G.R. No. 87110




Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 87110 January 24, 1996 GIL RUBIO, petitioner, vs. THE HON. MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, BRANCH 4, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, CITY SHERIFF OF CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, and SPOUSES LIM LIONG KANG and LIM PUE KING, respondents. D E C I S I O N PANGANIBAN, J.: When is a "writ of demolition" equivalent to a writ of execution? When does a motion for reconsideration not suspend the period to appeal? Is the pendency of (and later a final judgment in) a parallel case where ownership is the main issue "a change in the situation of the parties" sufficient to justify a suspension of a final and executory judgment in an action for ejectment? These questions were raised in this Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside and reverse two orders of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cagayan de Oro City, as well as the writ which led to the demolition of two buildings of light materials belonging to petitioner and constructed on a parcel of land registered in private respondents' name. The Facts In the action for ejectment and damages (Civil Case No. 10077) filed by the spouses Lim Liong Kang and Lim Pue King (private respondents herein) against petitioner with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cagayan de Oro City, said court rendered on September 18, 1985 a decision1 in favor of private respondents. The MTCC disposed of the case as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, by preponderance of evidence, ordering defendant: 1. To vacate the premises in question and restore possession unto plaintiff; 2. To pay the plaintiff the sum of P12,800.00 as of June 6, 1985 representing the rentals in arrears with legal rate of interest until the defendant fully paid his accounts. 3. To pay 25% of the amount due as attorney's fees. Execution shall issue immediately except on the order to vacate the premises which shall issue after six (6) months from and after receipt by defendant of this decision, unless an appeal has been perfected and defendant to stay execution file a supersedeas bond in the amount of Twelve Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos (P12,800.00) approved by this Court and executed to the plaintiff to enter the action in the RTC, and to pay the rents, damages, and costs, accruing down (to the) time of judgment appealed from and unless during the pendency of the appeal the defendants (sic) deposit with the appellate court the reasonable value for the use and occupation of the premises for the preceeding (sic) month or period at the rate determined by the judgment in the amount of Two Hundred (P200.00) a month due from to (sic) time on or before the 10th day of each succeeding month 2 . Before petitioner could perfect his appeal, private respondents moved for the execution of the decision. A writ of execution was issued by the MTCC on May 22, 1986, under which a KAWAI organ belonging to petitioner was levied upon. No sale thereof was, however, carried out in view of the perfection of petitioner's appeal in the Regional Trial Court (RTC). On December 20, 1985, the RTC rendered judgment, affirming in all respects the decision of the MTCC. Petitioner sought further relief from the Court of Appeals3 , which in its decision dated June 23, 1988, affirmed the judgment of the MTCC with modification as to the amount of rental arrearages that petitioner had to pay private respondents, thus: WHEREFORE, the judgments and orders appealed from are affirmed subject to the modification that the petitioner is ordered to pay the private respondents arrears in rentals beginning February 22, 1983 up to June 6, 1985 or a period of 2 years, 3 months and 14 days a total amount of P2,733.00, with interest until fully paid at the legal rate. The temporary restraining order issued previously is dissolved. Costs against petitioner.4 Entry of the CA decision was effected on September 14, 1988, after which the records of the case were remanded to the court of origin. On November 13, 1988, counsel for private respondents filed before the MTCC a Motion for the Issuance of an Order of Demolition, which was set for hearing on December 19, 1988. After the scheduled hearing on December 19, 1988, MTCC Judge Roque D. Edmilao dictated in open court the first of the herein assailed orders 5 , as follows: O R D E R When this case was called this morning, Atty. Roderico Villaroya appeared for the plaintiffs and Atty. Teodulo Tandayag appeared for the defendant. Atty. Villaroya manifested that this case has been appealed to the Regional Trial Court and the decision of this court was affirmed and then again the RTC decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals and which also affirmed the decision of this Court and the RTC. Atty. Tandayag moved that he be given time to file the necessary pleading for the suspension of this case because according to him, Judge Noli Catli of the RTC rendered a decision adverse to the plaintiff and declared a certain Maura So as the owner of the lot in question. However, the court gives the defendant thirty (30) days within which to remove the property in question. Otherwise, demolition will be ordered by the court in order to have the rights of the plaintiffs enforced. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the December 19, 1988 Order, alleging mainly that the same was prematurely issued and without procedural basis as the court a quo had not yet issued a writ for the execution of the final judgment of the Court of Appeals; that the order of demolition was a gross violation of the last paragraph of the dispositive portion of the judgment of the MTCC; and, that the judgment in Civil Case No. 8983 of the RTC of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 25, which declared private respondents as buyers in bad faith of the land in question constituted a supervising event which had changed the rights and situation of the parties as would justify the suspension of the execution of the judgment in the case 6 . Pending resolution of petitioner's motion, private respondents filed a Second Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Demolition. In its second questioned Order of January 27, 1989, MTCC Judge Edmilao denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration and granted private respondent's second motion for the issuance of a writ of demolition7 , thus: O R D E R Defendant Rubio was not made a party to Civil Case No. 8983. Besides, the matter treated in said case is spicific (sic) performance and/or title to the subject land. This case treats of possession. WHEREFORE, premises considered, Motion for Reconsideration dated January 4, 1989, is not impressed with merit. Denied. Motion for Writ of Demolition dated January 20, 1989 by plaintiff's counsel being well-taken, as prayed for, granted. Therefore, let Writ of Demolition issue to enforce the judgment dated September 18, 1985 by this court which was affirmed with modifications by the (C)ourt of (A)ppeals in its decision promulgated on June 23, 1988. Accordingly, a Writ of Demolition8 was issued on February 2, 1989 and enforced on February 20, 1989 with the demolition of petitioner's houses. Turn-over of the possession of the