independent evidence was presented to show that Hector was the author of the crime for which he was charged with under Republic Act No. 9003.
Similarly, the RTC made no finding that Hector "established" or "operated" the subject property as an open dump site. Like the MCTC, all that the RTC stated was that it had been established by the prosecution that a particular property was being utilized as an open dump site and that solid wastes and other garbage were present in the area during the actual ocular inspection.14 The RTC's discussion, therefore, focused also on the condition of the property, and not on the identity of the person who performed the penalized acts.
Aside from the sweeping statements of the MCTC and RTC, there is a dearth of evidence to conclude that Hector had "established" or "operated" the dump site. In affirming Hector's conviction, even without his admission that the barangay had used the open dump site, the CA reasoned that the barangay was using the property as an open dump site:
(i) In his Judicial Affidavit, [Hector] stated that the Materials Recovery Facility (MRF) of the Barangay could no longer accommodate any more garbage;
(ii) [Hector] also admitted that the open dump site had existed for (3) three years and locals and tourists have been complaining about it ever since;
(iii) [Hector] does not know whether valid permits and licenses to operate were obtained, but admitted that he did not bother to inquire about them;
(iv) [Hector] only acted when his uncle, who was the caretaker of the property, asked for his assistance;
(v) [Hector's] only solution was to send people to help sort out the garbage; and,
(vi) Although [Hector] said that a private entity was the one actually dumping garbage into the open dump site, he was unable to present any evidence proving the existence and involvement of the said private entity.15 (Citations omitted)
The foregoing circumstances, however, do not establish beyond reasonable doubt that Hector committed the acts punished by law. They show, at most, knowledge of the dumpsite, the existence of a garbage problem, and an imperfect or belated response. Knowledge is not "establishment." Failure to inquire about permits is not "operation." Sending people to sort garbage describes a remedial act, not proof that Hector operated, directed, or managed dumping activities. His failure to prove that another entity was responsible does not supply the missing proof that it was he who established or operated the dump site.
At this juncture, the ponencia affirms the conviction, not on additional proof of establishment or operation, but principally on Hector's notarized Reply before the Office of the Ombudsman, which it treats as an admission that the barangay established and operated the dumpsite. The relevant portion of the Reply reads:
There [were] several complaints from tourist[s] and residents[,] and even hotel operators regarding the health and sanitary condition[s] due [to] uncollected garbage. The MRF was already full and at that time was not operational.
The residents[,] especially the vulnerable group of [minors] and elderly suffered health problems, prompting the [Barangay] Council to look for an alternative temporary dumping site.
They were able to locate one that is located in a less populated portion[] of [Barangay] Yapak.
They approach[ed] the caretaker Otelo Casidsid and after a call with herein complainant [Leo], they were allowed to dump in the area. [. . .]
. . . .
To avert and arrest the proliferation of sickness of our constituents in Yapak, the [Barangay] Council was constrained to look for a suitable site far from the residents and the [h]otels in [Barangay] Yapak. After a suitable place was located[,] the [Barangay] Council sought the permission of the caretaker who in turn sought the permission of the alleged claimant of the area who also allowed its use.
This was used as a temporary dumpsite until such time that the MRF is fully operational.16 (Citation omitted)
The ponencia further treats the Reply as an admission against interest under Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. It reasons that a party's act or declaration as to a relevant fact may be received in evidence against him, on the theory that no person would make a statement adverse to himself unless it were true. It stresses that Hector's statements supposedly satisfy the requisites of an admission against interest.17
This is egregious error—it assumes what still had to be proven—that the Reply contains a categorical admission of the fact that Hector established or operated the dumpsite.
To be admissible, an admission must; (a) involve matters of fact, and not of law; (b) be categorical and definite; (c) be knowingly and voluntarily made; and (d) be adverse to the admitter's interests, otherwise it would be self-serving and inadmissible.18 Here, the Reply does not satisfy the second and crucial requirement that it be categorical and definite as to the fact in issue.
The fact in issue here is not merely that dumping occurred, nor that the barangay faced a garbage problem. The material fact that must be proved under Section 48(9), in relation to Section 37 of Republic Act No. 9003, is that Hector himself established or operated an open dump. Nothing in the quoted Reply categorically and definitely states that Hector organized disposal operations, directed the dumping of waste, or maintained the area as a disposal facility. The Reply only narrates surrounding circumstances including garbage complaints, a non-operational Materials Recovery Facility, the search for an alternative site, permission from a caretaker, and temporary use of the area. These statements explain why dumping happened. They do not admit who performed the acts of establishment or operation. The Reply contains admissions that a temporary dumping arrangement existed, but it does not contain a categorical and definite admission that Hector established or operated the dumpsite in the sense contemplated under Section 48(9), in relation to Section 37 of Republic Act No. 9003.
