DISSENTING OPINION
SERENO, CJ:
The threshold issue in this case is whether or not Artemio dela Cruz (Artemio) is a third party in possession of the subject property who claims a right adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor in the foreclosure proceedings, therefore warranting the quashal of the Writ of Possession.
The Court of Appeals (CA) annulled the assailed Writ of Possession1 and Notice to Vacate,2 which the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 72, Olongapo City, had issued to petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, Jose R. Peñaflor (Peñaflor). The CA found that respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Artemio, was a third party who was in adverse possession of the subject property as against Nicolasa dela Cruz (Nicolasa), the judgment obligor in the ex parte possession case. Thus, the RTC had no authority to issue the Writ of Possession and Notice to Vacate.
This finding was based on this Court's Decision in an ejectment case submitted by Artemio (second SC judgment). This Court affirmed therein his lawful possession over the subject property.3 The CA found that the pieces of evidence that were given probative value by this Court in that case all indicated that Artemio was claiming ownership of the subject property, which was also in his possession.
The CA also took note of a notarized deed dated 3 May 1989 denominated as "Waiver and Transfer of Possessory Rights."4 The deed was executed by Nicolasa, who thereby waived and transferred all her rights and interests over the subject property in favor of Artemio. To the appellate court, this notarized waiver fortified his adverse claim which, at the very least, was bona fide and in good faith.5
The CA then held that because Artemio was a third person in possession of the property, the RTC should have desisted from issuing and enforcing a Writ of Possession. It further held that pursuant to law and jurisprudence, a trial court's otherwise ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases when the subject property is in the possession of a third party who claims ownership.6 To dispossess the third-party on the strength of a mere ex parte possessory writ would be tantamount to a violation of due process.7
The ponencia now reverses the CA's ruling and affirms the RTC's issuance of a Writ of Possession. It holds that Artemio was not able to sufficiently prove that he was a third party in possession of the subject property.8 I respectfully register my dissent.
The legal and jurisprudential basis of the exception.
The legal and jurisprudential antecedents of the issue would facilitate an understanding of the conclusions I have arrived at as discussed below.
The well-settled rule is that in the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage under Act No. 3135, the issuance of a writ of possession is ministerial upon the court after the foreclosure sale and during the redemption period.1aшphi1 In the latter period, the court may issue an order for a writ of possession upon the mere filing of an ex parte motion and the approval of the corresponding bond. A writ of possession also issues as a matter of course without need of a bond or of a separate and independent action after the lapse of the period of redemption and the consolidation of ownership in the purchaser's name.9
There are, however, several exceptions to this ministerial duty established by law and jurisprudence.10 One of the exceptions is that which was first enunciated in Barican v. Intermediate Appellate Court11 in line with Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court: when a third party in possession of the property claims a right adverse to that of the debtor-mortgagor in a foreclosure case. The threshold issue in this case revolves around this particular exception.
The exception was explained further by the Court in Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals12 as follows:
Thus, in Barican v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we held that the obligation of a court to issue an ex-parte writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to be ministerial once it appears that there is a third party in possession of the property who is claiming a right adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor. The same principle was inversely applied in a more recent case, where we ruled that a writ of possession may be issued in an extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage, only if the debtor is in possession and no third party had intervened. Although the factual nuances of this case may slightly differ from the aforecited cases, the availing circumstances are undeniably similar — a party in possession of the foreclosed property is asserting a right adverse to the debtor/mortgagor and is a stranger to the foreclosure proceedings in which the ex-parte writ of possession was applied for. (Emphases supplied)
From the foregoing, it is apparent that there are three requisites that must concur for the exception to apply:
1. The claimant must be a third party.
2. The claimant must be in actual possession of the subject property.
3. The third party in possession must claim a right adverse to that of the debtor or mortgagor in the foreclosure proceedings.
The vast body of case law on the exception provides an insight into the specifics of each requisite.
Under the first requisite, to be considered a third party means that the claimant was a stranger to the foreclosure proceedings.13 Villanueva v. Cherdan Lending Investors Corporation14 defines a third party in a more specific manner as one who was a stranger to the mortgage, and who did not participate in the foreclosure proceedings.
