Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 203974 April 22, 2014
AURELIO M. UMALI, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JULIUS CESAR V. VERGARA, and THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CABANATUAN, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 204371
J.V. BAUTISTA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DISSENTING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
I am constrained by my view of my judicial duty to express a dissenting opinion to the ponencia of an esteemed colleague.
The issue raised in this case has not yet been passed upon squarely by this court. At issue is whether the change in classification of a component city to a highly urbanized city req~ires a plebiscite which includes the voters of the entire province or only those within the component city. More specifically, we are asked to construe Section 453 of the Local Government Code in relation to Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution.
Section 453 of the Local Government Code provides:
Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status. - It shall be the duty of the President to declare a city as highly urbanized within thirty (30) days after it shall have met the minimum requirements prescribed in the immediately preceding section, upon proper application therefor and ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein.1 (Emphasis supplied)
Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution states:
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied)
While this issue is novel for this court, the Commission on Elections and the executive have had their interpretation of these provisions implemented in a number of cities. Petitioner Governor Aurelio M. Umali proposes that it should be the entire Province of Nueva Ecija that should be included in the plebiscite while respondent Mayor Julius Cesar V. Vergara asserts that only the qualified voters of Cabanatuan City should participate in the plebiscite in accordance with the resolution of the Commission on Elections.
It is granted that any change in the status of Cabanatuan City will have its consequences on the lives of its citizens and the politics of both the city and the province.
The ponencia relied mainly on Miranda v. Aguirre2 to support its contention that the petition should be granted. I will have to disagree with my esteemed colleague. In Miranda v. Aguirre, the issue was the challenge of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8528, which downgraded Santiago City, located in the Province of Isabela, from an independent component city to a component city without a requirement of a plebiscite. The court ruled that:
It is markworthy that when R.A. No. 7720 upgraded the status of Santiago City from a municipality to an independent component city, it required the approval of its people thru a plebiscite called for the purpose. There is neither rhyme nor reason why this plebiscite should not be called to determine the will of the people of Santiago City when R.A. No. 8528 downgrades the status of their city. Indeed, there is more reason to consult the people when a law substantially diminishes their right. Rule II, Article 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code is in accord with the Constitution when it provides that:
(f) Plebiscite – (1) no creation, conversion, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of LGUs shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the LGU or LGUs affected. The plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120) days from the effectivity of the law or ordinance prescribing such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date.
The rules cover all conversions, whether upward or downward in character, so long as they result in a material change in the local government unit directly affected, especially a change in the political and economic rights of its people.3 (Emphasis in the original)
That case contained no definitive juridical pronouncement regarding the scope of the plebiscite that is required.
Also cited in the ponencia is Tan v. COMELEC.4 Residents questioned the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, which proposed the creation of the new province, the Province of Negros del Norte, from Negros Occidental. Batas Pambansa No. 885 was nullified because it did not conform with the land area and income requirements of the old Local Government Code. With regard to the plebiscite, this court stated that:
x x x the more significant and pivotal issue in the present case revolves around in the interpretation and application in the case at bar of Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution, which being brief and for convenience, We again quote:
SEC. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.
It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision makes it imperative that there be first obtained "the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected" whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries. It is thus inescapable to conclude that the boundaries of the existing province of Negros Occidental would necessarily be substantially altered by the division of its existing boundaries in order that there can be created the proposed new province of Negros del Norte. Plain and simple logic will demonstrate then that two political units would be affected. The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.5
What was involved in Tan was the creation of a new province, Negros del Norte, and not the process of conversion of a component city into a highly urbanized city.
Padilla, Jr. v. COMELEC6 is also cited in the ponencia.1âwphi1 This involved a plebiscite for the creation of the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa. Again, this case is not applicable because it involved the creation of a new municipality. The creation of a new municipality is different from the conversion of an already existing component city into a highly urbanized city.
