A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC - Dissenting Opinion




A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC, December 4, 2018, ♦ Decision, Per Curiam ♦ Separate Concurring Opinion, Per Curiam, ♦ Dissenting Opinion, Leonen, [J] ♦ Dissenting Opinion, Caguioa, [J] EN BANC [ A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC. December 04, 2018 ] IN RE: SPECIAL REPORT ON THE ARREST OF ROGELIO M. SALAZAR, JR., SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT-OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, BOAC, MARINDUQUE, FOR VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, A.M. NO. P-16-3450 (FORMERLY A.M. No. 15-12-379-RTC) OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, COMPLAINANT, VS ROGELIO M. SALAZAR, JR., SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT-OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, BOAC, MARINDUQUE, RESPONDENT. DISSENTING OPINION LEONEN, J.: I disagree with the ponencia. The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is absolute. If it is shown that the primary source, the "tree," was unlawfully obtained, any secondary evidence, the "fruit," derived from it is deemed inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. On March 2, 2015, Anju O. Villanueva (Villanueva)1 and Daphne Chloe G. Alcima (Alcima)2 of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency applied for a search warrant to search the house of Sheriff Rogelio Salazar (Salazar) of the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Boac, Marinduque.3 On March 4, 2015, Villanueva testified before Executive Judge Fernando T. Sagun, Jr. (Executive Judge Sagun) of Branch 78, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City that the application for search warrant was lodged with the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City because Salazar was a court personnel of the Regional Trial Court in Boac, Marinduque.4 Villanueva further testified that Salazar had been under their surveillance since January 11, 2015 and that they had observed him committing 10 violations of Republic Act No. 9165, with Villanueva personally witnessing two (2) of them.5 Villanueva then stated that on February 12, 2015 and February 19, 2015, he and Alcima conducted successful test-buys at Salazar's beach house at Brgy. Ihatub, Boac, Marinduque.6 That same day, Executive Judge Sagun granted the application and issued a search warrant,7 authorizing the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency agents to look for dangerous drugs in Salazar's beach house. On March 6, 2015, Villanueva received reports that Salazar and a certain Raymond Mistal (Mistal) were selling shabu in Boac. Mistal and Salazar were part of the Philippine National Police Boac, Marinduque's listed target personalities. A buy-bust operation was then planned, with a confidential informant setting up the transaction with Mistal.8 The following day, at around 9:00 a.m., Mistal sold shabu to Alcima, the poseur-buyer, after which he was immediately arrested and frisked by PO1 Jayson Quindoza.9 While being led to the police car, Mistal supposedly told the agents that he had a scheduled transaction to purchase shabu from Salazar at 10:00 a.m. that same day at Salazar's beach house. Villanueva immediately planned a buy-bust operation against Salazar and directed PO1 Jervin Estoya (PO1 Estoya) to accompany Mistal.10 PO1 Estoya and Mistal met up with Salazar at his beach house. However, Salazar merely accepted the money from Mistal and instructed them to get the shabu from a certain Melvin Lubrin (Lubrin) at Lalay, Boac.11 PO1 Estoya and Mistal went to Lalay, Boac where they found Lubrin overseeing his "lugawan" stall. Lubrin handed a small plastic sachet to PO1 Estoya, who arrested him on the spot.12 After arresting Lubrin, the agents proceeded to Salazar's beach house, served the search warrant, closed off the area, and conducted their search. Their search yielded seven (7) plastic sachets of white crystalline substance, which succeeding tests revealed to be shabu.13 Consequently, Salazar was arrested and detained. His urine sample tested positive for shabu.14 Following the buy-bust operation, Salazar and Lubrin were charged with violations of Sections 5 and 15 of Republic Act No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The complaint against them was docketed as XV-05-INV-15C-087.15 On April 26, 2015, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor dismissed the charges against Salazar and Lubrin. In dismissing the charges, Provincial Prosecutor Edwin Valdez (Provincial Prosecutor Valdez) pointed out the many inconsistencies and "inexplicable things"16 in the statements of the arresting officers.17 The dispositive portion of the Provincial Prosecutor's Resolution read: WHEREFORE, the following is ordered: 1. An information for violation of Section 5 and 15 of R.A. 9165 be filed against respondent Raymond Mistal @Raymond. No bail and Php100,000, respectively, is recommended. 2. The same charges be dismissed against respondent Rogelio Salazar[,] Jr. or @Ogie and Melvin Lubrin or @Melvin. Consequently[,] they are ordered released, unless detained for some other lawful cause or causes. 