Under the second requisite, possession is to be understood in its ordinary meaning. That is, the claimant must hold actual possession of the property in a certain and undisputed manner.15
The last requisite must be understood in light of possession by a third party. To put it simply, the possession must be under a claim adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor;16 the third party must be asserting a hold on the property in litigation under a title adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor.17 Under this requisite, a claim or an assertion of an adverse nature is sufficient.
The concurrence of the three requisites as discussed above would result in the application of the exception. Consequently, the ministerial duty of the court to issue an ex parte writ of possession ceases. Instead, it is mandated to conduct a hearing to determine the nature of the possession; i.e., whether or not the third party is in possession of the subject property under a claim adverse to that of the judgment debtor.18 It is in this manner that the issuance of a writ of possession ceases to be ex parte and non-adversarial.19
The purpose of the hearing was explained in the early case Saavedra v. Siari Valley Estates,20 as follows:
There may be cases when the actual possessor may be claimed to be a privy to any of the parties to the action, or his bona-fide possession may be disputed, or where it is alleged, as in the instant case; that such possession has been taken in connivance with the defeated litigant with a view of frustrating the judgment. In any of these events, the proper procedure would be to order a hearing on the matter of such possession and to deny or accede to the enforcement of a writ of possession as the finding shall warrant.
The aforecited rulings of the Court would indicate that a hearing is conducted only to determine whether or not possession by a third-party claimant is really adverse for purposes of issuing a writ of possession. If the possession is adverse within the definition of the law, the court shall defer or quash the issuance of a writ of possession; otherwise, it shall proceed to issue the writ.
This rule is explained in Rivero de Ortega v. Natividad,21 which reads in relevant part as follows:
But where a party in possession was not a party to the foreclosure, and did not acquire his possession from a person who was bound by the decree, but who is a mere stranger and who entered into possession before the suit was begun, the court has no power to deprive him of possession by enforcing the decree. Thus, it was held that only parties to the suit, persons who came in under them pendente lite, and trespassers or intruders without title, can be evicted by a writ of possession. The reason for this limitation is that the writ does not issue in case of doubt, nor will a question of legal title be tried or decided in proceedings looking to the exercise of the power of the court to put a purchaser in possession. xxx The petitioner, it is held, should be required to establish his title in a proceeding directed to that end.22 (Emphases supplied, citations omitted)
Clearly, the court cannot dispossess the current possessor of the property who posits an adverse claim through its issuance of a Writ of Possession in the same foreclosure proceedings.
In determining whether or not possession is indeed adverse, the court must look into the nature of the possession by the third-party claimant and determine if the latter's claim is indeed adverse, as defined above, and is bona fide and in good faith. To provide a better understanding of when possession is adverse, jurisprudence on who is not an adverse claimant is informative. In Planas v. Madrigal & Co.,23 the Court held that an adverse claimant must not be a mere transferee or possessor pendente lite of the property in question. Roxas v. Buan held that a successor-in-interest of the judgment obligor cannot be considered an adverse claimant.24 In Rivero de Ortega,25 the Court stated that an adverse possessor must be one who did not acquire possession from a person who was bound by the decree; rather, the adverse claimant must be a mere stranger who entered into possession before the foreclosure suit began.
China Banking Corporation v. Spouses Lozada26 likewise held as follows:
The exception provided under Section 33 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court contemplates a situation in which a third party holds the property by adverse title or right, such as that of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary. The co-owner, agricultural tenant, and usufructuary possess the property in their own right, and they are not merely the successor or transferee of the right of possession of another co-owner or the owner of the property. (Emphases supplied)
In other words, in order not to be ousted by the ex parte issuance of a writ of possession, the third party must have possession that proceeds from a right independent of and even superior to that of the judgment debtor/mortgagor.27 Not only must the property be possessed by a third party; it must also be adversely held by the third party adversely to the judgment obligor.28
In light of these rulings, it is apparent that the third-party claimant need not prove ownership in the proceedings.29 All that needs to be shown with a preponderance of evidence is that the third-party claimant is in possession of the property and is asserting a right adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor with respect to the possession as discussed above. Once such evidence is shown, the court must defer the issuance of a writ of possession and let the parties file the proper judicial action. The matter of whether or not the third-party claimant is indeed the lawful owner or better possessor of the property is a matter that must be threshed out in a separate proceeding.30
It bears to emphasize that the mandated separate proceeding is founded on the underpinnings of the exception in substantive law, particularly Art. 433 of the Civil Code. Under this provision, as explained in Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals,31 one who claims to be the owner of a property possessed by another must bring the appropriate judicial action for its physical recovery. Art. 433 requires nothing less than an ejectment or reivindicatory action to be brought even by the true owner. After all, the actual possessors of a property enjoy in their favor the legal presumption of a just title, which must be overcome by the party claiming otherwise. An ex parte petition for the issuance of a possessory writ under Section 7 of Act No. 3135 is not, strictly speaking, a "judicial process" as contemplated above. Even if the petition may be considered a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one's right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale, it is not an ordinary suit filed in court.32 In an ordinary lawsuit, one party "sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."