Governor Umali alleged that the phrase "qualified voters therein" in Section 453 should mean the voters in the whole province of Nueva Ecija and not only those in Cabanatuan City.7
On the other hand, Mayor Vergara of Cabanatuan City argues that the same phrase "qualified voters therein" refers to the qualified voters of the city.8 Among others, he pointed out that "only the residents of Cabanatuan City"9 will be affected because "they will lose their right to vote for provincial officials."10
In its comment, the Commission on Elections pointed out:
However, qualification must be permitted where, as in this case, the subject city of Cabanatuan is simply being converted from a component city into a highly urbanized city. In this instance, the political unit directly affected by the conversion is only Cabanatuan City, which exercises powers and prerogatives it already maintains and enjoys but which are being reinforced with the political unit’s probable elevation to that of a highly urbanized city as demanded by its compliance with the criteria established under the Local Government Code. No political unit is created, merged or removed from another local government unit. No boundaries are being altered or affected. In fact, contrary to petitioner’s ratiocination, there is no severance from the parent unit, which has long enjoyed the status of being a component city since its elevation to cityhood on June 16, 1950.11
More in point is the Commission on Elections’ Minute Resolution No. 12-0797, specifically the memorandum of Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento, which discussed the rationale for the rule regarding "qualified voters" in cases of conversion of local government units:
It is respectfully submitted that only those registered residents of Cabanatuan City should participate in the plebiscite.
First, the primary purpose of the conversion from being a component city to highly urbanized city is INDEPENDENCE from the province where it is geographically located. A conversion will necessarily affect the province as it will reduce its income, voters for the provincial elective position, among others. As expected, it would be detrimental to any petition for conversion from component city to HUC to allow residents of the entire province to vote in the plebiscite. If we allow this, a scenario will be created wherein all the indicators for the conversion have been met including the vote of approval of the residents of Cabanatuan City but conversion was not allowed due to the opposition through votes of the other residents of the province.
It is a general rule of statutory construction that a law should not be so construed as to produce an absurd result. The law does not intend to be an absurdity or that an absurd consequence shall flow from its enactment. If the words of the statute are susceptible of more than one meaning, the one that has a logical construction should be adopted over the one that will produce an absurdity. Statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion.
Moreover, under the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the LGC:
(f) Plebiscite – (1) no creation, conversion, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of LGUs shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the LGU or LGUs affected. The plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120) days from the effectivity of the law or ordinance prescribing such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date.
While the province will be affected by the conversion, it is submitted that the LGU directly, as pertained above, is the Cabanatuan City and not the province. Even assuming that the IRR contemplates the direct effect on both Cabanatuan and the province, it must be remembered that the IRR cannot go beyond what is provided in the law which it seeks to implement.
The Local Government Code provides:
Sec. 452. Highly urbanized cities.
(c) Qualified voters of highly urbanized cities shall remain excluded from voting for elective provincial officials.’
Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status.
It shall be the duty of the President to declare a city as highly urbanized within 30 days after it shall have met the minimum requirements prescribed in the immediately preceding Section, upon proper application therefor and ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein.
The term qualified voters therein pertains to the voters of the city to be converted as highly urbanized city. ‘Therein’ pertains to the city to be declared as highly urbanized.
Third, previous conversion of component cities to HUCs would show that only those residents of the converted city were allowed to vote. Example: Puerto Princesa City, Tacloban City and Lapu Lapu City.12
The Commission on Elections’ position is in line with the position of the executive. Thus, the Implementing Rules of the Local Government Code, Rule II, Article 12, paragraph (b) provides:
Article 12. Conversion of a Component City Into a Highly-Urbanized City. — (a) Requisites for conversion — A component city shall not be converted into a highly-urbanized city unless the following requisites are present:
x x x x
(b) Procedure for conversion —
(1) Resolution — The interested component city shall submit to the Office of the President a resolution of its sanggunian adopted by a majority of all its members in a meeting duly called for the purpose, and approved and endorsed by the city mayor. Said resolution shall be accompanied by certifications as to income and population.
