G.R. No. 113930 March 5, 1996
PAUL G. ROBERTS, JR., RODOLFO C. SALAZAR, LUIS LORENZO, SR., LUIS LORENZO, JR., AMAURY R. GUTIERREZ, BAYANI N. FABIC, JOSE YULO, JR., ESTEBAN B. PALANNUAYAN, and WONG FONG FUI, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. MAXIMIANO ASUNCION, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 104, HON. APOLINARIO G. EXEVEA, HON. HENRICK F. GINGOYON, and HON. PHILIP A. AGUINALDO, in their capacities as Members of the Department of Justice "349" Committee, and the CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY, respondents.
J. ROBERT DELGADO, petitioner-Intervenor.
Separate Opinion
NARVASA, C.J., concurring:
I agree with the disposition of the case proposed by Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide in his dissenting opinion, that the determination of whether or not probable cause exists to warrant the prosecution in court of the petitioners should be consigned and entrusted to the Department of Justice, as reviewer of the findings of the public prosecutors concerned.
In this special civil action, this Court is being asked to assume the function of a public prosecutor. It is being asked to determine whether probable cause exists as regards petitioners. More concretely, the Court is being asked to examine and assess such evidence as has thus far been submitted by the parties and, on the basis thereof, make a conclusion as to whether or not it suffices "to engender a well founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probable guilty thereof and should be held for trial."1
It is a function that this Court should nut be called upon to perform. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor,2 one that, as far as crimes cognizable by a Regional Trial Court are concerned, and notwithstanding that it involves an adjudicative process of a sort,3 exclusively pertains, by law, to said executive officer, the public prosecutor.4 It is moreover a function that in the established scheme of things, is supposed to be performed at the very genesis of, indeed, prefatorily to, the formal commencement of a criminal action.5 The proceedings before a public prosecutor, it may well be stressed, are essentially preliminary, prefatory, and cannot lead to a final, definite and authoritative adjudgment of the guilt or innocence of the persons charged with a felony or crime.6
Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor — i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case — is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.7 There is no provision of law authorizing an aggrieved party to petition for such a determination. It is not for instance permitted for an accused, upon the filing of an information against him by the public prosecutor, to preempt trial by filing a motion with the Trial Court praying for the quashal or dismissal of the indictment on the ground that the evidence upon which the same is based is inadequate. Nor is it permitted, on the antipodal theory that the evidence is in truth adequate, for the complaining party to present a petition before the Court praying that the public prosecutor be compelled to file the corresponding information against the accused.8
Besides, the function that this Court is asked to perform is that of a trier of facts which it does not generally do,9 and if at all, only exceptionally, as in an appeal in a criminal action where the penalty of life imprisonment, reclusion perpetua, or death has been imposed by a lower court (after due trial, of course),10 or upon a convincing showing of palpable error as regards a particular factual conclusion in the judgment of such lower court.11
What, in sum, is being attempted in this Court is to reverse the established and permanent order of things — for the Court to act before trial and judgment by a lower tribunal; to require it to perform the role of trier of facts — which, to repeat, it does not generally do, the issues properly cognizable by it being normally limited exclusively to questions of law; 12 to make it do something that even the trial court may not do at this stage of the proceedings — itself to determine the existence of probable cause; to usurp a duty that exclusively pertains to an executive official 13 — to a preliminary investigation or review the findings and conclusions of the public prosecutor who conducted one.
The matter is not within the review jurisdiction of the Court as this is clearly specified in the Constitution,14 a jurisdiction which even the Congress may not increase "without . . . (the Court's) advice and concurrence."15
From the pragmatic aspect, it is also an undesirable thing, for the result could well be an increase the already considerable work load of the Court.
Furthermore, any judgment of this Court in this action would be inconclusive, as above intimated. It would not necessarily end the case. It would not, for instance, prevent the complaining witnesses from presenting additional evidence in an effort to have the information ultimately filed in the proper court against the accused, or the respondents from asking for a reinvestigation and presenting additional or other evidence warranting the dropping of the case. The Court would thus have wielded judicial power without a definite settlement of rights and liabilities.
