Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FRANCISCO, J.:

Appellants, thereafter, initiated this direct appeal, for which this Court appointed a counsel de oficio to represent them upon their manifestation that their lawyer in the court a quo moved abroad. ³

The trial court's findings of fact ably supported by evidence on record are as follows: ⁴

To avail of the benefit of self-defense, appellant Noel, as the party invoking it, has the burden of proving: ⁵

The manner appellants executed the attack tends directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to themselves against any possible defense that the victim might offer. ¹⁴ This constitutes treachery — and when the act is attended by treachery on the part of the offender, it could not be said that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the offended party, because the facts constituting the treachery would be inconsistent not only with the offended party's alleged unlawful aggression but also irreconcilable with the offender's claims that he was merely acting in self-defense. For one, treachery presupposes a deliberate design to cause a wrongful act, whereas, self-defense injects the thought that the defendant's action was the product of necessity. For another, there is a high degree of depravity in treachery which is not present in self-defense. With the sore absence of the primordial element of unlawful aggression, the other requisites of self-defense would have no leg to stand on. ¹⁵ Accordingly, that same treachery which negated unlawful aggression was properly appreciated by the trial court as the circumstance that qualified the killing to murder. ¹⁶

Appellant Noel posits that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when the latter raised his right hand armed with a knife and attempted to stab the former. He further asserts that he (Noel who was allegedly left-handed) grabbed the victim's raised right hand with his both hands. It was at this instance that appellant Noel look out a knife with his left hand and stabbed the victim. However, the Court agrees with the trial court's finding that the proffered excuses of appellant Noel are "incredible and unbelievable". ¹⁷ Thus.

Besides, the nature, number and location of the wounds sustained by the victim belie the assertion of self-defense. The necropsy report of the examining physician stated that the victim suffered stabbed, incised and hacked wounds on the vital parts of his body from the neck to the chest, stomach, arms and back near the hipline. ¹⁹ The gravity of these wounds is indicative of a determined effort to kill and not just to defend. ²⁰

With respect to appellant Jolly's defense of alibi, again such defense is weakened in this case by the trial court's finding that it was a "mere concoction and fabrication." ²¹ Such alibi falls when juxtaposed with the testimony of credible witnesses who actually saw and positively identified appellant Jolly as the one who initiated the attack on the victim. ²² Alibi is "inherently weak and unreliable, it is easy of fabrication ²³, without much opportunity at checking or rebutting it" ²⁴ and will not prosper if it is established mainly by the accused or his relatives and not by credible persons. ²⁵

Appellant Jolly failed to strictly satisfy the two conditions of alibi respecting time and place. ²⁶ Well entrenched is the doctrine that for alibi to prosper, the defendant must prove not only (1) that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but (2) it must likewise be demonstrated that he was so far away that he could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. ²⁷ Both elements are wanting in this case. Appellant Jolly was at the place of the crime (Furugannan Landing) at the time of the incident. It was not shown that he was somewhere else as to be physically absent therefrom.

In addition, appellant Jolly's denial aside from being inherently weak ²⁸ , like his alibi, ²⁹ easily crumbles in the light of positive declarations of truthful witnesses who testified on affirmative matters that the former was at the scene of the incident and was one of the victim's assailants and perpetrators of the crime. ³⁰ Applicable herein is the Court's ruling in People v. Paragua, ³¹ that:

Be that as it may, evidence on record attests that appellant Noel used a 6-inch knife while Jolly used a bolo about a foot long. ³² From this proven fact, the lower court correctly deduced that:

As to appellants' contention that the trial court erred in not conducting an ocular inspection of the crime scene "thereby disregarding the(ir) right to a speedy disposition of the case" ³⁴ — this is non-sequitur. On the contrary, by dispensing with the ocular inspection, the trial court avoided a delay of the case. At any rate, ocular inspection rests within the sound discretion of the court. Inspection may be granted only where it is reasonably certain that it will be of substantial aid to the court in reaching a correct verdict. The trial court in this case, correctly refused to make the inspection where testimonial evidence adequately pictured the condition of the place. Thus, a view of the place would serve no useful purpose. ³⁵

Appellants next dispute the finding of conspiracy. A conspiracy exists when two (2) or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. ³⁶ It need not be established by direct
proof. ³⁷ It would suffice if the acts of the conspirators are characterized by unity of purpose, intent and design to achieve a common unlawful end. It may even be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime. ³⁸ In the case at bench, appellant Jolly suddenly attacked the victim from behind and subsequent thereto, appellant Noel joined the fray stabbing the victim from the front. Appellants' actions of "helping or assisting each other in simultaneously stabbing or inflicting wounds on the victim" are "clear and indubitable proof(s)" ³⁹ of a concerted effort to bring about the death of the victim. ⁴⁰ Thus, appellants as conspirators are equally liable for the crime ⁴¹ as it is unnecessary to determine who inflicted the fatal wound ⁴² because in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. ⁴³

In the final analysis, appellants' arguments depend on the trial court's findings of facts and its assessment of the credibility of witnesses. ⁴⁴ Jurisprudence is settled that the trial court's findings of fact when ably supported by substantial evidence on record are accorded with great weight and respect by this Court. Thus, upon review, the Court finds that no material facts were overlooked or ignored by the court's below which if considered might vary the outcome of this case nor there exist cogent reasons that would warrant reversal of the findings below. ⁴⁵ Further, the trial court did not err in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. ⁴⁶ They cannot be discredited as unreliable and untrustworthy because of their relation to the victim. No law disqualifies relatives of the victim of a crime from testifying about the facts and circumstances of the crime. Relationship per se of a witness to the victim, whether by consanguinity or affinity, is no indicator of an impaired credibility of a witness nor would it affect his positive and clear testimony and render it unworthy. On the contrary relationship with a victim would deter a witness from indiscriminately implicating anybody to the crime. His natural and usual interest would be to identify the malefactor and secure his conviction to obtain true justice for the death of a relative. This is specially so when the witnesses were present at the scene of the crime, as in the case at bench. ⁴⁷ Needless to say, the question of credibility of witnesses is best left to the trial court since it is in the best position to make an honest evaluation of the witnesses' deportation during trial. ⁴⁸ Such evaluation binds this Court as the proffered inconsistencies (like the number of times the victim was stabbed and the place where he fell after he was stabbed) in the prosecution witnesses' testimonies do not substantially affect the result hereof.

Lastly, contrary to the trial court's ruling, appellants should have been entitled to the mitigating circumstance of surrender, though they never told the responding police officer that they were surrendering. Appellant Noel's declaration to the police of "Nakadisgracia nak" ⁴⁹ and his action together with appellant Jolly of spontaneously and unconditionally placing themselves at the disposal of the authorities are, under the factual milieu of this case, indicia of their respect for the law by saving the time and effort of the authorities attendant to the search. ⁵⁰ A categorical declaration of a voluntary surrender is not necessary as the action of appellants in moving towards the responding police officer, surrendering a weapon, ⁵¹ seeking police protection and telling the police of what they did are mute words sufficient to satisfy the rationale of a voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance.

Prior to R.A. 7659, ⁵² murder was penalized with "reclusion temporal maximum to death". ⁵³ In accordance with the graduation of penalties under Article 64(2) of the Revised Penal Code, when there is a mitigating circumstance (surrender) and no aggravating circumstance, as in this case, the imposable penalty is the minimum period which is reclusion temporal maximum. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL), appellants could be held to bear the indeterminate penalty of anywhere from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum to 17 years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal medium, as the minimum penalty, to anywhere from seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal maximum, as the maximum penalty. ⁵⁴