Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

 

G.R. No. 123544 July 29, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAUL BERANA y GUEVARRA, accused-appellant.

 

ROMERO, J.:

In this sordid tale of defloration, a man is saved from the gallows for failure of the prosecution to adduce clear and positive proof of his relationship with the complainant.

Before us on automatic review is a decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 25, imposing the supreme penalty of death on herein accused-appellant, Raul Berana y Guevarra for the crime of rape. 1

The facts of the case are as follows:

On June 2, 1994 at around 2:00 o'clock in the morning, 14-year old Maria Elena Jarcia was sleeping with her four-year old niece in one of the two rooms in a house her family was renting at Bayawas Street, Naga City when she was awakened by her brother-in-law, herein accused-appellant, Raul Berana. Complainant recognized him because light was filtering in from a nearby window. Berana pointed a "buntot page" at her neck and warned her not to make any noise, otherwise she would be killed.1âwphi1.nęt

The terrified girl was made to lie down while accused-appellant raised her duster and proceeded to remove her shorts and her underwear, after which he mashed her breasts and lay on top of her. The hapless girl was again threatened not to make any noise otherwise he would kill her. Complainant tried to cover her breasts with her arms but accused-appellant pushed her arms aside. As he inserted his organ into her womanhood, Elena felt excruciating pain. He began kissing her and made several push and pull movements, after which, the victim felt something liquid in her organ. Accused-appellant sat down and warned her not to talk to anyone about the incident.

His bestial lust not having been satisfied, accused-appellant lay on top of her for the second time, fondled her breasts and made push and pull movements. At around 2:30 o'clock in the morning, accused-appellant left after warning her that only the two of them must know about the incident. During the entire time that the accused-appellant was raping her, the poor girl was weeping and trembling with fear because he repeated his threats to kill her should she make any noise. Complainant, before having identified in court Exhibit A as the "buntot page" used by accused-appellant, described it as "long with some protruding parts and with long and pointed tip."2

After the accused-appellant left, Elena put on her clothes and went to the adjacent room to report the incident to her sister, Ma. Ana. When Ana heard the grim story, she lost no time in hurrying to Camaligan, Camarines Sur where their parents, having been invited to a birthday party of a relative, had stayed overnight. On the same day, their mother fetched Elena and accompanied her to the Provincial Hospital for medical examination. The medical examination conducted revealed the following findings:

P.E.

Vagina admits one finger

(+) Hymenal Laceration at 6:00 o'clock and 9 o'clock positions

Gram Staining Result:

— gram (+) bacilli = many

— pus cells = few

— epithelial cells = many

NOTE: Gram stains smear shows presence of spermatozoa3

After having been examined, Elena and her mother proceeded to the Sabang Police station in Naga City to report the incident. Thereafter, accused-appellant apprehended by the police.

On June 3, 1994, an information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 25, against accused-appellant for the crime of rape, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about June 2, 1994, in the city of Naga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused by means of force, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have sexual intercourse with the herein complaining witness, MARIA ELENA JARCIA Y DELOS MARTINEZ, a minor, 14 years of age.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

On June 6, 1994, an amended information was filed against accused-appellant which reads:

That on or about June 2, 1994, in the City of Naga, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, a relative of the offended party within the third civil degree, by means of force and intimidation, did there and then, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with herein complaining witness MARIA ELENA JARCIA Y DE LOS MARTINEZ, a minor, 14 years of age, to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty.

On October 12, 1994, the prosecution again sought the amendment of the information filed in accordance with the mandate of Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure relating to de oficio offenses which require the offended party's express conformity to the filing of the information.

On October 17, 1994, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the re-amended information.