Pursuant to the foregoing discussion, it has been held that the jurisdiction of the court over the proceedings discussed above is limited to the issuance of a writ of possession. It has no jurisdiction to determine who between the parties is the rightful owner and lawful possessor of the property.33
The Writ of Possession and the Notice to Vacate were not issued in compliance with law.
The question now is whether Artemio, as substituted by respondents, is a third party in adverse possession of the subject property who is claiming a right adverse to that of Nicolasa, the debtor/mortgagor in the ex parte possession case.
The RTC found that he was not. On the other hand, the CA found that he was an adverse possessor and ordered the quashal of the issued writ.
It is submitted that the CA ruling, when tested against the law and jurisprudence cited above, was not in error.
First, Artemio was definitely a third party within the contemplation of the exception. Nowhere in the records does it appear that he was a party to the foreclosure proceedings, from which sprung the petition for the issuance of an ex parte writ of possession. In fact, the records indicate that he was apprised of the mortgage only when the sheriff first attempted to implement the Writ of Possession and Notice to Vacate.34 This attempt supposedly prompted him to file an action for Annulment of Judgment in the ex parte writ of possession case.35 However, the RTC dismissed without prejudice that action for the Annulment of Judgment for lack of jurisdiction.36
Second, the actual possession of the subject property by Artemio is undisputed, as it was affirmed by no less than the second SC judgment.
In the aforementioned Decision, which concerns the ejectment case Artemio had filed against Carmelita, this Court affirmed his possessory rights over the subject property after he was found to be in prior possession thereof.37 Likewise noted is the issuance of the second SC judgment in 2006, or during the pendency of Peñaflor's application for a writ of possession pursuant to the judgment in the ex parte possession case. This simply means that Artemio's possession of the subject property was already subsisting at the time it was extrajudicially foreclosed. The RTC should have noted this fact.
Lastly, Artemio possessed the property under an adverse claim against Nicolasa, the debtor/mortgagor in the foreclosure proceedings, as affirmed by the evidence available before the Court.
The second SC judgment38 specifically found the following:
1. Artemio had been in long-term possession of the property since 1968.
2. He had a Sales Patent Application over the property in his name dated 2 October 1968.
3. He had Tax Declarations over the property in his name dated 7 January 1969 and 22 May 1989, or prior to the execution of the mortgage and the foreclosure thereof.
4. He had executed mortgages over the property in 1968 and 1973, also prior to the execution of the mortgage and the foreclosure thereof.39
The CA was thus correct in ruling as follows:
We find that petitioners are holding the property adverse to Nicolasa, the judgment obligor. Nowhere is this made clearer than in the evidence submitted by Artemio in Civil Case No. 4605 [ejectment case], which were given probative value by no less than the Supreme Court. The evidence, consisting of Artemio's sales application, the deeds of real estate mortgage and payment of taxes on the property, all indicate that Artemio is claiming ownership of the subject property, which was in his possession at the time.40
Likewise noted is the notarized Waiver41 executed in 1989 by Nicolasa, who thereby renounced all her rights, interests, and participation in favor of Artemio. This Waiver, which strengthened Artemio's adverse claim of ownership, especially against Nicolasa, was executed prior to the bank's mortgage lien.
