Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

EN BANC

G.R. No. 168766             May 22, 2008

THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner,
vs.
HENRY A. SOJOR, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

REYES, R.T., J.:

IS the president of a state university outside the reach of the disciplinary jurisdiction constitutionally granted to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) over all civil servants and officials?

Does the assumption by the CSC of jurisdiction over a president of a state university violate academic freedom?

The twin questions, among others, are posed in this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision¹ of the Court of Appeals (CA) which annulled two (2) CSC Resolutions² against respondent Henry A. Sojor.

The Facts

The uncontroverted facts that led to the controversy, as found by the CSC and the CA, are as follows:

On August 1, 1991, respondent Sojor was appointed by then President Corazon Aquino as president of the Central Visayas Polytechnic College (CVPC) in Dumaguete City. In June 1997, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8292, or the "Higher Education Modernization Act of 1997," was enacted. This law mandated that a Board of Trustees (BOT) be formed to act as the governing body in state colleges. The BOT of CVPC appointed respondent as president, with a four-year term beginning September 1998 up to September 2002.³ Upon the expiration of his first term of office in 2002, he was appointed president of the institution for a second four-year term, expiring on September 24, 2006.⁴

On June 25, 2004, CVPC was converted into the Negros Oriental State University (NORSU).⁵ A Board of Regents (BOR) succeeded the BOT as its governing body.

Meanwhile, three (3) separate administrative cases against respondent were filed by CVPC faculty members before the CSC Regional Office (CSC-RO) No. VII in Cebu City, to wit:

Before filing his counter-affidavits, respondent moved to dismiss the first two complaints on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, bar by prior judgment and forum shopping.

He claimed that the CSC had no jurisdiction over him as a presidential appointee. Being part of the non-competitive or unclassified service of the government, he was exclusively under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Office of the President (OP). He argued that CSC had no authority to entertain, investigate and resolve charges against him; that the Civil Service Law contained no provisions on the investigation, discipline, and removal of presidential appointees. He also pointed out that the subject matter of the complaints had already been resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman.⁹

Finding no sufficient basis to sustain respondent’s arguments, the CSC-RO denied his motion to dismiss in its Resolution dated September 4, 2002.¹⁰ His motion for reconsideration¹¹ was likewise denied. Thus, respondent was formally charged with three administrative cases, namely: (1) Dishonesty, Misconduct, and Falsification of Official Document; (2) Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; and (3) Nepotism.¹²

Respondent appealed the actions of the regional office to the Commission proper (CSC), raising the same arguments in his motion to dismiss.¹³ He argued that since the BOT is headed by the Committee on Higher Education Chairperson who was under the OP, the BOT was also under the OP. Since the president of CVPC was appointed by the BOT, then he was a presidential appointee. On the matter of the jurisdiction granted to

CSC by virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 807¹⁴ enacted in October 1975, respondent contended that this was superseded by the provisions of R.A. No. 8292,¹⁵ a later law which granted to the BOT the power to remove university officials.

CSC Disposition

In a Resolution dated March 30, 2004,¹⁶ the CSC dismissed respondent’s appeal and authorized its regional office to proceed with the investigation. He was also preventively suspended for 90 days. The fallo of the said resolution states:

In decreeing that it had jurisdiction over the disciplinary case against respondent, the CSC opined that his claim that he was a presidential appointee had no basis in fact or in law. CSC maintained that it had concurrent jurisdiction with the BOT of the CVPC. We quote:

The CSC categorized respondent as a third level official, as defined under its rules, who are under the jurisdiction of the Commission proper. Nevertheless, it adopted the formal charges issued by its regional office and ordered it to proceed with the investigation:

No merit was found by the CSC in respondent’s motion for reconsideration and, accordingly, denied it with finality on July 6, 2004.²⁰

Respondent appealed the CSC resolutions to the CA via a petition for certiorari and prohibition. He alleged that the CSC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed resolutions; that CSC encroached upon the academic freedom of CVPC; and that the power to remove, suspend, and discipline the president of CVPC was exclusively lodged in the BOT of CVPC.

CA Disposition

On September 29, 2004, the CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction directing the CSC to cease and desist from enforcing its Resolution dated March 30, 2004 and Resolution dated July 6, 2004.²¹ Thus, the formal investigation of the administrative charges against Sojor before the CSC-RO was suspended.

On June 27, 2005, after giving both parties an opportunity to air their sides, the CA resolved in favor of respondent. It annulled the questioned CSC resolutions and permanently enjoined the CSC from proceeding with the administrative investigation. The dispositive part of the CA decision reads:

The CA ruled that the power to appoint carries with it the power to remove or to discipline. It declared that the enactment of R.A. No. 9299²³ in 2004, which converted CVPC into NORSU, did not divest the BOT of the power to discipline and remove its faculty members, administrative officials, and employees. Respondent was appointed as president of CVPC by the BOT by virtue of the authority granted to it under Section 6 of R.A. No. 8292.²⁴ The power of the BOT to remove and discipline erring employees, faculty members, and administrative officials as expressly provided for under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8292 is also granted to the BOR of NORSU under Section 7 of R.A. No. 9299. The said provision reads:

The CA added that Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292,²⁵ which grants disciplinary jurisdiction to the CSC over all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, is a general law. According to the appellate court, E.O. No. 292 does not prevail over R.A. No. 9299,²⁶ a special law.

Issues

Our Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

I. Jurisdiction of the CSC

The Constitution grants to the CSC administration over the entire civil service.²⁸ As defined, the civil service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, including every government-owned or controlled corporation.²⁹ It is further classified into career and non-career service positions. Career service positions are those where: (1) entrance is based on merit and fitness or highly technical qualifications; (2) there is opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and (3) there is security of tenure. These include:

Career positions are further grouped into three levels. Entrance to the first two levels is determined through competitive examinations, while entrance to the third level is prescribed by the Career Executive Service Board.³¹ The positions covered by each level are:

On the other hand, non-career service positions are characterized by: (1) entrance not by the usual tests of merit and fitness; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, coterminous with the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made.³³ The law states:

The Non-Career Service shall include:

It is evident that CSC has been granted by the Constitution and the Administrative Code jurisdiction over all civil service positions in the government service, whether career or non-career. From this grant of general jurisdiction, the CSC promulgated the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.³⁵ We find that the specific jurisdiction, as spelled out in the CSC rules, did not depart from the general jurisdiction granted to it by law. The jurisdiction of the Regional Office of the CSC and the Commission central office (Commission Proper) is specified in the CSC rules as:

Respondent, a state university president with a fixed term of office appointed by the governing board of trustees of the university, is a non-career civil service officer. He was appointed by the chairman and members of the governing board of CVPC. By clear provision of law, respondent is a non-career civil servant who is under the jurisdiction of the CSC.

II. The power of the BOR to discipline officials and employees is not exclusive. CSC has concurrent jurisdiction over a president of a state university.

Section 4 of R.A. No. 8292, or the Higher Education Modernization Act of 1997, under which law respondent was appointed during the time material to the present case, provides that the school’s governing board shall have the general powers of administration granted to a corporation. In addition, Section 4 of the law grants to the board the power to remove school faculty members, administrative officials, and employees for cause:

The above section was subsequently reproduced as Section 7(i) of the succeeding law that converted CVPC into NORSU, R.A. No. 9299. Notably, and in contrast with the earlier law, R.A. No. 9299 now provides that the administration of the university and exercise of corporate powers of the board of the school shall be exclusive:

Measured by the foregoing yardstick, there is no question that administrative power over the school exclusively belongs to its BOR. But does this exclusive administrative power extend to the power to remove its erring employees and officials?

In light of the other provisions of R.A. No. 9299, respondent’s argument that the BOR has exclusive power to remove its university officials must fail. Section 7 of R.A. No. 9299 states that the power to remove faculty members, employees, and officials of the university is granted to the BOR "in addition to its general powers of administration." This provision is essentially a reproduction of Section 4 of its predecessor, R.A. No. 8292, demonstrating that the intent of the lawmakers did not change even with the enactment of the new law. For clarity, the text of the said section is reproduced below:

Verily, the BOR of NORSU has the sole power of administration over the university. But this power is not exclusive in the matter of disciplining and removing its employees and officials.

Although the BOR of NORSU is given the specific power under R.A. No. 9299 to discipline its employees and officials, there is no showing that such power is exclusive. When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.³⁷

All members of the civil service are under the jurisdiction of the CSC, unless otherwise provided by law. Being a non-career civil servant does not remove respondent from the ambit of the CSC. Career or non-career, a civil service official or employee is within the jurisdiction of the CSC.

This is not a case of first impression.

In University of the Philippines v. Regino,³⁸ this Court struck down the claim of exclusive jurisdiction of the UP BOR to discipline its employees. The Court held then:

In the more recent case of Camacho v. Gloria,⁴⁰ this Court lent credence to the concurrent jurisdiction of the CSC when it affirmed that a case against a university official may be filed either with the university’s BOR or directly with the CSC. We quote:

Thus, CSC validly took cognizance of the administrative complaints directly filed before the regional office, concerning violations of civil service rules against respondent.

III. Academic freedom may not be invoked when there are alleged violations of civil service laws and rules.

Certainly, academic institutions and personnel are granted wide latitude of action under the principle of academic freedom. Academic freedom encompasses the freedom to determine who may teach, who may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.⁴² Following that doctrine, this Court has recognized that institutions of higher learning has the freedom to decide for itself the best methods to achieve their aims and objectives, free from outside coercion, except when the welfare of the general public so requires.⁴³ They have the independence to determine who to accept to study in their school and they cannot be compelled by mandamus to enroll a student.⁴⁴

That principle, however, finds no application to the facts of the present case. Contrary to the matters traditionally held to be justified to be within the bounds of academic freedom, the administrative complaints filed against Sojor involve violations of civil service rules. He is facing charges of nepotism, dishonesty, falsification of official documents, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. These are classified as grave offenses under civil service rules, punishable with suspension or even dismissal.⁴⁵

This Court has held that the guaranteed academic freedom does not give an institution the unbridled authority to perform acts without any statutory basis.⁴⁶ For that reason, a school official, who is a member of the civil service, may not be permitted to commit violations of civil service rules under the justification that he was free to do so under the principle of academic freedom.

Lastly, We do not agree with respondent’s contention that his appointment to the position of president of NORSU, despite the pending administrative cases against him, served as a condonation by the BOR of the alleged acts imputed to him. The doctrine this Court laid down in Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.⁴⁷ and Aguinaldo v. Santos⁴⁸ are inapplicable to the present circumstances. Respondents in the mentioned cases are elective officials, unlike respondent here who is an appointed official. Indeed, election expresses the sovereign will of the people.⁴⁹ Under the principle of vox populi est suprema lex, the re-election of a public official may, indeed, supersede a pending administrative case. The same cannot be said of a re-appointment to a non-career position. There is no sovereign will of the people to speak of when the BOR re-appointed respondent Sojor to the post of university president.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The assailed Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission are REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, JJ., concur.

Footnotes