Accused-appellant does not deny having sexual intercourse with the complainant but, however, maintains that Elena consented to it. According to accused-appellant, at around 1:30 o'clock in the morning of June 2, 1994, he had difficulty sleeping, so he took a walk and decided to visit his daughter at the house in Bayawas Street. When he arrived at the said place, he sat on the stairs at the rear of the house. While seated, he heard someone calling, "Mama." He recognized the voice as Elena's so he answered, "This is not your mama, this is your manoy,"4 On hearing these words, complainant opened the door and approached accused-appellant to ask him where her mother was, whereupon, accused-appellant told her that her parents might not return home because her father got drunk at a birthday party of a relative in Camaligan. He then asked Elena if his daughter was already asleep. Upon having been informed that his daughter had just fallen asleep, accused-appellant bade Elena goodbye but the girl, invited him to stay for the night so that he could keep watch over her and his daughter. Accused-appellant accepted her invitation since he was very tired. When he entered the room, Elena followed him and locked the door. Seeing his daughter sleeping soundly on a mat, he picked her up and moved her away from the middle to the left side so as not to disturb her. Elena turned off the light from the gas lamp and lifted the mosquito net to prepare for bed.

At this point, she reminded the accused-appellant of the sum of money which she had been asking him some time. When told that he had no money, complainant allegedly started to caress and embrace accused-appellant while at the same time insisting that he give her the money. When he reiterated that he had no money, complainant took hold of his hand and placed it on her breast. Complainant allegedly was wearing only an undershirt and panty at the time. Accused-appellant, feeling "hot", decided, and succeeded in having sex with her. During the sexual intercourse, Elena told him, "It is painful, manoy." but accused-appellant tried to assuage the pain, saying that it is painful only during the first time.5 Afterwards, accused-appellant sat beside Elena and engaged her in conversation. Elena allegedly asked him to help her when she completes high school. When accused-appellant promised to help her on condition that she will be serious in her studies, Elena rose from her lying position and embraced him. He kissed her on the lips, touched her breasts and asked her again for sex. Complainant allegedly smiled and told him, "To my sister, you could do it only one (sic) but to me you will make it two,"6 They had sex for the second time in the early morning of June 2, 1994. Accused-appellant left the room at around 2:30 o'clock in the morning. While answering a call of nature near a santol tree outside the house, he heard Ma. Ana ask Elena, "What did your manoy do to you?", to which the latter answered, "None, none." Accused-appellant heard nothing more as he decided to go on his way.7

Accused-appellant narrated that prior to the incident, or specifically on December 1993, he was alone in the same room, reading an adult magazine when Elena arrived. She saw what he was reading and remarked that she had read the same magazine also. Embarassed, accused-appellant turned away and went near the window to continue his reading. Complainant, in the meantime, removed her school uniform leaving only her "sando" and her panty on. She approached accused-appellant and told him of the interesting parts in the magazine. When he told her that he had already seen them and was just reviewing the magazine, she told him, "Manoy, there are parts there which are beautiful." He then showed her the adult magazine and asked her to point out where these were. Elena placed her arms on his shoulders as she obliged him. When she embraced him, accused-appellant responded by embracing her back. He felt "hot" and placed his hand on her cheek then began touching her breast also. However, she turned her lips away so he ended kissing her cheek instead. Elena responded by kissing his cheek in turn. Accused-appellant, this time, kissed her lips and touched her breasts. They moved away from the window to avoid unwitting voyeurs. Somebody soon arrived and interrupted them so Elena became flustered and accused-appellant left. They maintained no relationship after the incident.

The trial court did not give credence to the testimony of accused-appellant and on November 27, 1995, rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, this court finds accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape defined and punishable under the provisions of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 which provides:

The death penalty shall be imposed when the crime of rape is committed with any of the following circumstances:

1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a . . . relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree.

The accused being the husband of the victim's sister, is related by affinity to his victim within the third civil degree, the court hereby imposes upon Raul Berana Guevarra to suffer DEATH PENALTY, to pay Ma. Elena M. Jarcia, the amount of P50,000.00 by way of damages and to pay the costs.

In this automatic review of the decision rendered by the trial court, accused-appellant raises the following issues:

I. The trial court erred when it convicted herein accused-appellant despite the absence of any clear and convincing evidence demonstrating the alleged use of force.

II. The trial court erred when it convicted herein accused-appellant despite serious lapses and material inconsistencies in the testimony of the private complainant.