All these facts indicate that the claim of Artemio was not derived from his relationship with Nicolasa as her heir or successor-in-interest. Therefore, he was holding the property in his own right.
Under the above circumstances, the RTC was without authority to grant the Writ of Possession. It should have desisted from enforcing the writ until a determination as to who, between petitioners and respondents, had the better right to possess the property. To enforce the writ against an unwitting third-party possessor, who took no part in the foreclosure proceedings, would be tantamount to the taking of real property without the benefit of proper judicial intervention.42
Petitioners cannot invoke Peñaflor's title in the ex parte proceeding; they must resort to the appropriate judicial process in order to recover the property. As correctly concluded by the CA, the correct remedy is not the implementation of the Writ of Possession, but petitioners' institution of ejectment proceedings or a reivindicatory action.43
Whatever arguments petitioners have raised to prove their supposed rightful possession or ownership of the property are matters that should be threshed out in an appropriate action filed specifically for their resolution.44 In the writ of possession case, the RTC had no jurisdiction to determine who between the parties was entitled to ownership and possession of the foreclosed property.45
The Waiver was not Artemio's source of title over the subject property.1aшphi1
One of the arguments raised in the ponencia is that a mere waiver of rights is not an effective mode of transferring ownership under the law.46 This argument is premised on the position that the Waiver executed by Nicolasa in favor of Artemio back in 1989 was the source of his claim of ownership.
However, the Waiver was not the basis of the claim of Artemio. The CA ruled that the Waiver simply fortified his claim over the property, especially against Nicolasa. It was the totality of evidence, as appreciated by the CA, that showed that he was clearly an adverse third-party possessor of the subject property. The evidence included the second SC judgment itself affirming his possession over the subject property.
In fact, this Court found in that case that "[Artemio] presented enough evidence proving his prior possession of the Property independent of the Waiver."47 To put it simply, his adverse claim - specifically one of ownership -was founded on his long-term possession of the subject property together with his other acts of ownership executed over it.
It must also be emphasized that Nicolasa could not have possibly been Artemio's source of claim of ownership over the subject property, as she herself had no title thereto in her name. Further, she was never shown to have actually possessed the subject property at any time. Her supposed right thereto was based on (1) a Sales Patent Application, which in the ejectment case was found by this Court to be undated; and (2) Tax Declarations which, however, failed to clearly indicate that it was Nicolasa, not Artemio, who had first declared the property for tax purposes.48
Further, the assailed Waiver49 reads as follows:
That I, NICOLASA DELA CRUZ, of legal age, Filipino, widow and residing at No. 11 Ifugao St. Barretto, Olongapo City, Philippines, do hereby by these presents, freely and irrevocably WAIVE, RENOUNCE, TRANSFER and QUITCLAIM all my rights, interests and participation over a parcel of residential lot including all the existing improvements thereon, x x x:
x x x x
x x x in favor of my son ARTEMIO DELA CRUZ, xxx the above-described property free from all liens and encumbrances;
That I hereby warrant peaceful possession of the above-described property herein waived, binding myself to defend him, his heirs, successors, assigns from any lawful claims of any person whomsoever.50
Nowhere in the Waiver was it stated that Nicolasa owned the subject property, and that she was transferring ownership thereof to Artemio. Rather, she simply renounced all her rights, interests, and participation in his favor. It is understood that she did so on account of the finding in the ejectment case that she had previously attempted to apply for a sales patent for herself. It was also found that she even had Tax Declarations in her name over the subject property, but that these were insufficient to debunk the documents of Artemio proving his claim over the property. The Waiver simply indicates that Nicolasa had previously laid claim over the subject property, but that she is now letting go of her claim in favor of Artemio. Therefore, at the very least, the Waiver establishes his claim of ownership specifically against that of Nicolasa, the debtor/mortgagor in the foreclosure proceedings.
The factual findings in the ejectment case were properly considered.
While the documentary evidence under consideration (i.e. the Sales Patent Application, Deeds of Real Estate Mortgage, Tax Declarations, and Waiver) do not, on their own, conclusively prove the ownership of Artemio over the subject property, together they indicate his adverse claim thereto, especially against Nicolasa.