The ponencia converts the narrative of circumstances into a legal conclusion of "establishment or operation," but again that conclusion is not expressly admitted in the Reply. An admission against interest must be categorical as to the fact admitted. What the Reply establishes is a narrative of why a site was used, not how it was operated or established. The ponencia treats as conclusive an "admission" that is not categorical as to the very element that makes the act criminal. On this point alone, the Reply cannot, by itself, satisfy the quantum of proof required for conviction.
It also bears noting that Hector presented conflicting claims or defenses at various stages of the proceedings. In his Reply Counter-Affidavit before the Office of the Ombudsman, he stated that the area was used as a temporary dump site while the Materials Recovery Facility was not operational. He asserted during trial, however, that it was DMCI which was responsible for dumping garbage on the property.
The ponencia treats this later explanation as an attempt to refute what it considers an earlier admission. It then invokes the rule that an admission against interest embodied in a notarized document enjoys a presumption of regularity, and that any evidence contradicting it must be clear and convincing. From this, the ponencia faults Hector for failing to present documentary proof of a contract between the property owner and DMCI. It emphasizes that he did not produce a copy of the contract or testimony from any officer of DMCI. It concludes that, absent such proof, there is no clear and convincing evidence to refute the supposed admission in the Reply.19
However, this line of reasoning again erroneously shifts the burden of proof. A conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt, or moral certainty that the accused is guilty.20 This quantum of proof is constitutionally anchored in the presumption of innocence under Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution, which provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. And the said "contrary" is proved only with the highest quantum of evidence required in any judicial proceeding, that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt. When this burden is not met, it leaves no room for compromise: acquittal becomes not merely an option but a constitutional imperative.
That Hector failed to present documentary proof of a contract between the property owner and a private entity, proving the existence and involvement of DMCI21 should not be taken against him. It is axiomatic that the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and should not rely on the weakness of that of defense.22 Even if Hector's explanation that DMCI was responsible for the dumping were uncorroborated or unpersuasive, such circumstance does not relieve the prosecution of its duty to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Hector himself performed the acts punished by law. His inability to substantiate the alleged agreement does not constitute proof that he established or operated the dumpsite. It only means that his defensive explanation was not affirmatively proven. By faulting Hector for failing to present documentary proof of the alleged contract and by treating the absence of such proof as strengthening the case against him, the ponencia effectively requires the accused to disprove guilt, which is incompatible with the constitutional presumption of innocence.
Further, the ponencia adopts the CA's conclusion that Hector's silence and inaction indicate that he is responsible for the establishment, operation, and use of the illegal dump site. It states that as Barangay Chairperson, Hector was vested with authority to implement Republic Act No. 9003, that he could have taken appropriate action to close the dumpsite, but did not, and that such silence and inaction may be treated as indicia that he allowed its establishment and operation.23
This is simply wrong.
Republic Act No. 9003 penalizes the establishment or operation of open dumps. It does not penalize the failure to immediately close a dumpsite, nor does it criminalize silence or inaction as such. While Hector, as Barangay Chairperson, has duties in relation to solid waste management, the existence of a duty does not automatically convert every lapse in performance into a penal offense. The statute punishes affirmative or positive acts, i.e., establishing, operating, or disposing of solid waste through an open dump, and not the failure to prevent another's dumping. Hector's alleged failure to stop DMCI's activities, even if assumed, is therefore not the act punished by law. The Court should not expand criminal liability by treating omissions, in the absence of a clear statutory basis, as equivalent to the defined acts. Nowhere in the law does it provide that a public official who fails to prevent another's dumping automatically becomes the operator of the dump.
Despite these limits, the ponencia treats Hector's supposed inaction as the basis of criminal liability, instead of requiring proof that he performed the acts of establishment or operation defined by law. The State must prove that the accused committed the acts defined as crimes. Hector's silence or failure to act cannot establish beyond reasonable doubt that he performed the specific acts punished by statute.
Thus, Hector's alleged silence, inaction, or failure to stop others from dumping cannot be treated as proof that he established or operated the open dump within the contemplation of Republic Act No. 9003. Criminal liability under Republic Act No. 9003 remains anchored on proof that the accused himself performed the acts punished by law. Absent such proof, the constitutional presumption of innocence cannot be overcome.