There are set rules, and procedural mechanisms in place for the determination of probable cause at the level of the public prosecutor, the Department of Justice and, to a certain extent, the Regional Trial Court. No recourse to this Court should normally be allowed to challenge their determinations and dispositions. I therefore vote to refer to the Department of Justice for resolution, the petition for the review of the Joint Resolution issued by Investigating Prosecutor Ramon Gerona.
Vitug, J., concurs.
Footnotes
1 Sec. 1, Rule 112, Rules of Court.
2 Castillo v. Villaluz, 171 SCRA 39 (1989); Peo. v. Inting, 187 SCRA 788 (1990); Allado v. Diokno, 232 SCRA 192 (1994); Cruz, Jr. v People, 233 SCRA 43s9.
3 Crespo v. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462.
4 Lim v. Felix, 194 SCRA 292, citing Castillo v. Villaluz, 171 SCRA 39 and Salta v. CA, 143 SCRA 228; SEE Sec. 2, Rule 112; Sec. 11 (b), PD No. 1275.
5 §1 Rule 112; Rules of Court.
6 Cojuangco v. PCGG, 190 SCRA 226, cited in Herrera, Remedial Law, Vol. IV (1992 ed., p. 164); SEE Reyes v. Camilon, 192 SCRA 444 (1990); Cruz, Jr. v. People, 233 fSCRA 439 (1994) citing Paderanga v. Drilon, et al., 196 SCRA 86 (1991).
7 Crespo, supra at note 2; Kwong Sing v. City of Manila, 41 Phil. 103.
8 Paderanga v. Drilon, 196 SCRA 86; cf. Brocka v. Enrile, 192 SCRA 183. SEE Ogburn v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 483 (1992). N.B. Where, however, the public prosecutor finds that probable cause exists as regards several suspects but unaccountably files the information only against some, but not all of them, mandamus will lie to compel him to include in the indictment those he has excluded.
9 Go v. Court of Appeals, 224 SCRA 145; PNB v. Court of Appeals, 187 SCRA 735; Ongsiako v. IAC, 152 SCRA 627.
10 Par. 2 (D), §5 of Art. VIII, Constitution; Sec. 3 (c) and (e), Rule 122, Rules of Court; SEE Sec. 17 (1), Judiciary Act and Sec. 22, Republic Act No. 7659.
11 See Peo. v. Jimenez, 235 SCRA 322; Geronimo v. Court of Appeals, 224 SCRA 494; BPI Credit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 204 SCRA 601; Medina v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 218; Peo. v. Nemeria, 242 SCRA 448 (1995), citing Peo. v. Tidong, 225 SCRA 324 (1993); Peo. v. Simbulan, 214 SCRA 537 (1992); Peo. v. Saulo, 211 SCRA 888 (1992).
12 Rule 45, Rules of Court; see Pan Realty Corp v. Court of Appeals, 167 SCRA 564 and Del Pozo v. Penaco, 167 SCRA 577; Isabelo, Jr. v. Perpetual Help College of Rizal, Inc., 227 SCRA (1993), citing Soriano III v. Yuson, 164 SCRA 226 (1988), etc.
13 Supra, at note 3.
14 Par. 2, §5 of Art. VIII, Constitution.
15 §30 of Art. VI, Constitution.
Separate Opinion
PUNO, J., dissenting:
I
The constitutional policy of speedy adjudication of cases demand that we now affirm or reverse the judicial finding of probable cause to hold petitioners for trial on the charge of estafa. Pepsi's Number Fever Promotion, the root cause of the case at bar, was held way back in 1992. Since 1993, City Prosecutor Candido Rivera of Quezon City, RTC Judge Maximiano Asuncion and the Court of Appeals have uniformly found the existence of probable cause against petitioners. It is now 1996 and petitioners have yet to be tried in court. Three (3) long years of expensive litigation on the part of private respondents, mostly belonging to the powerless of our people, will go to naught by remanding the case to the Department of Justice for another executive determination of the issue of probable cause.