As has been said, all that third-party claimants in foreclosure proceedings need to show is that they are in possession, and that their possession is adverse to the claim of the judgment obligor. In other words, they simply have to show that they have a valid claim of ownership together with their possession, not that they in feet have ownership.51
Here, the second SC judgment itself shows, at the very least, that Artemio has indisputably been in possession of the subject property since 1968. The ponencia points out that the second SC judgment was limited to the issue of possession against his sister, Carmelita. Nevertheless, possession of the property by Artemio gives him a presumptive title over it, considering that the debtor/mortgagor (Nicolasa) did not have any title in her name and was not in possession of the property at the time she mortgaged it. Development Bank of the Philippines v. Prime Neighborhood Association52 has ruled that a third party's possession of the property is legally presumed to be pursuant to a just title. It must be borne in mind that the foregoing legal presumption may be overcome by the purchaser only in a judicial proceeding for recovery of the property.
It is noteworthy that the second SC judgment case involves the same property. The ejectment case therein was also filed against the sister of Artemio, who is involved in the present case as the one who mortgaged the property on behalf of their mother, Nicolasa. Lastly, the ruling in favor of Artemio, while primarily focused on his right of possession, was based on a set of documents asserting his claim of ownership over the subject property. Consequently, the relevance of the ejectment case to the one presently before us cannot be denied.
It is not surprising, therefore, for the CA to find that this act of filing the ejectment case and pursuing it through four different courts establishes, to a large extent, that Artemio's claim of ownership is "far from being a mere ruse to prevent the implementation of the writ of possession and frustrate the effects of the mortgage executed in favor of [Peñaflor]."53
On this note, it is worthy to address the due process arguments raised.54 Indeed, the documents that formed the basis of the second SC judgment were not submitted and considered before the court a quo. Rather, what was submitted to the lower court was the second SC judgment itself.
A review of the facts would show that, through a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion,55 Artemio presented before the RTC the second SC judgment to prove his status as a third-party claimant. The facts also show that Peñaflor, through counsel, was able to oppose that motion.56
Thus, contrary to the ponencia 's concern, the right of Peñaflor to due process was not violated in the course of the proceedings below. He was able to examine, object to, and set up his defense as against that particular Decision of the Court, the implications of which could have guided the trial court in determining the status of Artemio as an adverse possessor of the subject property.
The records affirm the veracity of Artemio's adverse claim.
The ponencia points out certain parts of the records that supposedly diminish the veracity of Artemio's claim.57
At the outset, it cannot be emphasized enough that a third party claiming ownership of the subject property need not prove the validity of the claim in the proceedings for the issuance of a writ of possession. What needs to be shown is simply possession of an adverse character as against the claim of the debtor/mortgagor in the foreclosure case. In other words, what needs to be shown is a bona fide claim, not proof of ownership per se. The veracity or truth of that claim must be threshed out in a separate proceeding, as discussed above.
At any rate, it is submitted that the circumstances pointed out do not diminish the adverse nature of Artemio's claim over the property.
First, in his case for Annulment of Judgment, Artemio's claim that Nicolasa did not own the subject property was not inconsistent with respondents' claim in the present case that Nicolasa transferred her rights over the property through a Waiver. As discussed above, the Waiver was not the primary source of the right of Artemio over the property. Also, nowhere in the Waiver is it mentioned that Nicolasa owned the property or was transferring ownership thereof to him.
Second, the separate Motions to Quash filed by the siblings of Artemio cannot be taken against him, as he did not join them in their motions for the reason that his own Motion to Quash was founded on a different ground. Instead of banking on his father's share in the subject property, he grounded his motion on his own claim of ownership.58 It is this claim that he has been asserting since Day One; that is, through the filing of his action for Annulment of Judgment.