III. The trial court erred when it convicted herein accused-appellant despite the prosecution's failure to adduce clear proof of all the attendant qualifying circumstances of the crime charged.

IV. The trial court erred when it convicted herein accused-appellant based on a misplaced conclusion that herein accused-appellant allegedly admitted committing the offense charged.

We shall deal with the issues raised seriatim.

Regarding the first issue, accused-appellant contends that the trial court's finding that he had forcible sexual intercourse with the complainant was based solely on the results of the medical examination conducted by the prosecution's witness, Dr. Humilde Janaban on Elena. In support of his contention, appellant cites the following excerpt from the trial court's decision:

A careful perusal of the evidence adduced during the trials conducted in this case, show that the medical certificate of June 2, 1994 which was identified by Dra. Ma. Humilde B. Janaban, showing that the victim, private complainant Ma. Elena M. Jarcia suffered "Hymenal laceration at 6:00 o'clock and 9:00 o'clock positions in her private part which could have been caused by sexual intercourse and/or by the intervention of a blunt object by thrusting and then pulling then thrusting again of a hard blunt object and the presence of spermatozoa confirms the testimony of Ma. Elena Jarcia that she was sexually molested makes such testimony credible. To the mind of the court this [sic] findings are significant to the effect that sexual intercourse was involuntary or through threat and duress. The absence of any kind of external injury in the body of the victim other than those found in her organ is of no consequence.

Accused-appellant alleges that Elena encouraged his advances and the sexual intercourse was consensual. He asserts that while the hymenal laceration and the presence of spermatozoa prove the fact of sexual intercourse, they do not ipso facto prove that such act was committed by means of force, in line with our pronouncement in People vs. Godoy8 that, "Even granting ex gratia argumenti that the medical report and the laceration corroborated the complainant's assertion that there was sexual intercourse, of course the same cannot be said as to the alleged use of force. It has been held that such corroborative evidence is not considered sufficient, since proof of facts constituting one element of the crime is not corroborative proof of facts necessary to constitute another equally important element of the crime.

Accused-appellant's contention is misplaced. The trial court's finding of rape in the case at bar, was not based solely on the medical findings showing hymenal laceration and the presence of spermatozoa in the victim's organ. While the excerpt quoted by the accused-appellant from the questioned decision gives the impression that the trial court considered the hymenal laceration and the presence of spermatozoa in the victim's organ as proof of forcible sexual intercourse, the decision read in its entirety shows otherwise. The trial court merely considered the medical findings as corroborative evidence for the complainant's testimony that accused-appellant had sexual intercourse with her. Complainant was forced to accede to accused-appellant's advances because he poked a "buntot page" at her neck and threatened to kill her should she make any noise. With such repeated threats, the hapless girl eventually broke down and cried.

Accused-appellant maintains, however, that complainant's testimony is too full of material inconsistencies to deserve belief. For instance, although complainant alleged that she bled after the coitus, the medical examination revealed otherwise; complainant's testimony in court that accused-appellant asked her for sex a second time belies her allegation that accused-appellant forced himself on her; complainant' s statement in her affidavit that accused-appellant was armed with a blunt instrument is materially different from her testimony in court that accused-appellant carried with him a "buntot page".

Accused-appellant's assertion that the medical record is bereft of any proof/corroborating complainant's testimony that she bled after she was raped hardly merits consideration. The underwear of the complainant which was presented and admitted in court as evidence bore traces of blood.9 Moreover, the absence of any sign of physical bleeding on the part of the complainant does not necessarily mean there was no forcible sexual intercourse. For one thing, complainant was threatened with a "buntot page" poked at her neck at that time. Then too, accused-appellant's threat was sufficient enough to intimidate a young girl of 14 to force her to submit to his baser instincts. It must be noted that proof of external injuries inflicted on the complainant is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape committed with force or violence. The law does not impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving resistance. Physical resistance need not be established in rape cases when intimidation is exercised upon her and she submits herself against her will to the rapist's lust because of fear for life and personal safety. 10 When a woman testifies that she was raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that said crime has been committed.

Accused-appellant, however, would have us believe that the sexual intercourse was consensual since complainant herself testified during trial that he asked her for sex a second time during the night in question. While complainant did state during trial that, "After the first incident, he sat down and he again asked me to give him for the second time," 11 complainant also stated that she was then crying and trembling with fear. Considering the continuing threat on her life if she makes an outcry, complainant had no choice but to accede to the desire of accused-appellant. That he asked her for sex does not necessarily imply that she gave her consent when he succeeded in ravishing her again. It is indeed preposterous that a young woman, untrained in the ways of the world and of men would initiate and encourage his advances, as accused-appellant claims, considering especially that he is the husband of her older sister.

Accused-appellant nevertheless insists that complainant's testimony does not merit credence because of inconsistencies in her statement regarding the weapon used by the accused-appellant to threaten her on the night of the incident. We are not unaware that complainant stated in her affidavit that accused-appellant was armed with a blunt instrument in contrast with her testimony in court that accused-appellant was armed with a "buntot page." It must be borne in mind, however, that discrepancies between an affidavit and testimony in court occur more often than not since an affidavit is not prepared by the affiant herself but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant's statement. It might not be amiss to note, at this point, that the instrument which was submitted by complainant to the police and later identified in court as the "buntot page" used by the accused-appellant was described by the Chief of Police in his letter to the prosecutor as "one (1) blunt instrument with black handle. 12 In the case of People vs. Empleo 13, we had occasion to state that, "the contradiction between the affidavit and the testimony of the witness may be explained by the fact that an affidavit will not always disclose all the facts and will oftentimes and without design incorrectly describe, without the deponent detecting it, some of the occurrences narrated."

We find merit, however, in accused-appellant's contention that the prosecution failed to adduce clear and positive proof of the qualifying circumstance of relationship between accused-appellant and complainant. It should be noted that the relationship between accused-appellant and the complainant qualifies the crime from rape punishable by reclusion perpetua to rape punishable by death under Republic Act No. 7659. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. No. 7659, the death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

xxx xxx xxx

1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim.

Affinity is defined as "the relation which one spouse because of marriage has to blood relatives of the other. The connection existing, in consequence of marriage between each of the married persons and the kindred of the other. The doctrine of affinity grows out of the canonical maxim that marriage makes husband and wife one. The husband has the same relation by affinity to his wife's blood relatives as she has by consanguinity and vice versa. 14

Consequently, to effectively prosecute accuse-appellant for the crime of rape committed by a relative by affinity within the third civil degree, it must be established that a) he is legally married to complainant's sister and b) complainant and accused-appellant's wife are full or half blood siblings.

The prosecution tried to established the relationship of accused-appellant to the complainant by asking her the following during trial:

xxx xxx xxx

Q: By the way, do you know the accused in this case by the name of Raul?

A: Yes, I know him, sir.

Q: Why do you know him?

A: He is the husband of my sister. 15

Complainant' s mother also testified:

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Do you know the accused in this case, Raul Berana y Guevarra?

A: Yes, I know him, sir.

Q: Why do you know him?

A: Because he is the husband of my daughter.

Q: Whose name is that?

A: Rosa Jarcia, sir. 16

Based on abovementioned testimonies, as well as accused-appellant's letter to the complainant's parent's addressing them as "mama at papa" and his use of phrase, "ang inyong manugang, Raul" 17 the trial court convicted him of the crime of rape committed by a relative by affinity within the third civil degree, under the provisions of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act. No. 7659.

Considering that the relationship of accused-appellant to complainant qualifies the crime of rape punishable by reclusion perpetua to rape punishable by death, it is but proper that a more stringent proof of relationship between the offender and the offended party must be established by the prosecution. Corollarily, a clearer proof of relationship between the complainant and the spouse of accused-appellant must be presented. The relationship of accused-appellant and the complainant is not adequately substantiated since it is merely based on testimony of the complainant, her mother's testimony and the accused-appellant's use of the words, "mama at papa" in his letters. Needless to say, the evidence presented are not sufficient to dispel doubts about the true relationship of accused-appellant and the complainant, to the benefit of which the accused is entitled. Where the life of an accused-appellant hangs in the balance, a more exacting proof must be adduced.