To be sure, the case at bar is deeply impressed with public interest. On one hand are some 12,000 people holding "349" Pepsi crowns and who have long been clamoring for payment of their prize money. Their collective claim runs to billions of pesos. On the other hand is petitioners' business integrity which needs a shield from false and malicious charges. We should decide this dispute with dispatch and with little resort to procedural technicalities, otherwise, our people's search for justice will be too wearisome a toil.
II
Pursuant to this precis, I will skip capillary issues and immediately go to the heart of the case — i.e., determine whether the respondent Court of Appeals committed reversible error in affirming the respondent trial judge who found probable cause to hold petitioners for trial on the charge of estafa. The concept of probable cause is not a high level legal abstraction to be the subject of warring thoughts. It is well established that "a finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt."1
On the basis of the evidence presented by the parties in a long and exhaustive preliminary investigation, Quezon City Prosecutor Rivera determined that there is a sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that petitioners committed estafa. City Prosecutor Rivera approved the findings of First Assistant City Prosecutor Ramon M. Gerona contained in a 17-page Joint Resolution. I quote in extenso the factual findings relied upon by the prosecutors in finding probable cause, viz.:
x x x x x x x x x
The complaints-affidavits and replies by complainant and counter-affidavits and rejoinder by respondents as well as arguments and counter- arguments from both sides may be summed up to three simple but comprehensive issues, to wit:
1. Was there fraud or deceit committed by Pepsi through respondents prior to or simultaneously with their deliberate act of refusal to pay complainants the prizes indicated in their crown/caps?
2. Did Pepsi officials, herein respondents, comply with the rules and regulations imposed by the DTI especially on the mechanics of the promotion, or deviation, modification, addition or deletion of aforenamed mechanics?
3. Was there a way respondents could have avoided the fraud?
Relative to the first and second issues, respondents insist that they had complied with all the requirements or conditions imposed by the DTI particularly with respect to the prior approval of the latter of the mechanics of the promotion. Respondent likewise contend that the deviation of the duly approved mechanics of the promotion was also approved by the DTI. In this regard, Section 10.1 of the Ministry Order No. 33 reads as follows:
10.1 All advertisements, brochures or any printed material indicating or describing the mechanics of the promotion shall conform with the mechanics approved by this Bureau. Any deviation, modification, addition or deletion shall first be submitted to this Bureau for approval.
Parenthetically, the contention by respondents that the mechanics of the promotion was approved by the DTI is not in question, but, the additional contention that the deviation thereof was likewise approved by the DTI is not supported by or does not jibe with the facts. The report of Task Force DTI, page 14 thereof, says and we quote:
It appears that after the "349" controversy which came about during the extension period of Pepsi "Number Fever" promo, the significance of the security code as a measure against tampering and faking of the crowns or caps has been modified. For after May 26, 1995 the "349" number surfaced to have both winning and non-winning security codes." (emphasis supplied)
Page 15 of the same Task Force Report reads:
The DTI-NRC records show that the modification/deviation on the use of security code as explained in the trade posters and other joint advertisements was never submitted for approval in violation of the specific requirements of 10.1 of Memorandum Order No. 33.
As to why only number "349" has both a winning and non-winning security code, Mr. Q.J. Gomez, Jr.ℒαwρhi৷ could not amplify the same except by testifying that the supplier from Mexico gives them the list of winning numbers and security codes together with the master list of the non-winning number which were done through a computer program.
Respondents admit that only "349" was given two kinds of security codes, winning and non-winning. This condition was added by respondents while the promo was going on and after "349" had been announced as winner. The modification sans approval by the DTI as shown in the preceding DTI findings to the extent that the holders of the '"349" crowns are prejudiced or damaged after said number had been drawn and announced as winner constitutes deceit, commencing from the date of the launching of the promotion sometime in February 1992 up to the present with Pepsi's refusal to honor complainants' demand for payment.
The alteration was found to be factual by the DTI in the last portion of the Task Force Report which says with specifity:
x x x x x x x x x
The TF (Task Force) however noted it was only for No. "349" that a deviation in the use of security code from what was originally approved by the DTI-NCR was made. In all the other winning numbers PPCPI and PCI complied with the approved mechanics. (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, the mechanics mentioned the use of "a 3 digit security code as a measure against tampering or faking the crowns" and that "each and every number has its own unique, matching security code." (counter-affidavit, Rosemarie Vera, p. 13).