3. Let the records of this case be elevated to the Department of Justice for its automatic review of the herein resolution as per Department Circular No. 46, Series of 2003.18 On the other hand, a complaint for violation of Sections 11 and 15 of Republic Act No. 9165, which was docketed as IV-05-INQ-lSC-086, was also filed against Salazar, due to the seizure of seven (7) sachets of shabu in his beach house.19 On April 20, 2015, Provincial Prosecutor Valdez20 found probable cause against Salazar and directed the filing of an information against him. The following day, Criminal Case Nos. 63-1521 and 62-1522 were filed against Salazar before the Regional Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque for violation of Sections 11 and 15, respectively, of Republic Act No. 9165. Pertinent documents related to Criminal Case No. 63-15 were forwarded by the Office of the Administrative Services to the Office of the Court Administrator, which then docketed the case as A.M. No. 15-12-379- RTC.23 On November 6, 2015, the Office of the Court Administrator24 opined that Salazar's actuations constituted grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the service. It recommended that the matter be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter, that Salazar be directed to comment on the Information dated April 21, 2015, and that he be suspended from service pending the final outcome of the criminal case against him.25 On April 11, 2016,26 this Court adopted the recommendations of the Office of the Court Administrator, re-docketed the case as A.M. No. P-16-3450, and suspended Salazar from service. On July 14, 2016, Salazar submitted his Comment,27 where he denied selling shabu28 or that a bag with shabu was found in his beach house. He claimed that after the search warrant was served on him by the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency agents, he was made to lie face down on the floor, with an agent stepping down on his head to prevent him from looking up.29 Salazar narrated that while he was lying on the ground, his children were herded to the back of the house and were prevented by an agent from using their phones or from entering the house. However, his children saw another agent enter the house on the pretext of getting drinking water and then deposit a black bag on top of a cabinet. This unknown agent then left the house, got inside a car and the perimeter of the beach house was cordoned off with yellow tape. The sachets of shabu were eventually discovered inside the black bag planted by the agent.30 Meanwhile, Police Senior Superintendent Lorenzo Junio Holanday, Jr., the Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police Marinduque Police Provincial Office, wrote31 to then Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno to inform her of the buy-bust operation against Salazar and the seizure of seven (7) sachets of shabu in his beach house. The Office of the Chief Justice directed32 the Office of the Court Administrator to act on the matter and the ensuing inquiry was docketed as A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC. On January 28, 2016,33 the Office of the Court Administrator, recommended Salazar's continued suspension from service and for the matter to be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter.34 On April 7, 2017, in A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC,35 the Office of the Court Administrator recommended that A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC be consolidated with A.M. No. P-16-3450, that Salazar be found guilty in both administrative cases of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, that he be dismissed from service with all his benefits forfeited, except for his accrued leave credits, and that he be disqualified from re-employment in government service.36 The Office of the Court Administrator in A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC found that the undisputed fact that Salazar's urine sample, which was taken immediately after his arrest, tested positive for shabu, constituted substantial evidence to hold him administratively liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.37 The Office of the Court Administrator had the same conclusions and recommendations for A.M. No. P-16-3450.38 On May 4, 2017, the Regional Trial Court, acting on Salazar's Motion to Quash Search Warrant with Motion to Suppress Evidence, quashed the search warrant and granted the motion to suppress evidence.39 The Regional Trial Court stated that it conducted an ocular inspection of Salazar's beach house, together with some court employees, agents of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency and Salazar's witnesses. In its inspection, it found the beach house to be no more than a small shanty without any partitions and with a gravel floor. This belied the floor plan presented during the application for search warrant where Alcima described the hut as having a terrace and a partition wall separating the kitchen and bedroom.40 The Regional Trial Court also pointed out that in their application for a search warrant, Villanueva and Alcima emphasized that they had conducted surveillance operations on Salazar and his house; yet, they repeatedly mistakenly referred to Salazar's