It must be emphasized that "[c]riminal statutes are to be strictly construed[;] [n]o person should be brought within their terms who is not clearly within them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal which is not clearly made so by the statute."24 Conduct not plainly and unmistakably falling within the statutory definition cannot be the basis of criminal liability.(awÞhi( Again, what the relevant provisions punish under Section 48(9), in relation to Section 37, Republic Act No. 9003 are only the following: (a) establishment and operation of open dumps; or (b) any practice or disposal of solid waste by any person which constitutes the use of open dumps for solid waste. Silence and inaction, as well as allowing an open dump site to exist, are not the acts punishable under the subject provisions.
Significantly, even the Information did not charge Hector with allowing or failing to prevent the operation of a dumpsite. It specifically alleged that he "willfully, unlawfully and criminally establish[ed], operate[d], and use[d] an open dump site."25 The conviction, however, effectively rests on a different theory, that Hector knew of the dumpsite and did not sufficiently stop it. This is a material variance. An accused cannot be convicted for an act not alleged in the information, especially where the substituted basis of liability, omission, tolerance, or inaction, is not even among the acts criminalized by the statute.
This principle was applied by the Court in Aricheta v. People,26 where the accused was charged with one specific act of deceit, but the conviction was attempted to be sustained on another factual basis not alleged in the Information. The Court categorically ruled:
The prosecution cannot rely on the warranty contained in the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage that "the Vendor warrants the Vendee from any lawful claim of whomsoever over the same" for the reason that the same is not alleged in the Information. This is not part of the charge against petitioner. Petitioner was indicted for making false representations to the private complainant that she is the owner of the property involved when this property was supposedly already sold to another person. The allegations were made pursuant to Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. She was not charged with falsely representing to private complainant that the property was not mortgaged or being occupied by a third person. The charge in the information is specific. The charge cannot be broadened to include what is not alleged to the detriment of the petitioner. If this were to be done, the petitioner's right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her would be violated.27 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
To convict Hector of a ground not alleged while he is concentrating his defense against the ground alleged would plainly be unfair and underhanded.28 More fundamentally, this reasoning, if accepted, would mean that any local official who becomes aware of illegal dumping and fails to eradicate it immediately could be deemed to have "established" or "operated" the dump. That interpretation stretches the penal statute beyond its text and risks criminalizing inaction or imperfect governance instead of the specific acts the law defines as offenses. To emphasize, what is clear in the present case is that a temporary dumping situation existed. What is not clear, and not admitted in the Reply, is that Hector himself established or operated the dumpsite. That missing element cannot be supplied by inference alone without diluting the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
In sum, Hector's guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution failed to establish, as alleged in the Information, that Hector himself willfully established, operated, or used an open dump site. The proof against Hector must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that Hector bears the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime.29 In the same vein, every circumstance favoring his innocence had to be duly taken into account.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the Petition and ACQUIT Hector Aguirre Casidsid of violation of Section 48(9), in relation to Section 37, of Republic Act No. 9003 for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Footnotes
1 An Act Providing for an Ecological Solid Waste Management Program, Creating the Necessary Institutional Mechanisms and Incentives, Declaring Certain Acts Prohibited and Providing Penalties, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes (2001).
2 Rollo, p. 14, Petition.
3 Id. at 29, CA Decision.
4 Ponencia, pp. 4-5.
5 Id. at 22-23.
6 Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group v. P/Supt. Villafuerte, 840 Phil. 243, 253 (2018) [Per J. Caguioa, En Banc].
7 Cabaobas v. Pepsi-Cola Products, Philippines, Inc., 757 Phil. 96, 118-119 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
8 Republic Act No. 9003 (2001), sec. 3(t).
9 Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004), p. 1654.
10 Cambridge Dictionary, available at https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/operate (last accessed on January 31, 2026).
11 Rollo, pp. 70-71, MCTC Judgment.
12 Id. at 72.
13 Id. at 65.
14 Id. at 76, RTC Decision.
15 Id. at 45-46, CA Decision.
16 Ponencia, p. 22.
17 Id. at 23.
18 Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr., 661 Phil. 306, 318 (2011) [Per J. Villarama, Jr., Third Division].
19 Ponencia, pp. 24-25.
20 People v. Erguiza, 592 Phil. 363, 387 (2008) [Per J. Austria-Martinez. Third Division].
21 Ponencia, p. 25.
22 People v. Postrero, 239 Phil. 347, 354 (1987) [Per J. Melencio-Herrera, Second Division].
23 Ponencia, pp. 25-26.
24 U.S. v. Santos, 36 Phil. 243, 246 (1917) [Per J. Moreland, En Banc]. (Citation omitted)
25 Rollo, p. 14, Petition.
26 560 Phil. 170 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
27 Id. at 183.
28 See Andaya v. People, 526 Phil. 480 (2006) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
29 See People v. Dramayo, 149 Phil. 107 (1971) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].
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