It is worth reproducing complainants' discussion of these two points in their Memorandum.
Let us analyze these two rules:
4.2 The first rule defines the purposes of the security code, which is to provide the basis for detecting whether or not a crown containing a winning number is fake, spurious or tampered with. By the wording of this rule, a genuine, true and real Pepsi, Mirinda, 7-up or Mountain Dew crown bearing a winning number, as drawn and announced, could not possibly lose in the promo. The genuineness of the crown will be assured by the security code; and the drawn winning number it bears will make it win.
In other words, the certainty about the genuineness of the crown that is, not fake or tampered with is the objective of the security code, not the crown's number being a winning number. Stated otherwise, the rule, as published makes the security code the determinant of the genuineness of the crown, not the winning quality of the number it bears.
Deliberately, however, Pepsi is now applying this rule — nay, bending it — (see par. 4.6.1. Counter-Affidavit) to make the security code determinant of which, among the crowns bearing the winning number "349," is really a winner! By giving the rule unwarranted and on-second thought application, Pepsi has effectively defrauded complainants of their prizes. Is this not deceit?
4.3 The second rule above-stated must be tackled in conjunction with par. 4.6 of the Counter-Affidavit which shows the meaning of the term "number" as used in this rule. It means "A 3-digit number ranging from 001 to 999" found under the specially-maked crowns of softdrinks manufactured and sold by Pepsi.
The rule uses the term "unique" which the dictionary defines as "Being the only one of its kind" (Funk and Gagnalls Standard) and "without another of the same kind" (Webster's). A contextual and syntactical appreciation of the rule would tell us that there is only one security code of each number under the crown for insuring the genuineness of the crown.
It is thus clear under the rule in question that "349" has its own unique 7-digit security code to insure that the crown bearing it is not fake or tampered with, do all the other winning numbers have or should have. But what did Pepsi do after "349" was drawn as a winner on May 25, 1992? Pepsi announced that "349" did not have only one unique security code, but that it had both "winning" and "non-winning" security codes. The security code of "349" was not the one unique, but "349" itself became unique because it became a winning and non-winning number at the same time. Was this unique "uniqueness" of "349" announced at the start of the promo? No! When was the revelation made? Only after "349" was drawn as a winner and numerous-thousands of winning crown holders had stormed the Pepsi plants all over the country, specially along Aurora Boulevard, Quezon City, claiming their prizes.
The actuations of Pepsi vis-a-vis the above-stated two rules are indubitable cases of "changing the rules as the game is being played" to defraud the winners of the prizes. If DECEIT has many faces, this is one of the ugliest among them.
We also concur with the argument of complainants that additional deceit was committed by respondents when they attempted to substitute number "123" for number "349" as the winning number announced and drawn on May 24, 1992 and the closure of Pepsi Plant along Aurora Boulevard previously announced as redemption center for winning crowns. The acts of respondents were described by complainants as a continuation of their adamant refusal to pay and even hear the claims of complainants who thereby sustained damage not for their expenses for transportation but for the amounts of prizes absolutely denied them, let alone their expense in buying Pepsi softdrinks in quantities beyond their normal needs. There is merit in the description.
The third issue is could Pepsi have remedied the fraud? Definitely, by taking reasonable steps in paying the "349" holders. Pepsi could not have succeeded in requesting approval by DTI of the deviation from and/or modification of the mechanics previously approved as an alternative remedy since sanctioning such deviation or modification could have placed DTI in equal footing with respondents, making them co-conspirators to the fraud.
The pertinent provision of the Revised Penal Code reads as follows:
Art. 318. Other Deceits. The penalty of Arresto Mayor and a fine of not less than the amount of the damage caused and not more than twice such amount shall be imposed upon any person who shall defraud or damage another by any other deceit not mentioned in the preceding Articles of this Chapter.