perimeter fence as being made of bamboo, when it was really made of hollow blocks. Furthermore, the Regional Trial Court found inconsistencies in the statements of Villanueva and Alcima as to whether or not Villanueva was actually present during the test-buys.41 It held: In the present case, after a careful and thorough review of the records, the inconsistencies on the testimonies of both police officers from their Sworn Affidavit and from their testimony that was given before Executive Judge Sagun provides a clear and convincing justification to cast reasonable doubt whether test-buy operations actually occurred. It can be concluded that when Agents Villanueva and Alcima applied for a search warrant with the Quezon City, Regional Trial Comi, they [did] not have personal knowledge about Salazar. Deliberate falsehoods were made by both Intelligence Officers just to impress [upon] the Quezon City Executive Judge that they had reason to believe that a crime ha[d] been committed. .... Applying the rule on the present case, the finding of probable cause is a nullity, because the trial judge was intentionally misled by the witnesses. .... Under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant is central to the right, and its existence largely depends on the finding of the judge conducting the examination. In the light of the nullity of Search Warrant No. 5043 (15), the search conducted on its authority is likewise null and void. Based on the above provision, any evidence obtained in violation of a person's right against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. With the inadmissibility of the drugs seized from Salazar's home, there is no more evidence to support his conviction. Thus, we see no reason to further discuss the other issues raised in this petition. WHEREFORE, with the foregoing, Search Warrant No. 5043 (15) is hereby QUASHED. The Motion to Quash Search Warrant with Motion to Suppress Evidence is hereby GRANTED for lack of probable cause and non-conformity of the conducted searches with established constitutional rules and statutory guidelines. SO ORDERED.42 (Emphasis supplied) Salazar moved for the dismissal43 of the cases against him, and on August 18, 2017, the Regional Trial Court44 granted the motion. The Regional Trial Court reiterated that all evidence obtained through the quashed search warrant, including the urine test conducted on Salazar, was considered illegal: In the May 4, 2017 resolution of this Court, Search Warrant No. 5043 which was obtained and used by the police was Quashed and declared NULL AND VOID for lack of probable cause and non-conformity in the search with the established constitutional rules and statutory guidelines. It was also declared that in the light of the nullity of Search Warrant No. 5043(15), the search conducted on its authority is likewise null and void. Based on the above provision (Section 2, Article III of the Constitution), any evidence obtained in violation of a person's right against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. All the evidence obtained as a result of such search is considered illegal, being the fruit of the poisonous tree. Ergo, even the urine test conducted on accused Salazar, having been done as a result of such arrest, occasioned by the search, is also considered as a fruit of such search, hence illegal. WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, there being no more prosecution evidence to support the charges against the accused with the Quashal of the Search Warrant used thereto, the Motion is hereby granted. Criminal Case No. 62-15 for Violation of Sec. 15 in relation to Sec. 28, Art. II of R.A. 9165 and Criminal Case No. 63-15 for violation of Section 11 in relation to Sec. 28, Art. II of R.A. 9165 against accused Rogelio Salazar, Jr. y Mondragon are hereby DISMISSED. The Provincial Jail Warden or any of his authorized representative is hereby directed to release the accused from custody unless his further detention is warranted for some other lawful cause or causes. SO ORDERED.45 (Emphasis supplied) Following the quashal of the search warrant and the dismissal of the criminal charges against him, Salazar prayed for, among others, the dismissal of the administrative cases against him, the revocation of his suspension order, and payment of his back salaries and other benefits withheld during his suspension and detention.46 Salazar's prayer should be granted. I The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of people against unreasonable searches and seizure, and declares that any evidence obtained in violation of this right cannot be used for any purpose in any proceeding: Article III Bill of Rights Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.47 This prohibition on utilizing any evidence obtained through an illegal search and seizure is also known as the exclusionary rule, or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, which originated in Stonehill v. Diokno.48 Stonehill overturned the ruling in Moncado v. People's Court,49 which deemed as admissible into evidence the things seized through an illegal search and seizure, in line with the common law rule that a criminal should not be allowed to go scot-free "because the constable has blundered."50 Stonehill emphasized that the abandonment of the Moncado doctrine and adoption of the exclusionary rule was the only "practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures."51 It pointed out that unreasonable searches and seizures occur when there is no competent evidence to back an application for the issuance of a search wan-ant and that they are resorted to by government agents as a form of fishing expedition: Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but, also, to spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause. Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed by agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the minority usually - but, understandably finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility of securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning, power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.52 (Emphasis in the original) People v. Alicando53 explained how the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine was adopted in our jurisdiction: We have not only constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in our jurisdiction. We have also adopted the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone v. United States. According to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the same illegal act. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained. We applied this exclusionary rule in the recent case of People vs. Salanga, et al., a ponencia of Mr. Justice Regalado. Salanga was the appellant in the rape and killing of a 15-year old barrio lass. He was, however, illegally arrested. Soldiers took him into custody. They gave him a body search which yielded a lady's underwear. The underwear was later identified as that of the victim. We acquitted Salanga. Among other reasons, we ruled that the underwear allegedly taken from the appellant is inadmissible in evidence, being a so-called "fruit of the poisonous tree."54 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted) In the case at bar, the sachets of shabu seized from the beach house, a positive finding for shabu of Salazar's urine sample, and his admission of using shabu during the preliminary investigation before the Provincial Prosecutor are all by-products, or fruits, of the quashed search warrant. The ponencia claims that Salazar's admission before the Provincial Prosecutor is testimonial evidence and not an object that can be the subject of a search and seizure. Furthermore, it contends that "[t]he admission was already far removed from the illegal search warrant that it cannot be regarded as a fruit of the poisonous tree."55 After seven (7) sachets of shabu were allegedly seized from Salazar's beach house, a complaint for violations of Sections 11 and 15 of Republic Act No. 9165 was filed against him. It was during the preliminary investigation of this complaint, occasioned by the sachets of shabu which were eventually suppressed from evidence because of an illegal search warrant, that Salazar supposedly admitted his drug use to the Provincial Prosecutor. The ponencia claims that the time difference between the illegal search and the preliminary investigation negates a causal relation between the illegal search warrant and the admission. Again, I disagree with the ponencia. Salazar's very presence during the preliminary investigation was brought about by the illegal search warrant. He would not have been subject of a preliminary investigation in the first place if there was no illegal search warrant. Clearly, his purported admission before the Provincial Prosecutor was an indirect result of the illegal search. Thus, under established jurisprudence and the categorical pronouncement of the Constitution, his admission, which was a derivative evidence obtained from an illegal search warrant, "shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."56 Additionally, the Regional Trial Court May 4, 2017 Order,57 quashing the search warrant and suppressing the seized evidence, included all forms of evidence that resulted from the illegal search, such as testimonial evidence, since they were brought about by virtue of the quashed search warrant: In the light of the nullity of Search Warrant No. 5043 (15), the search conducted on its authority is likewise null and void. Based on the above provision, any evidence obtained in violation of a person's right against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. With the inadmissibility of the drugs seized from Salazar's home, there is no more evidence to support his conviction.58 (Emphasis in the original) The inadmissibility of both seized and derivative evidence was reiterated by the Regional Trial Court in its August 18, 2017 Order59 dismissing the criminal case against Salazar: All the evidence obtained as a result of such search is considered illegal, being the.fruit of the poisonous tree. Ergo, even the urine test conducted on accused Salazar, having been done as a result of such arrest, occasioned by the search, is also considered as a fruit of such search, hence illegal.60 (Emphasis supplied) Furthermore, it is irrelevant that XV-05-INV-15C-087 is still pending automatic review before the Department of Justice. The evidence involved is