Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

PANGANIBAN, J.:

This is an appeal from the December 11, 1992 Decision ¹ of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 172, in Criminal Case No. 10341-V-90 convicting Appellant Romeo Nell of murder.

Together with Danny Angeles, alias "Danny Fake," and one John Doe, appellant was charged with murder in an Information dated June 11, 1990 which reads:

The prosecution actually presented two versions of the incident: one by Rosini Espejo-Cenon and another by Benjamin Laureano. Although both versions undoubtedly pointed to appellant as the assailant, they materially differed as to the participation of the other accused and the events which led to the fatal stabbing of the deceased.

Prosecution Witness Rosini Cenon's testimony was summarized by the trial court as follows: ⁴

In contrast, Prosecution Witness Benjamin Laureano, the victim's brother, described the events differently. His testimony was presented in the appealed Decision as follows: ⁵

Dr. Prospero Cabanayan conducted the autopsy on the victim. He testified that the victim died of severe hemorrhage due to an eleven-inch stab wound below the right collarbone, penetrating the big blood vessels direct to the heart, and two puncture wounds located at the chest almost near the armpit. ⁶ The stab wound could have been caused by a sharp, single-bladed instrument while the puncture wounds, by a pointed instrument. ⁷ From the location of the wounds, he opined that it was possible that the victim was lying down, facing the assailant who was standing. ⁸

The prosecution presented Francisca Sagnip, the sister of the victim, as rebuttal witness. She testified that: ⁹

Appellant justifies his act by invoking self-defense. His testimony is synthesized in the Appellant's Brief: ¹⁰

In rejecting the claim of self-defense, the trial court held that the evidence of the prosecution was more credible than that of the appellant. Prosecution Witnesses Benjamin Laureano and Rosini Cenon gave two versions of the facts, but the trial court accepted Benjamin's testimony rather than Rosini Cenon's because the former gave his statement to the police immediately after the stabbing incident at ten minutes past one o'clock early morning of March 25, 1990. Rosini's statement, on the other, hand was executed two days later, on March 27, 1990, after her brother-in-law Junior Cenon was implicated in the stabbing by appellant.

Unlike Benjamin's story, appellant's version was not only uncorroborated; it was also incredible. The trial court opined that, even if the victim was a drug user and a troublemaker, appellant's actions were not justified.

The lower court also held that the killing was qualified by evident premeditation. It found that the appellant and the victim had a quarrel that ended when the former ran away from the latter. Later on, appellant returned and stabbed the victim.

Appellant claims self-defense. He ascribes the following errors to the trial court: ¹¹

The appeal is partly meritorious. We do not agree with appellant's claim of self-defense, but we find that the prosecution has not established evident premeditation beyond reasonable doubt. We shall now discuss the errors assigned by the appellant in inverse order.

By interposing self-defense, appellant shifted the burden of proof, thereby obligating himself to show that his act was justified and that he incurred no criminal liability therefor. ¹² Consequently, he must establish clearly and convincingly all the elements of self-defense, relying mainly on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution's; for even if the latter was weak, it could not be disbelieved after his open admission of the killing.

The trial court, however, did not find appellant's uncorroborated testimony credible. The time-tested doctrine is that a trial court's assessment of the credibility of a witness ¹³ is entitled to great weight — even conclusive and binding on this Court, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. Credibility is a matter that peculiarly falls within the province of the trial court as it had the opportunity to watch and observe the demeanor and behavior of the witnesses at the time of their testimony. ¹⁴ Thus, assigning value and weight to each testimony is within its jurisdiction. ¹⁵

The first point is the matter of the weapon used. Appellant claimed that he used a six-inch screwdriver to stab the victim. ¹⁶ The medico-legal officer described the two instruments which could have inflicted such wounds as a single-bladed weapon and an instrument with a sharp point. ¹⁷ A screwdriver fits neither of the two descriptions. Based on appellant's description, it was as an old screwdriver with a blunt end and rounded on the side. ¹⁸ He did not even present in evidence this alleged implement to show that it fitted either of the two descriptions.

Second, appellant would like us to believe that it was Benjamin who wielded a knife — one of the weapons that, according to the medico-legal officer, could have caused the wounds of the deceased. He thus wants to imply that it was Benjamin who fatally stabbed his brother. This allegation is not only illogical; it runs counter to the established fact that the quarrel was between the victim and the appellant, not Benjamin. Appellant has not show any plausible reason, argument or evidence why Benjamin should kill his own brother.

Third is appellant's choice of victim. He testified that he was hit on the head with a beer bottle by one Junior Cenon. Why then did he attack the victim who, according to him, was only poised to box him. Clearly, it was Junior who had hit him and was probably holding a bottle of beer, broken by then. The more imminent threat against his life was posed by the armed Junior, not the unarmed victim.

