Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

PANGANIBAN, J.:

This appeal seeks the reversal of the December 4, 1990 Decision ¹ of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 2 ² in Criminal Case No. 3141 convicting Appellant Diarangan Dansal of the crime of murder.

A complaint against appellant was filed on March 28, 1990 by INP ³ Station Commander Cabsaran C. Azis of Matungao, Lanao del Norte. After preliminary investigation, Provincial Prosecutor IV Felix Fajardo charged appellant with murder on September 7, 1990 in an Information which reads: ⁴

Upon arraignment, appellant with the assistance of counsel de oficio pleaded nor guilty. In due course, the trial court rendered its assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: ⁵

Panda Antalo testified that at three o'clock in the afternoon of March 2, 1990 in Matungao, Lanao del Norte, he and Timal Mosa were walking through a barrio road on their way to see Mayor Asis. ⁶ They saw Abubakar Alamat, the victim, conversing with five (5) persons, one of whom was appellant. However, Antalo did not recognize appellant's companions. When he and Mosa were five (5) meters away from the group, he heard gunshots. He turned his head and noticed that smoke was coming out of appellant's rifle and empty shells were falling therefrom. The Garand rifles of appellant and his companions were pointed at the victim who was lying on the ground face upwards. Seven (7) shots were fired. At that time Antalo was "immobile as he was frightened." Thus, he was unable to run and take cover. After appellant and his companions ran towards the coffee plantation, Antalo approached the victim and discovered that the latter had sustained seven (7) wounds. ⁷

Timal Mosa corroborated Antalo's account. He testified that at 3:00 p.m. of March 2, 1990, he and Antalo were on their way to Mayor Asis' house in Pasaupnon, Matungao. He saw the victim, the appellant and four (4) other persons talking to one another. Then he heard a gunshot from behind. When he turned to look, he noticed that smoke was coming out of appellant's gun and that empty shells were dropping from it as appellant continued to fire at the victim. Appellant's rifle was pointed at the victim who had fallen on the ground. He heard seven (7) gunshots. Appellant's companions also carried Garand rifles, but Mosa concluded that these were not fired because he did not notice any smoke from their barrels. He was not frightened. Neither did he take cover, as he knew both the victim and the appellant. After firing at the victim, appellant together with his four companions fled towards Mayor Asis' coffee plantation. He and Antalo approached the victim, whom they found already dead. Thereafter, they reported the shooting to the victim's wife. ⁸

Cosain Dowa, a Rural Sanitarium Inspector of the Health Office of Matungao, Lanao del Norte, testified that on March 5, 1990 he prepared the victim's Certificate of Death (Exh. "A"). Although his main duty was to inspect food establishments, construct barangay toilets, and assist in watershed constructions in the municipality, he also helped the health officer in the preparation of death certificates. ⁹ When the body of the victim was brought in, he observed gunshot wounds on his right foot, right thigh and right breast. The right knee was distorted. There was a bullet hole at the victim's back which he believed was the entry point leading to the gaping wound on the breast. ¹⁰

Dr. Marilyn Rico testified that she was the Rural Health Officer of Matungao, Lanao del Norte. She signed Abubakar Alamat's Certificate of Death (Exh. "A-2") ¹¹ which was prepared by Dowa.

Amina Oticol, the widow of the victim, testified that, around 3:00 p.m. of March 2, 1990, she was at their house in Panta-on, Matungao, Lanao del Norte. Antalo and Mosa came and informed her that appellant killed her husband. She had her husband's corpse brought to their house. Her husband was buried in Panta-on, Matungao, Lanao del Norte. She incurred expenses for the burial in the amount of P15,000.00, but she asked for P100,000.00 as compensation therefor. ¹²

Appellant was the lone witness for the defense. He testified that on March 1, 1990, he went to Tagolo-an, Lanao del Norte to visit his elder sister Saramina Dansal. At his sister's house, Mimbalawang Dorado, together with his sons Macod, Talente and Talente's son Usop, all surnamed Dorado, seized appellant and brought him to their house at Tongkol, Tagolo-an, Lanao del Norte for reasons undisclosed to him. ¹³

After shooting the victim, the Dorados allegedly aimed their guns appellant and told him to run away. As he was also related to the victim, the latter's mother being his paternal aunt, appellant wanted to shoot the Dorados. Finding that his rifle was not operational, he fled with the Dorados. Thereafter, they rode a truck to Karomatan. They left their guns at the house of Mimbalawag's sister in Bangko, near Matungao. ¹⁴ He went home and afterwards told the mayor of Tagolo-an that the Dorados killed his cousin. He was subsequently summoned and detained by the mayor of Panta-on. ¹⁵

As stated earlier, the court a quo convicted appellant of murder. It gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. It disbelieved appellant in view of the absence of any improper motive on the witnesses' part to testify wrongly against him.