also subject to the exclusionary rule since the evidence relative to Salazar's use of dangerous drugs, i.e., the positive finding of his urine sample and his admission to using dangerous drugs, was the same tainted evidence occasioned by the illegal and quashed search warrant. Thus, recognizing the illegality of his arrest on an imaginary buy-bust operation, the Provincial Prosecutor dismissed the charges for illegal sale and use of dangerous drugs against him: It seems that the scenario of continuing operation of complainants against respondents was a mere build up to the search conducted at the beach house of [Salazar], thereby projecting him as the person behind the rampant selling of dangerous drugs in Marinduque. Doubtless, it was intended to convey the probability of the positive search of dangerous drugs in his beach house. There was no need for this unless nothing was really found inside the beach house of [Salazar]. Considering the improbability of the succeeding buy-bust operation against [Salazar] and [Lubrin], with all the safeguards of the law against "instant" or imaginary buy bust operation, the charges against these respondents for illegal sale of drugs are hereby dismissed. Consequently, the charges of illegal use of drugs, the filing of which can be warranted only upon their lawful arrests on drug[-]related charges, are likewise dismissed.61 (Emphasis supplied) In as much as all forms of evidence obtained by the agents using the illegal search warrant had been suppressed as evidence, including the derivative evidence derived from the suppressed evidence, there is no substantial evidence to support a finding of administrative liability against Salazar because, as the ponencia correctly stated, substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."62 In this case, there is not even a scintilla of evidence to support the conclusion that Salazar is guilty of the administrative charges of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service against him. II An extrajudicial confession made before the provincial prosecutor enjoys the same safeguards available to an accused under Republic Act No. 7438, or An Act Defining Certain Rights of Person Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation as well as the Duties of the Arresting, Detaining and Investigating Officers and Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof. The safeguard of having a written and signed confession before competent counsel still applies because this right springs from the exclusionary rule. This was emphasized by People v. Sunga:63 The right to counsel applies in certain pretrial proceedings that can be deemed "critical stages" in the criminal process. The preliminary investigation can be no different from the in-custody interrogations by the police, for a suspect who takes part in a preliminary investigation will be subjected to no less than the State's processes, oftentimes intimidating and relentless, of pursuing those who might be liable for criminal prosecution. In the case at bar, Sunga was thrust into the preliminary investigation and while he did have a counsel, for the latter's lack of vigilance and commitment to Sunga's rights, he was virtually denied his right to counsel. The right to counsel involves more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections; rather it means an efficient and decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation. As in People v. Abano where the confession by the therein accused in the preliminary investigation was excluded as inadmissible due to the absence of her counsel, this Court will not admit Sunga's. This makes it unnecessary to discuss and emphasize the conflict on material points of Sunga's and Locil's accounts of the incident.64 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) A careful review of the records of the case shows that Salazar was not assisted by counsel during his preliminary investigation before the Provincial Prosecutor. Neither was any written and signed confession on his use of dangerous drugs found or adverted to within the records. In fact, his confession was only briefly mentioned in the Provincial Prosecutor's April 20, 2015 Resolution finding probable cause against him: With respect to the dangerous drug found in his urine sample, he readily admitted using drugs but he was quick to add that he had stopped doing it as he had promised her (sic) mother on her deathbed in December 2014. .... On the charge of illegal use of dangerous drugs, probable cause exists with a positive result of the confirmatory test conducted on the urine sample of [Salazar]. He himself admitted that he had used dangerous drugs. It is as simple as that.65 (Emphasis supplied) However, it is not as simple as the Provincial Prosecutor would like to believe. Any person arrested, detained, or under custodial investigation has the right to be assisted at all times by a competent counsel66 and the records show that Salazar was not afforded that right. III The fundamental rights of an accused can be found in Article III, Section 14 of the Constitution and these rights follow the accused throughout every stage of the criminal proceedings: Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. Additionally, the