As aptly contended by complainants any other kind of conceivable deceit may fall under this Article. As in other cases of estafa, damage to the offended party is required (Reyes, Revised Penal Code, p. 775, Book 2, 11th Ed. 1977).
Fraudulently obtaining a loan on the promise that realty would be mortgaged as security for said loan which promise was not fulfilled because the borrower sold the property would constitute estafa under Article 318 . . .
Complainants have, to our mind, succeeded in proving deceit and fraud by respondents to avoid payment of prizes complainants are claiming in the "Number Fever Promotion" for the "349" winning number to hold respondents, whose names we will hereinafter enumerate, liable for estafa (Art. 318, RPC).
The prosecutors' finding of probable cause rests on two (2) critical facts established by substantial evidence: one, that petitioners deviated from the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) rules when they required that only "349" crowns with security codes can win, and two, that petitioners attempted to substitute "134" for "349" as the winning number. These acts were interpreted by the prosecutors as prima facie deceitful and fraudulent. I do not see how the resolution of the prosecutors finding sufficient ground to charge petitioners with estafa can be successfully assailed as grave abuse of discretion.
III
To be sure, respondent judge Asuncion affirmed the prosecutors' finding when petitioners challenged its validity. He found probable cause against the petitioners and ordered their arrest. The majority opinion faults the procedure followed by Judge Asuncion in issuing the warrants of arrest against petitioners. It cites two (2) reasons, viz.: (1) that Judge Asuncion issued the warrants merely on the basis of the Information, Amended Information and Joint Resolution of the City Prosecutors of Quezon City; he did not check and consult the complete records of the case which include the affidavits of the witnesses, transcripts of stenographic notes and other documents submitted in the preliminary investigation; and (2) Judge Asuncion did not expressly make any finding of probable cause.
The procedure to be followed by a judge in reviewing the finding of probable cause by a prosecutor has long been a quiescent area. In Soliven vs. Makasiar,2 we laid down the following procedure, viz.:
x x x x x x x x x
The second issue, raised by Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized by law" has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.
Soliven and other related3 cases did not establish the absolute rule that unless a judge has the complete records of the preliminary investigation before him, he cannot lawfully determine probable cause and issue a warrant of arrest. Soliven only held that it is the personal responsibility of the judge to determine probable cause on the basis of the report and supporting documents submitted by the fiscal; that he must independently evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the fiscal; and, if he finds no probable cause on the basis thereof, he can require submission of additional supporting affidavits of witnesses. There is nothing in Soliven that requires prosecutors to submit to the judge the complete records of the preliminary investigation especially if they are voluminous. Nor is there anything in Soliven that holds that the omission to physically submit the complete records of the case would constitutionally infirm a finding of probable cause by a judge even if it was made on the basis of an exhaustive prosecutor's report or resolution. Indeed, in Webb vs. de Leon,4 we sustained the finding of probable cause made by the trial judge even if the complete records of the preliminary investigation were not elevated to the said judge.
A revisit of our case law will reveal that what we condemned in the past as constitutionally impermissible was the practice of judges of totally relying on pro forma certifications of fiscals that they conducted a preliminary investigation and found probable cause that the accused committed the crime charged in the Information. These pro forma certifications usually consisted of a short sentence. They did not relate the relevant proceedings in the preliminary investigation nor did they calibrate the weight of diverse and dueling evidence submitted by the parties. These bare certifications carried no findings of fact and made no legal analysis which could be used by judges as a rational basis for a determination of probable cause. Thus, we laid down the jurisprudence that a judge who determines probable cause by relying on such meaningless certifications violates the constitutional provision prohibiting issuance of warrants of arrest ". . . except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge . . .
The case at bar does not involve these outlawed certifications. The respondent Court of Appeals found that the 17-page Joint Resolution of the prosecutors provided the trial judge with sufficient factual basis to find probable cause and to issue warrants of arrest against the petitioners. To repeat, the finding of probable cause against petitioners rests on two (2) critical facts established by evidence: one, that petitioners deviated from the Department of Trade and Industry rules when they required that only "349" crowns with security codes could win, and two, that petitioners attempted to substitute "134" for "349" as the winning number. The finding of deviation is based on the Task Force Report of the DTI, the relevant portion of which was liberally quoted in the prosecutors' Joint Resolution. The finding of attempt at substitution was taken from the affidavits of witnesses of the private respondents. Petitioners do not charge that the Task Force Report of the DTI and the affidavits of witnesses of the private respondents were incorrectly quoted by the prosecutors in their joint Resolution. Thus, respondent judge need not be burdened by the duty of ordering the elevation of the complete records of the preliminary investigation to check the accuracy of the critical evidence as stated in the Joint Resolution.
The majority opinion also flays Judge Asuncion allegedly because". . . he made no finding of probable cause . . ." I am not disposed to make this serious charge. When Judge Asuncion issued the warrants of arrest against petitioners, I assume as did the respondent Court of Appeals, that he had studied the Information and 17-page Resolution of the prosecutors and that he agreed with the prosecutors' finding of probable cause. It is unnecessary for him to issue an Order just to reiterate the findings of the prosecutors. It ought to be likewise underscored that before Judge Asuncion issued the warrants of arrest, the matter of probable cause was the subject of exhaustive pleadings before him. Thus, the parties submitted the following for the respondent judge's consideration: (1) Motions to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest; (2) Motion for Issuance of Warrants of Arrest; (3) Supplemental Urgent Motion to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest and to Suspend Proceedings; (4) Opposition to Motion to Defer Arraignment; (5) Objection and Opposition to Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrants of Arrest; and (6) Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of the Warrants of Arrest. In these pleadings, the parties, especially the petitioners, discussed in length and in depth the findings of the prosecutors as contained in their 17-page Joint Resolution. It is, thus, erroneous to assume that the respondent judge had nothing before him when he ruled that there is probable cause to charge petitioners with estafa.
With due respect to the majority, the ruling that a judge should always order the elevation of the complete records of a preliminary investigation before proceeding with the task of reviewing the finding of probable cause made by prosecutors will exacerbate the mischief of delays in the disposition of criminal cases. This will not sit well with our people who are complaining that their continuing calls for speedy justice are only receiving dial tones from courts. The transcription of stenographic notes and the transfer of physical and documentary evidence, especially when voluminous, will consume time, result in loss of valuable evidence and aggravate the burden of litigants. It is my humble submission that the forwarding of complete records is not necessary when the prosecutor's report is exhaustive and accurate as in the case at bar.
IV
The majority has deviated from the general rule when it set aside the finding of probable cause made by the respondent Court of Appeals and the respondent trial judge. To be sure, this Court can restrain the prosecution of criminal prosecutions in exceptional cases. These exceptional cases are:5
a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused (Hernandez vs. Albano, et al., L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions (Dimayuga, et al. vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez vs. Albano, supra; Fortun vs. Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA 607);
c. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice (De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202);
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil. 62);
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation (Young vs. Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang vs. People and Avendia, 109 Phil. 1140);
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez vs. City Judge, L-25795, October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616)
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia vs. Ocampo, CA-G.R. 4760, March 25, 1960);
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance (Recto vs. Castelo, 18 L.J. [1953], cited in Ranoa vs. Alvendia, CA-G.R. No. 30720-R, October 8, 1962, cf. Guingona, et al. vs. City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA 577); and
j. Where there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied (Salonga vs. Pano, et al., L-59524, February 19, 1985, 134 SCRA 438).
7. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners (Rodriguez vs. Castelo, L-6374, August 1, 1953). (cited in Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, p. 288, 1988 Ed.)
It must be stressed, however, that in these exceptional cases, the Court took the extraordinary step of annulling findings of probable cause either to prevent the misuse of the strong arm of the law or to protect the orderly administration of justice. The constitutional duty of this Court in criminal litigations is not only to acquit the innocent after trial but to insulate, from the start, the innocent from unfounded charges. For the Court is aware of the strains of a criminal accusation and the stresses of litigation which should not be suffered by the clearly innocent. The filing of an unfounded criminal information in court exposes the innocent to severe distress especially when the crime is not bailable. Even an acquittal of the innocent will not fully bleach the dark and deep stains left by a baseless accusation for reputation once tarnished remains tarnished for a long length of time. The expense to establish innocence may also be prohibitive and can be more punishing especially to the poor and the powerless. Innocence ought to be enough and the business of this Court is to shield the innocent from senseless suits right from the start.