Third, there was a reason why it took Artemio seven years from the mortgage of the subject property to file the ejectment complaint. Prior to filing that case, he had filed the earlier Complaint for Annulment of Judgment in the ex parte possession case decided in Peñaflor's favor. Unfortunately, that Complaint was dismissed only in March 1998,59 prompting Artemio to immediately file an ejectment case against his sister in April 1998. Instead of engendering doubt, these events further affirm the CA's conclusion that his unwavering acts to defend his claim over the property, including the "filing of [the ejectment case] and seeing it through four different courts xxx establishes to a large extent that his claim of ownership is far from being a mere ruse to prevent the implementation of the writ of possession and frustrate the effects of the mortgage executed in favor of [Peñaflor]."60
CONCLUSION
There is no dispute that the law puts a premium to the mortgagee who has already consolidated the title to the subject property. But the law also protects the actual possessor of a property under a claim of ownership61 as clearly articulated in Art. 433 of the Civil Code. This provision underpins the issue involved in the present case. Artemio has been shown to be such a possessor.
I submit that it would be premature, unwarranted, and, ultimately unjust if, on the basis of doubts as to the source of his ownership over the subject property, Artemio were to be deprived of the right to defend his claim over it in a separate action. This is a matter that must be properly threshed out in a separate judicial proceeding as required by Art. 433.
It must be emphasized that all that the exception does is make the RTC defer the issuance of a writ of possession and allow the parties to thresh out their claim in a proper judicial proceeding. The exception does not in any way nullify or affect the mortgagee's consolidated title.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DENY the Petition. The Court of Appeals Decision62 and Resolution63 in CA-G.R. SP No. 110392 should be AFFIRMED.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 122-124; dated 27 June 2008.
2 Id. at 128; dated.18 June 2009.
3 See Guanga v. Dela Cruz, 519 Phil. 764 (2006).
4 Rollo, p. 170.
5 Id. at 64-65.
6 Id. at 67.
7 Id. at 65-66.
8 Ponencia, p. 14.
9 Cabling v. Lumapas, 736 Phil. 582 (2014).
10 See Nagtalon v. UCPB, 715 Phil. 595 (2013).
11 245 Phil. 316 (1988).
12 424 Phil. 757, 769 (2002).
13 Id.
14 647 Phil. 494 (2010).
15 Hernandez v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 181268, 15 August 2016.
16 Development Bank of the Phils, v. Prime Neighborhood Association, 605 Phil. 660 (2009).
17 Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Icot, 618 Phil. 3210 (2009).
18 Hernandez v. Ocampo, supra note 5.
19 Okabe v. Saturnino, G.R. No. 196040, 26 August 2014, 733 SCRA 652.
20 106 Phil. 432, 437 (1959); see Santiago v. Sheriff of Manila, 77 Phil., 740, 743- 44.
21 71 Phil. 340 (1941).
22 Id. at 342-343.
23 94 Phil. 754 (1954).
24 249 Phil. 41 (1988).
25 Rivero de Ortega v. Natividad, supra note 21.
26 579 Phil. 454 (2008).
27 Id.
28 BPI Family Savings Dank, Inc. v. Golden Power Diesel Sales Center, Inc., 654 Phil. 382 (2011).
29 Royal Savings Bank v. Asia, 708 Phil. 485 (2013); Development Bank of the Phils. v. Prime Neighborhood Association, supra note 16.
30 Development Bank of the Phils. v. Prime Neighborhood Association, id.
31 Supra note 12.
32 Dayot v. Shell Chemical Co. (Phils.). Inc., 552 Phil. 602 (2007).
33 Development Bank of the Phils. v. Prime Neighborhood Association, supra note 16.
34 Rollo, p. 91.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 95.
37 Guanga v. Dela Cruz, supra note 3.
38 Id.
39 Rollo, p. 60.
40 Id. at 64.
41 Id. at 170.
42 Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, supra note 12.
43 Rollo, p. 67.
44 Royal Savings Bank v. Asia, supra note 29.
45 Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, supra note 12.
46 Ponencia, pp. 8-10.
47 Guanga v. Dela Cruz, supra note 3 at 773.
48 Id.
49 Rollo, p. 170.
50 Id.
51 Development Bank of the Phils. v. Prime Neighborhood Association, supra note 16
52 Id.
53 Rollo, p. 65.
54 Ponencia, p. 11.
55 Rollo, p. 28.
56 Id.
57 Ponencia, pp. 13-14.
58 Rollo, p. 61.
59 Id. at 90-95.
60 Id. at 65.
61 Unchuan v. CA, 244 Phil. 733 (1988).
62 Dated 18 February 2011.
63 Dated 8 July 2011.
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