(2) Declaration of conversion — Within thirty (30) days from receipt of such resolution, the President shall, after verifying that the income and population requirements have been met, declare the component city as highly-urbanized.
(3) Plebiscite — Within one hundred twenty (120) days from the declaration of the President or as specified in the declaration, the COMELEC shall conduct a plebiscite in the city proposed to be converted. Such plebiscite shall be preceded by a comprehensive information campaign to be conducted by the COMELEC with the assistance of national and local government officials, media, NGOs, and other interested parties.
(c) Effect of Conversion —
The conversion of a component city into a highly-urbanized city shall make it independent of the province where it is geographically located.13
Cabanatuan City is not the first city to apply for conversion from a component city into a highly urbanized city. In 2007, Lapu-Lapu City in the Province of Cebu held a plebiscite for its conversion. The Commission on Elections issued Resolution No. 785414 dated April 3, 2007. Section 7 of Resolution No. 7854 states:
Sec. 7. Who may vote. – All qualified voters of Lapu-Lapu City duly registered as of the January 8-12, 2007 hearings of the Election Registration Board (ERB) are entitled to vote in the plebiscite.
The EO of Lapu-Lapu City shall prepare the lists of voters for use in the plebiscite in accordance with Section 11 hereof.15
In 2008, Tacloban City conducted a plebiscite for its conversion from a component city into a highly urbanized city. The Commission on Elections then issued Resolution No. 851616 dated November 12, 2008. With regard to the qualified voters for the conduct of the plebiscite, Resolution No. 8516 states:
Sec. 7. Who may vote. – All qualified voters of Tacloban City during the October 29, 2007 Barangay and SK Elections are entitled to vote in the plebiscite.
The EO of Tacloban City shall prepare the lists of voters for use in the plebiscite in accordance with Section 11 hereof.17
The conversion of Cabanatuan City is no different from the conversions of Lapu-Lapu City and Tacloban City. There is no need to deviate from the settled rule, which is based on law as interpreted by the executive and the Commission on Elections.
By its very nature, the exercise of judicial review should be attended with a great deal of deference to acts of co-equal and coordinative constitutional organs. In this case, the legislature provided in Section 453 of the Local Government Code the plain phrase "ratification on a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein."18 The executive implements this provision with the recognition of conversion following a plebiscite involving only the qualified voters of a component city. The Commission on Elections, equally a constitutional organ tasked with the implementation of all laws relating to plebiscites, also interprets the statutory provision and the relevant constitutional provision to the same effect: the plebiscite should include only the qualified voters of a component city.
Our power to strike down an act of co-equal constitutional organs is not unlimited. When we nullify a governmental act, we are required "to determine whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."19
No less than three constitutional organs have interpreted the law and the relevant provision of the Constitution. I am of the view that our power to strike down that interpretation should not be on the basis of the interpretation we prefer. Rather, Governor Umali should bear the burden of proving that the interpretation of the law and the Constitution in the actual controversy it presents is not unreasonable and not attended by any proven clear and convincing democratic deficit. We should wield the awesome power of judicial review awash with respectful deference that the other constitutional organs are equally conscious of the mandate of our people through our Constitution.
The Constitution provides:
Article X, Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied)
This provision applies when a city is "created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered." Clearly, this does not apply to Cabanatuan City’s quest to have itself elevated to the status of "highly urbanized city" with all the consequent advantages of that new legal categorization. Arguably, one way to read this provision is to say that the boundary of the province is substantially altered. I could understand how certain pragmatic political and economic considerations can support this conclusion to the extent that we can tend to minimize other’s viewpoints.
But that is not what this court should do. Rather, it should uphold principled modalities for reviewing statutes in relation to constitutional provisions that can serve as a check for our personal preferences. After all, all of us who sit in this chamber are sentinels of the rule of law and reason. We do not sit to entrench specific political ideologies.
It is reasonable to read the provision of the Constitution in question in the way that Mayor Vergara, the City Government of Cabanatuan, and the Commission on Elections have proposed consistent with the view of the legislature, the executive, and the Constitutional Commission. This reading is not attended with arbitrariness or capriciousness. It is not so abhorrent that it amounts to the kind of grave abuse of discretion that will cause us to unleash our power to nullify these acts in judicial review.
In my view, this interpretation may be consistent with the constitutional concept of local autonomy and the kind of local self-determination that could have been envisioned by our people when we ratified the Constitution. After all, it is realistically possible that provinces that are economically or politically dependent on one progressive component city will be the obstacle for the continued progress of that city when the latter decides to take advantage of all that a highly urbanized city will enjoy.
Governor Umali has not discharged his burden enough. I do not find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the legislature, the executive, and the Commission on Elections. I do not view the past practice that allowed several component cities to convert into highly urbanized cities as unreasonable in the light of the exact text of the Constitution. Rather, given the facts of this case, I propose that we adopt the judicial temperament which requires caution, courtesy, and deference.
Accordingly, I vote to deny the petition.
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
CERTIFIED TRUE COPY
ENRIQUETA ESGUERRA-VIDAL
Clerk of Court
OCC-En Banc
Supreme Court
Footnotes
1 Republic Act No.7160, An Act Providing for a Local Government Code of 1991, sec. 453.
2 Jose C. Miranda, Alfredo S. Dirige, Manuel H. Afiado, Mariano V. Babaran and Andres R. Cabuyadao v. Hon Alexander Aguirre, in his capacity as Executive Secretary; Hon. Epimaco Velasco, in his capacity as Secretary of Local Government, Hon. Salvador Enriquez, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, Hon. Benjamin G. Dy, in his capacity as Governor of Isabela, the Honorable Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Isabela, Atty. Baltazar Picio, in his capacity as Provincial Administrator, and Mr. Antonio Chua, in his capacity as Provincial Treasurer; Giorgidi B. Aggabao, intervenor, G.R. No. 133064, September 16, 1999, 314 SCRA 603 (1999) [Per J. Puno].
3 Id at pp.612-613.
4 Patricio Tan, Felix Ferrer, Juan M. Hagad, Sergio Hilado, Virgilio Gaston, Conchita Minaya, Teresita Estacio, Desiderio Deferia, Romeo Gamboa, Alberto Lacson, Fe Hofilena, Emily Jison, Nieves Lopez, and Cecilia Magsaysay v. The Commission on Elections and The Provincial Treasurer of Negros Occidental, G.R. No. L-73155, 142 SCRA 727 (1986) [Per J. Alampay].
5 Id. at pp.742-743.
6 Hon. Roy A. Padilla, Jr., in his capacity as Governor of the Province of Camarines Norte v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 103328, 214 SCRA 735 (1992) [Per J. Romero].
7 Rollo, p. 35.
8 Id. at 408.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 238-239.
12 Id. at 113-114.
13 Administrative Order No. 270, Prescribing the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code of 1991, Rule II, article 12 (b).
14 COMELEC Resolution No. 7854, Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of the May 14, 2007 Plebiscite to Ratify the Conversion of Lapu-Lapu City from a Component City into a Highly-Urbanized City, pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 1222 dated January 23, 2007, simultaneously with the May 14, 2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections, April 3, 2007 <http://www.comelec.gov.ph/?r=Archives/RegularElections/2007NLE/Resolutions/res7854 > (visited March 21, 2014).
15 Id.
16 COMELEC Resolution No. 8516, Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of the December 18, 2008 Plebiscite to Ratify the Conversion of Tacloban City from a Component City into a Highly-Urbanized City, pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 dated October 4, 2008, November 12, 2008 <http://www.comelec.gov.ph/?r=References/ComelecResolutions/OtherMatters/Res8516 > (visited March 21, 2014).
17 Id.
18 Republic Act No.7160, An Act Providing for a Local Government Code of 1991, Sec. 453.
19 Sec. 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
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