Accused-appellant, in his last submission, insists that the trial court erred in convicting him based solely on a misplaced conclusion that he admitted the offense charged based on the four (4) letters he sent to the parents of the complainant, one of which states:

Ma, Pa, patawarin niyo na ako, alam ko na hindi niyo basta-basta mapapatawad ang nagawa ko pero paano naman po ang kinabukasan nang mga apo at anak ko. 18

Accused-appellant asserts that the letters, in no way, indicate an admission of guilt on his part. In support of his contention, accused-appellant cites the case of United States vs. Maqui 19 where it was held that an accused may show that an offer of compromise on his part was not made under a consciousness of guilt but merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a claim by the accused that an offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of his guilt and an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily therefrom.

We are not convinced. The tenor of the letters sent by the accused-appellant to the parents of the complainant, while not explicitly admitting the forcible sexual intercourse, could hardly be considered an admission made merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment. Consider the following excerpts:

Mama at Papa,

Masakit man sa inyo ang nagawa ko. Pero nagsasabi ako sa inyo ng totoo. Nang maganap ang insidenteng iyon. Wala ako sa sarili kong pagkatao. At wala akong matandaan sa nangyari (sic) 20

And

xxx xxx xxx

Ma, pa, hindi ko kayo sinusumbatan. Dahil wala naman po akong dapat isumbat sa inyo. Napakabait niyo sa kain. Ewan ko nga lang kung bakit ko nagawa iyon. Kung totoo talagang ako nasa sarili kong pagkatao. 21

Despite his claim that complainant initiated and consented to the sexual intercourse, accused-appellant in his letters never made mention of this fact but has, instead, unceasingly asked for forgiveness from the parents of the complainant, short of admitting categorically the offense charged. Clearly, the unsolicited letters of the accused-appellant cannot be construed as an offer of compromise to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment but a plea of mercy to save him from the gallows.

In view of the fact that relationship between accused-appellant and the complainant was not properly established, we are constrained to reduce the penalty imposed by the lower court from death to reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is, however, ordered to pay civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of P50,000 and the P50,000 imposed by the lower court shall constitute moral damages. The fact that the complainant has suffered the trauma of mental, physical and psychological suffering which constitutes the bases for moral damages is too obvious to still require the recital thereof at the trial by the victim since the court itself assumes and even acknowledges such agony on her part as gauge of her credibility. 22

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 25, finding accused-appellant Raul Berana y Guevarra guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape is AFFIRMED with the modification that accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is ordered to pay complainant Ma. Elena M. Jarcia the sum of P50,000 by way of civil indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages. Costs against accused-appellant.1âwphi1.nęt

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1 Penned by Judge Jose T. Atienza.

2 TSN, November 3, 1994, p. 7.

3 Exh. F.

4 TSN, July 13, 1995, p. 13.

5 TSN, July 13, 1995, p. 22.

6 TSN, July 13, 1995, p. 25.

7 TSN, July 13, 1995, pp. 26-27.

8 250 SCRA 676 [1995].

9 TSN, November 3, 1994, p. 15.

10 People vs. Bartolome, G.R. 129054, September 29, 1998; People vs. Ferrer, G.R. 116516-20, September 7, 1998.

11 TSN, December 6, 1994, p. 22.

12 Records, p. 2.

13 226 SCRA 454 [1993].

14 Campbell, Henry. Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, 1979 p. 54.

15 TSN, December 3, 1994, p. 4.

16 TSN, January 18, 1995, p. 3.

17 Exh. H-2-a, Exh. K-1.

18 Exh. H.

19 27 Phil 97 [1914].

20 Exh. K.

21 Exh - J.

22 People vs. Prades, G.R. 127569, July 30, 1998.


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