rights afforded to an accused are available even before an arrest is made, as these rights not only encompass persons arrested, detained, or under custodial investigation, but also embrace invitations or requests for appearance67 extended by State agents to persons suspected of committing crimes. People v. Deniega68 emphasized that the modifiers "competent and independent," describing a counsel of an accused, were not present previous to the 1987 Constitution; thus, their inclusion in the present Constitution stresses the importance of a voluntary confession by an accused based on informed judgment during custodial investigation: [T]he primacy accorded to the voluntariness of the choice, under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial investigation, by according the accused, deprived of normal conditions guaranteeing individual autonomy, an informed judgment based on the choices given to him by a competent and independent lawyer.69 On the other hand, a person's rights in a preliminary investigation are derived from statute and not the Constitution; hence, such rights are subject to the limitations of procedural law.70 Furthermore, a preliminary investigation is considered merely preparatory to a trial and not part of a trial; thus, while parties may submit affidavits, they have no right to examine witnesses.71 Nonetheless, this Court has established in Sunga and People v. Bokingo72 that the right to counsel and the requirement of a signed confession with the assistance of a counsel also obtain during preliminary investigation. Moreover, the failure to respect the rights of an accused during preliminary investigation also renders inadmissible any resulting evidence obtained from it, even supposedly voluntary confessions. In the case at bar, the quashal of the illegal search warrant, the suppression of the tainted evidence obtained using the quashed search warrant, and the failure to present Salazar's written confession signed in the presence of a counsel compel this Court to dismiss the administrative case against him for utter lack of evidence to support the charges brought against him. ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS Administrative Matter Nos. 15-05-136-RTC and P-16-3450. I also vote to REVOKE the suspension order against Sheriff Rogelio M. Salazar, Jr. and to ALLOW him to report back to his position as Sheriff IV of Regional Trial Court, Office of the Clerk of Court, Boac, Marinduque, with the concomitant payment of his back salaries and other benefits which were withheld during his suspension. Footnotes 1 Rollo (A.M. No. P-16-3450), pp. 48-49. 2 Id. at 50-52. 3 Id. at 56. 4 Id. at 58. 5 Id. at 60-61. 6 Id. at 61-62. 7 Id. at 46-47. 8 Id. at 139. 9 Id. 10 Id. 11 Id. 12 Id. 13 Id. at 169. 14 Rollo (A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC), pp. 46-47. 15 Rollo (A.M. No. P-16-3450), p. 138. 16 Id. at 142. 17 Id. at 142-143. 18 Id. at 143-144. 19 Rollo (A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC), p. 48. 20 Id. at 48-50. 21 Id. at 18 and 21. 22 Id. at 19-20. 23 Rollo (A.M. No. P-16-3450), p. 1. 24 Id. at 1-2. 25 Id. 26 Id. at 8-9. 27 Id. at 10-32. 28 Id. at 16-25. 29 Id. at 11. 30 Id. at 11-12. 31 Rollo (A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC), pp. 2-3. 32 Id. at 1. 33 Id. at 54-57. 34 Id. at 56-57. 35 Id. at 67-75. 36 Id. at 75. 37 Id. at 72. 38 Rollo (A.M. No. P-16-3450), pp. 148-154. 39 Id. at 168-177. The Order in the consolidated cases of People of the Philippines v. Salazar (Criminal Case No. 62-15) and People of the Philippines v. Salazar (Criminal Case No. 63-15) was penned by Judge Designate Dennis R. Pastrana. 40 Id. at 173. 41 Id. at 174-175. 42 Id. at 176-177. The Order was penned by Judge Designate Dennis R. Pastrana. 43 Id. at 178. 44 Id. at 178-179. 45 Id. at 179. 46 Id. at 163-164. 47 CONST., art. III, sec. 3. 48 126 Phil. 738 (1967) [Per C.J. Concepcion, En Banc]. 49 80 Phil. 1 (1948) [Per J. Pablo, Second Division]. 50 Stonehill v. Diokno, 126 Phil. 738, 750 (1967) [Per C.J. Concepcion, En Banc], citing People v. Defore, 140 NE 585. 51 Id. 52 Id. at 753-754. 53 321 Phil. 656 (1995) [Per J. Puno, En Banc]. 54 Id. at 690-691. 55 Ponencia, p. 9. 56 CONST., art. III, sec. 3(2). 57 Rollo (A.M. No. P-16-3450), pp. 168-177. 58 Id. at 177. 59 Id. 60 Id. at 179. 61 Id. at 143. 62 Ponencia, p. 7, citing Ombudsman Marcelo v. Bungubung, 575 Phil. 538 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division]. 63 447 Phil. 776 (2003) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc]. 64 Id. at 807. 65 Rollo (A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC), pp. 49-50. 66 Rep. Act No. 7438 (1992), sec. 2(a). 67 Lopez v. People, G.R. No. 212186, June 29, 2016 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division]. 68 321 Phil. 1028 (1995) [Per J. Kapunan, First Division]. 69 Id. at 1041. 70 Dichaves v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 206310-11, December 7, 2016 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division] 71 De Lima v. Reyes, G.R. No. 209330, January 11, 2016 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division]. 72 671 Phil. 71 (2011) [Per J. Perez, Second Division]. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation