EN BANC

 

G.R. No. 127845             March 10, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee,
vs.
LODRIGO BAYYA, defendant and appellant.

PURISIMA, J.:

For automatic review here is a judgment handed down by Branch 16 1 of the Regional Trial Court in Ilagan, Isabela, finding appellant Lodrigo 2 Bayya guilty of incestuous rape and sentencing him to the ultimate penalty of DEATH.

Filed on October 9, 1995 by Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Pacifico Paas and docketed as Criminal Case No. 2467, the accusatory portion of the Information indicting appellant, alleges:

That on or about the year 1994 and for sometimes (sic) thereafter in the municipality of Burgos, province of Isabela, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused armed with a knife, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, intimidation and with lewd designs, have carnal knowledge with his own daughter ROSIE S. BAYYA for several times against the latters (sic) will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 3

After appellant pleaded Not Guilty upon arraignment on Nov. 22, 19954 , trial ensued.

From the decision of Nov. 15, 1996 under review, it can be gleaned that:

This is a case of a father raping his own daughter, a minor, aged 12 when she was first sexually assaulted up to July 12, 1995, the last molestation having done on her on said date (sic).

x x x           x x x          x x x

. . . it appears that Rosie Bayya, a minor, revealed to her aunt, Trinidad Garcia, her horrible tale at the hands of her father, the accused herein, six (6) days after the last sexual assault on her when Rosie was asked by her to baby-sit for another aunt of hers at Santiago, Isabela. She was compelled to reveal what befell her when she was informed that her father asked her to go back home but never wanted to (sic), knowing that her father would continue raping her. She told her aunt Trining that she does not like to go home because her father used to have sexual intercourse with her.

With the revelation made by Rosie Bayya, her aunt Trining went back to Malasin, Burgos, Isabela to inform Melquiades Bayya, Rosie’s granduncle who in turn informed a certain Major Turingan of the PNP what the accused did to his daughter (sic). The girl was brought to the PNP station of Burgos to give her statement which she did where she divulged what her father did to her.

The gist of her testimony in court is that sometime in 1994 when she was still 12 years old, her father, the accused, forced her at the point of a knife to have sexual intercourse with her in the family house at Malasin, Burgos, Isabela. Being afraid as he threatened her, the accused succeeded in undressing the young daughter and he inserted his penis into her vagina. She felt pain as a result and just kept to herself what her father did fearing that her father would make good his threats if she squealed on him. She just cried helplessly.

The first sexual molestation happened at an unholy hour at noon time (sic) when her mother and the rest of the siblings were out, her mother working in the field at the time. Her father repeated this bestial act in their house about twice a week when her mother was not at home; at times only a sister six years of age was present but probably did not know what her father was doing to her elder sister. Then later, he used her four (4) times a month and the last that she remembered was on July 12, 1995. After she was advised to file a complaint at her behest, she was brought to the PNP station at Burgos to continue and wind up her ordeal with a physical examination of her by a public physician, Dr. Elvie 5 Amurao of the Roxas District Hospital at Roxas, a nearby town of Burgos.

Dr. Amurao found old lacerations compatible with the claim of the complainant that she was raped months before her examination. 6

Appellant and his wife, Cecilia Bayya, took the witness stand for the defense.

Appellant unhesitatingly admitted having carnal knowledge of his daughter, Rosie Bayya, twice but theorized that he was "out of his mind" 7 when he did the lecherous acts on her. He traced his criminal behavior to a childhood that was neglected and forlorn in the mountains of Isabela, let alone the maltreatment endured in the hands of his very own parents.8

On the other hand, Cecilia Bayya, mother of the victim and wife of appellant, manifested on the witness stand her "neutral" stance 9 in the case. Nonetheless, she disclosed that she had forgiven her husband for his salacious conduct since they are poor and she cannot eke out a living without appellant as breadwinner. 10

Finding the facts established by the evidence falling squarely under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the lower court, after trial on the merits, rendered a judgment of conviction, sentencing appellant to suffer the ultimate penalty of DEATH, disposing thus:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged, the court hereby sentences the accused LODRIGO BAYYA to suffer the supreme penalty of death without award to any form of damages for obvious reasons.

SO ORDERED. 11

At the outset, it bears stressing that having admitted authorship of the offense charged, appellant does not dispute the trial court’s finding of guilt. However, appellant questions the penalty imposed below, contending that since the information made no reference to Republic Act No. 7659, it was a reversible error to convict thereunder. And because the only penal provision relied upon by the prosecution is Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, he could only be sentenced to the maximum penalty of reclusion perpetua in accordance therewith.

Therefore, the only issue raised by appellant is whether there was a transgression of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him, in view of the fact that the Information is silent about the applicability of R.A. No. 7659.

While departing from appellant's strained reasoning, the Court nonetheless agrees with and adopts his submission that the trial court erred in imposing the capital punishment on him.

A careful perusal of the Information indicting appellant reveals a crucial omission in its averments of the minority of the victim, Rosie S. Bayya.

Instructive in this regard is Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed.

When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information.

The purpose of the above-quoted rule is to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, a right guaranteed by no less than the fundamental law of the land. 12 Elaborating on the defendant’s right to be informed, the Court held in Pecho vs. People 13 that the objectives of this right are:

1. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make the defense;

2. To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and

3. To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had.

It is thus imperative that the Information filed with the trial court be complete — to the end that the accused may suitably prepare his defense. Corollary to this, an indictment must fully state the elements of the specific offense alleged to have been committed as it is the recital of the essentials of a crime which delineates the nature and cause of accusation against the accused.14

The Court held recently that to sustain a conviction under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the prosecution must allege and prove the basic elements of: 1) sexual congress; 2) with a woman; 3) by force and without consent, and in order to warrant the imposition of the death penalty, the additional elements that 4) the victim is under 18 years of age at the time of the rape; and 5) the offender is a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the victim. 15

In the case under scrutiny, the information does not allege the minority of the victim, Rosie S. Bayya, although the same was proven during the trial as borne by the records. The omission is not merely formal in nature since doctrinally, an accused cannot be held liable for more than what he is indicted for. It matters not how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, but an accused cannot be convicted of any offense, not charged in the Complaint or information on which he is tried or therein necessarily included. He has a right to be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged before he is put on trial. To convict an accused of an offense higher than that charged in the Complaint or information on which he is tried would constitute unauthorized denial of that right. 16

The Information under consideration charges nothing more than simple rape defined and penalized in the first and second paragraphs of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, that is — having carnal knowledge of a woman by means of force and intimidation and against her will. The additional allegation that the offender is a parent of the offended party can only be deemed a generic aggravating circumstance. The failure of the prosecution to allege the age of the victim has effectively removed the crime from the ambit of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 prescribing the death penalty "when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim".

Previously, this Court had occasion to hold that the death penalty may be imposed only If the information alleges and the evidence has proven both the age of the victim and her relationship to the offender. 17 This theory of "concurring allegations" finds support in the earlier case of People vs. Ramos 18 where the Court enunciated that the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship with the offender gives a different character to the rape defined in the first part of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, having, as it does, the effect of raising the imposable penalty for rape from reclusion perpetua to the higher and supreme penalty of DEATH.

The Court explained in Ramos that relationship and minority must be alleged jointly if the death penalty is sought to be imposed because the same partakes of the nature of a special qualifying circumstance which has the effect of increasing the prescribed penalty by degrees. When either one of the said circumstances is omitted or lacking, that which is pleaded in the information and proven by the evidence may be considered merely as a generic aggravating circumstance in accordance with the general principles of criminal law. But since the penalty for simple rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code is the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua, the generic aggravating circumstance cannot effectively augment the criminal liability of appellant, it being required that the single indivisible penalty prescribed by law is to be applied regardless of any modifying circumstance in attendance.

Since the appellant had been informed of the elements of simple rape under the information indicting him and nothing more, he could only be convicted of simple rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua as prescribed by law. 19

In conclusion, the Court also takes note of the fact that the trial court failed to award an indemnity ex delicto to the victim pursuant to Article 100 20 in relation to Article 104 21 of the Revised Penal Code. In line with prevailing jurisprudence, moral damages should also be awarded to the victim in such amount as the court deems just 22 . The award of exemplary damages is also indicated considering that the relationship between the offender and the victim aggravates the crime of rape, such as in the present case.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction under review is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant LODRIGO BAYYA is adjudged guilty of simple rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is further ordered to pay the victim, ROSIE S. BAYYA, P50,000.00 as indemnity ex delicto, apart from P50,000.00 as moral damages and P 25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nęt

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Pardo, J., on official leave.


Footnotes

1 Presided by Judge Teodulo E. Mirasol.

2 Also referred to as "Rodrigo" in the records.

3 Rollo, p. 4.

4 Certificate of Arraignment, Original Records, p. 29.

5 Also referred to as "Elvis" in the records.

6 Rollo pp. 12-14.

7 TSN, August 27, 1996, p.4.

8 Ibid., pp. 5 & 7.

9 TSN, July 12, 1996, p. 28.

10 Ibid., p. 29.

11 Rollo, p. 17.

12 Art. III, Section 14 (2), 1987 Constitution.

13 262 SCRA 518.

14 People vs. Ramos, 296 SCRA 559.

15 People vs. Silvano, G.R. No. 127356, June 29, 1999.

16 People vs. Ramos, supra p. 576 citing: Matilde, Jr. vs. Jabson, 68 SCRA 456.

17 People vs. Tabion ,G.R. No. 132715, October 20, 1999; see also: People vs. Maglente, G.R. No. 124559-66, April 30, 1999; People vs. Acala, G.R. Nos. 127023-25, May 19, 1999.

18 People vs. Ramos, supra.

19 Art. 335, par. 2, Revised Penal Code.

20 Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. — Every person criminally liable for a felony is civilly liable.

21 Art. 104. What is included in civil liability. — The civil liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102 and 103 of this Code includes:

1. Restitution;

2. Reparation of damage caused;

3. Indemnification for consequential damages.

22 People vs. Prades, 293 SCRA 411.


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