The trial court noted that appellant and the four (4) Dorados were all armed with Garand rifles; that they immediately fired their guns at the victim as he came out of his house; and that the victim was not in a position to defend himself. From these facts, it concluded that the offenders consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by them to ensure the accomplishment of their purpose with impunity. Thus, treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident premeditation were appreciated in the conviction of the appellant.

Hence, this appeal.

Appellant through the Public Attorney's Office ascribes the following errors to the trial court:

Well-settled is the rule that appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses. ¹⁷ Such findings are conclusive upon the Supreme Court in the absence of any showing that the trial court has overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case. ¹⁸ We have carefully scrutinized the records of this case and the arguments of appellant, and we have found no reason to reverse the findings of the trial court.

The two prosecution eyewitnesses positively and clearly identified appellant as the assailant who alone fired his rifle at the victim. Their testimonies corroborated each other. Antalo testified thus: ¹⁹

Mosa corroborated Antalo's account in this wise: ²⁰

Furthermore, appellant has not alleged, much less proven, ill motive on the part of said witnesses to accuse appellant of such a grave offense. In his brief, appellant admits that he cannot discern any reason for Antalo and Mosa to testify falsely against him. ²¹ In this light, we cannot fault the court a quo for holding that: ²²

We disagree. Antalo said that he was so scared of what was happening that he could not move, while Mosa admitted that he "was afraid" but he did not take cover, as he knew both the appellant and the victim. Their reactions, although the exact opposite of each other, are valid and probable. Taking cover or running away is not the only natural reaction possible under the circumstances. There is no standard form of human behavioral response to a strange, startling and frightful event, and there is no standard rule by which witnesses to a crime must react. ²³

Appellant claims exemption from criminal liability under Article 12, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, because he allegedly acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force. He allegedly joined the armed Dorados against his will because of fear for his own safety. He claims in his brief that the Dorados were guarding him so closely that "escape was risky and protection by lawfully constituted authorities was, at the moment, out of reach." ²⁴

We cannot sustain such defense. A person who invokes the exempting circumstance of compulsion due to irresistible force must prove his defense by clear and convincing evidence. ²⁵ He must show that the irresistible force reduced him to a mere instrument that acted not only without will but also against his will. ²⁶ The compulsion must be of such character as to leave the accused no opportunity to defend himself or to escape.

The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending; and it must be of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done. A threat of future injury is not enough. ²⁷ A speculative, fanciful or remote fear, ²⁸ even fear of future injury, ²⁹ is insufficient.

In this case, appellant failed to show such compulsion. In his testimony, he did not mention that the Dorados physically or morally threatened to kill or hurt him. He did not even make any attempt to resist. He simply took for granted that they would kill or hurt him if he did not allow them. No evidence was presented to establish how, if at all, he was compelled to join the Dorados in killing the victim. In other words, appellant failed to prove that the Dorados made a real and imminent threat on his life or climb sufficient to overcome his free will.

Indeed, the Court finds no acceptable basis for appellant's assertion that he was compelled and intimidated by the Dorados. Even without him, the Dorados could have easily carried out the crime, if such was their intention. If we believe appellant's story, there was no need for the Dorados to mortally threaten appellant to join them. Besides, forcing appellant, a relative of the victim, to join them complicated rather than facilitated their criminal endeavor. With the appellant present among them, they would have had to guard themselves from possible resistance and double cross in case he did not consent to their plan. Furthermore, it would have been highly illogical for the Dorados to force appellant to take part in their crime, only to give him an unserviceable rifle. ³⁰

The evidence of the prosecution, however, adequately established only treachery. Treachery is appreciated when a frontal attack is directed at an unarmed victim who is totally unaware of and unprepared for said assault. ³¹ There is treachery where the attack on an unarmed victim, who has not given the slightest provocation, is sudden, unexpected and without warning. ³² According to Prosecution Witness Mosa, the victim, the appellant and his companions were talking to one another prior to the shooting. It would have been impossible to hide Garand rifles from someone who was so close. Thus, it is safe to assume that the victim knew that appellant and his companions were carrying them. If the victim suspected that they would use those rifles to commit the crime, then he would have avoided them. But instead, the victim stayed and spoke with them. The victim, therefore, had no idea that he was going to be shot by appellant who, after all, was his relative. Even if he eventually did come to know that appellant intended to shoot him, he — being alone and unarmed — could not have defended himself against all five of them.

Abuse of superior strength, on the other hand, was not established, as there was no testimony to the effect that appellant and his companions took advantage of their collective strength in order to kill the victim. ³³ Witness Mosa even said that only appellant fired at the victim. Mere superiority in number after all is not necessarily indicative of this aggravating circumstance.

The prosecution also failed to establish evident premeditation. For this qualifying circumstance to be appreciated, there must be a lapse of sufficient time to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection that would allow the conscience of the actor to attempt to overcome the resolution of his will. ³⁴ But the prosecution was unable to establish this time element as its evidence dealt merely with the circumstances of the actual shooting itself.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with modification as regards the civil indemnity which is hereby INCREASED to fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) in line with current jurisprudence. ³⁵