I respectfully submit, however, that the peculiar facts obtaining in the case at bar do not warrant us to take the exceptional step of setting aside the finding of probable cause made by the respondent appellate court and the trial court. Their finding is supported by substantial evidence and the issuance of warrants of arrest against the petitioners to hold them for trial for estafa does not constitute misuse of prosecutorial powers. To be sure, petitioners will be exposed to the inconvenience of facing numerous similar criminal suits but so long as the inconvenience is no more than what is necessary to dispense justice, they have no cause to gripe for justice equally belongs to the private respondents.
V
It is also respectfully submitted that the Department of Justice did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it refused to review the City Prosecutor's Joint Resolution and dismissed petitioners' appeal. The applicable case law is Crespo vs. Mogul, et al.,6 where we held:
x x x x x x x x x
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.
In order therefore to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court.
I concede that respondent judge Asuncion misread Crespo when he denied the prosecution's Motion to Defer Further Proceedings on the ground that ". . . to follow whatever opinion the Secretary of Justice may have on the matter would undermine the independence and integrity of this Court." I agree that Crespo did not prohibit the Department of Justice from reviewing resolutions of its prosecutors even if the proper informations have already been filed with the courts. Crespo merely counselled the Secretary of Justice to refrain from exercising said power of review "as far as practicable" taking into account the broader interest for a more orderly administration of justice. In exceptional instances where it is practicable for the Secretary of Justice to exercise the power of review, courts should not be heard to complain that their independence will be undermined. The dispensation of justice is not the monopoly of courts. It is as much the responsibility of the two other great branches of our government, the Executive and the Legislative.
Nevertheless, the refusal of the respondent Judge Asuncion to defer proceedings based on a misperception of Crespo is now of deminimis importance. The initial decision of the DOJ to review petitioners' case was due to its impression that the finding of probable cause made by the prosecutors of Quezon City was, at that time, open to honest contentions. This doubt, however, dissolved when no less than the respondent Court of Appeals sustained the finding of probable cause made by the respondent judge after an evaluation of the Joint Resolution of the Quezon City prosecutors. With the imprimatur of the respondent Court of Appeals on the existence of probable cause and following Crespo, it is no longer "practicable" for the DOJ to further review petitioners' case. Contrary to the impression of the majority, the appellate court affirmed the ruling of respondent judge on probable cause only after a long and deliberate study of the issue. The issue of probable cause was the subject of oral arguments and extensive pleadings before the appellate court which even directed the elevation of the original records of Criminal Case No. Q-93-43198. The probability that the DOJ will reach a finding different from the appellate court is nil considering that it will be reviewing the same set of evidence.
Finally, petitioners justify the need for DOJ to review their case in view of the latter's alleged contradictory rulings on cases brought by different parties involving the same controversy. The DOJ has denied the charge that it has issued contradictory rulings. But if these contradictory rulings were truly rendered by DOJ, there is more reason for DOJ to let the issue be resolved by the courts. As ultimate arbiters of rights in conflict, only the courts can write finis to the controversy between petitioners and private respondents.
I vote to dismiss the petition.
Regalado, Romero, Melo and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Hubert Webb vs. Hon. Raul E. de Leon, et al., G.R. No. 121234.
2 167 SCRA 397-398 [1988]; see also People vs. Inting, 187 SCRA 788 [1990]; Lim, Sr. vs. Felix, 194 SCRA 292 [1991].
3 Lim, Sr. vs. Felix, 194 SCRA 292 [1991]; People vs. Inting, 187 SCRA 788 [1990]; Allado vs. Diokno, 232 SCRA 192 [1994].
4 Supra.
5 Brocka vs. Enrile, 192 SCRA 183, 188-189 [1990].
6 No. L-53373, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA 462 471.
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