The fourth point is the matter of flight. Although he claimed that he did not go into hiding after the incident, he also admitted that he fled from the scene of the crime in his tricycle. ¹⁹ Flight, in jurisprudence, is a strong indication of guilt, ²⁰ although its converse does not necessarily imply innocence. ²¹ That he feared being imprisoned as he had children to take care of does not exempt him from these legal precepts. He even intentionally failed to report the incident to the police, negating his claim of self-defense. ²²

Thus, we cannot blame the trial court for not putting much faith in appellant's testimony. Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself. ²³

An accused must also establish by clear and convincing evidence ²⁴ the requisites of self-defense, namely: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. ²⁵ These, appellant failed to prove.

Self-defense, by its very nature, requires the attendance of unlawful aggression initiated by the victim. ²⁶ Unlawful aggression is an assault or attack, or a threat thereof in an imminent and immediate manner which places the accused's life in actual peril. ²⁷ It must be such that it puts in real danger the life or personal safety of the person defending himself. ²⁸ It cannot be merely an imagined threat or a threatening or intimidating attitude. ²⁹

In self-defense, there should also be reasonable necessity for the action taken as well as the means used. The latter requires a consideration of (1) whether the aggressor was armed, (2) the nature and quality of the weapon used, and (3) the physical conditions and sizes of both aggressor and the person defending himself. ³⁰ Appellant was armed while his three alleged assailants were not competently shown to have been armed. His claim is that Benjamin had a knife and that Junior Cenon and the victim held a bottle of beer each. But allegation is not evidence and, in the absence of the latter, we cannot agree with appellant that his alleged aggressors were similarly armed. Therefore, the reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the "aggression" from the victim and his companions was not proven in this case.

Clearly, the justifying circumstance of self-defense cannot be sustained. Appellant failed to prove unlawful aggression by the victim or to demonstrate the reasonable necessity of the means he employed to defend himself. ³¹

However, the trial court erred in appreciating evident premeditation based solely on the fact that appellant returned to the crime scene four hours after his first quarrel with the victim. Evident premeditation indicates a stubborn adherence to a decision to commit a felony. It requires a showing of: (1) a previous decision by the accused to commit the crime; (2) overt act(s) manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) a lapse of time between the decision to commit the crime and its actual execution sufficient to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his acts. ³² Evident premeditation connotes a deliberate adherence to a plan to commit a crime.

Returning to the scene of an earlier fight about four hours later does not establish these elements. Mere lapse of time is not equivalent to evident premeditation. ³³ Time and again, we have held that evident premeditation cannot be appreciated to qualify a killing to murder in the absence of evidence, not only of sufficient lapse of time, but also of the planning and preparation to kill when the plan was conceived. ³⁴ The prosecution evidence simply showed that after the fight was broken up, appellant returned to kill the victim. From said circumstances, we cannot deduce with certainty that appellant clung to a decision to kill the victim.

Treachery and abuse of superior strength were not discussed in the trial court's Decision. Since they were alleged in the Information, the Court pored over the records to find any evidentiary support therefor. However, we are also unable to appreciate treachery from the prosecution's narration of events. Benjamin was bringing several containers of water into their house when the incident occurred. Thus, because his attention was focused elsewhere prior to his brother's stabbing, he was not in a position to say that appellant attacked his brother suddenly and without warning. He did see, however, that appellant chased his brother with a bladed weapon and that they struggled with each other first before appellant stabbed his brother. In effect, he admitted that when appellant attacked the victim, the latter was not without a chance to defend himself. The prosecution failed to establish that the appellant employed means, methods or forms which tended directly and specially to insure the commission of the killing without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. ³⁵

The record is also bereft of proof that appellant and his companions took advantage of their collective strength to overwhelm their victim. ³⁶ Superior strength is not appreciated by the mere fact of superiority in the number of malefactors, but rather by the deliberate employment of excessive force which is out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. ³⁷ Note also must be made of the fact that the victim was not alone.

In sum, appellant's testimony suffers seriously from want of credibility. Even if we ascribe credibility to appellant's testimony, however, we still cannot accept his plea of self-defense, for he failed to prove all the requisites thereof. While the appellant failed to prove self-defense, the prosecution likewise failed to show any qualifying circumstance. In this light, appellant should be convicted only of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code without any generic aggravating or mitigating circumstance.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant is CONVICTED of homicide, not murder, and is SENTENCED to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. The trial court's disposition requiring the appellant "to indemnify the heirs of Reynaldo Laureano in the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs" is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.