premises to private respondents was made the following day, February 21, 1989. On March 2, 1989, petitioner instituted the instant petition. This Court took cognizance of the petition not withstanding the disregard by petitioner of the hierarchy of courts, because remanding the legal issues to the Regional Trial Court or the Court of Appeals would only prolong unduly the execution of the ejectment case. The Parties' Submissions Petitioner contends that pursuant to the mandate of the last paragraph of the MTCC decision, the earliest that said decision could be executed was after June 16, 1989 or six months after December 16, 1988 when records of the case were received on remand by the MTCC. Hence, the Orders dated December 19, 1988 and January 27, 1989, the Writ of Demolition dated February 2, 1989 as well as its enforcement on February 20-21, 1989 were all illegal, null and void. Private respondents, on the other hand, would reckon the six-month period from January 20, 1985, the date of the RTC decision, on the basis of Section 18, Rules of Summary Procedure, which provides that the decision of the RTC in civil cases covered by said Rules shall be immediately executory. At the latest, private respondents would count the six-month period from July 16, 1988, when the CA decision became final and executory. Since, according to private respondents, more than three years and more than six months had elapsed from January 20, 1985 and July 16, 1988, respectively, when the MTCC decision was executed on February 20, 1989, the orders complained of were perfectly legal. The Court's Ruling Not entirely their fault, both parties have misread the last paragraph of the dispositive portion of the MTCC decision. To be sure, the said paragraph is not a model of clarity. To recall, said paragraph reads in part: Execution shall issue immediately except on the order to vacate the premises which shall issue after six (6) months from and after receipt by defendant of this decision, unless an appeal has been perfected and defendant to stay execution file a supersedeas bond . . . (emphasis supplied) There are actually two periods provided in the above-quoted paragraph: a) the period of six months from and after receipt by the defendant of the MTCC decision; and, b) the period covered by the pendency of an appeal. The first period contemplates a situation where the decision becomes executory by the defendant's (herein petitioner's) failure to appeal or to file a supersedeas bond and deposit the rentals that may become due from time to time. By providing that the order to vacate could only be executed six months from and after the defendant's receipt of the decision, what the MTCC actually intended to do was to give petitioner a grace period of six months. The effect of the grace period is that even if the MTCC decision should attain finality within six months from and after receipt thereof by the defendant, and could otherwise be executed immediately thereafter, the execution could not be carried out until after the expiration of the six-month period provided for. In other words, execution of the portion of the MTCC decision dealing with the order to vacate was suspended, so that the earliest that said portion of the decision could be executed was six months from and after receipt thereof by therein defendant, notwithstanding that it may have earlier attained finality. That six-month period could, however, become moot and academic upon petitioner's perfecting an appeal. This is in consequence of the "unless an appeal has been perfected" provision. The fulfillment of this condition would render inoperative the six-month period because the appeal would in fact extend it indefinitely, as what actually transpired in the case at bench. Thus, petitioner had effectively availed himself of the six-month grace period, which was stretched to more than three years by the pendency of his appeal. He cannot further delay the execution of the MTCC decision, as affirmed by the CA, by seeking to avail of a grace period already spent by him. Note must likewise be taken of the fact that the six-month period was to be reckoned "from and after receipt" by the defendant of the MTCC decision, and not from the finality thereof. It is quite obvious then that the six-month period had long lapsed when the decision of the MTCC, as affirmed by the CA, was executed. When is a "Writ of Demolition" Equivalent to a Writ of Execution? Another objection of petitioner to the execution of the decision is that no writ of execution was ever issued by the MTCC to enforce the judgment of the CA.. At first blush, petitioner's contention seems to hold water, for upon the CA decision attaining finality, what private respondents filed with the MTCC was a Motion for the Issuance of an Order of Demolition, rather than a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. That motion was reiterated upon petitioner's failure to remove his houses as directed in the December 19, 1988 Order, and was granted in the Order of January 27, 1989. In fact, the writ that was subsequently issued on February 2, 1989 was denominated "Writ of Demolition." It reads in pertinent part9 thus: WRIT OF DEMOLITION xxx xxx xxx WHEREAS, on Sept. 18, 1985, the court rendered a decision the dispositive part of which is quoted as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, by preponderance of evidence, ordering defendant: 1. To vacate the premises in question and restore possession unto plaintiff; 2. To pay the plaintiff the sum of P12,800.00 as of June 6, 1985 representing the rentals in arrears with legal rate of interest until the defendant fully paid his accounts; 3. To pay 25% of the amount due as attorney's fee. WHEREAS, the decision was appealed which was affirmed with modifications by the Court of Appeals, on June 23, 1988. The dispositive part of which is quoted as follows: WHEREFORE, the judgments and orders appealed from are affirmed subject to the modification that the petitioner is ordered to pay the private respondents arrears in rentals beginning Feb. 22, 1983 up to June 6, 1985 or a period of 2 years, 3 months and 14 days for a total amount of P2,733.00, with interest until fully paid at the legal rate. The temporary restraining order issued previously is dissolved. Costs against petitioner. NOW THEREFORE, you are hereby commanded to enforce the foregoing judgment defendant Gil Rubio, Plaza Divisoria, Divisoria, Cag. de Oro City, you cause Rubio to vacate the premises and/or demolish the existing improvements therein introduced by the defendant to fully restore possession unto plaintiff (sic). Necessary expenses relative to such demolition shall be charged against defendant. While the writ was denominated as one for demolition, it nonetheless substantially complied with the form and contents of a writ of execution as provided for under Section 8, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the writ was issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines by the court in which the judgment or order was entered. It clearly referred to such judgment, stating the court, province and municipality where it is of record, the amount actually due thereon and requiring the sheriff to deliver possession of the premises to plaintiffs. This, to our mind, is sufficient to constitute a writ of execution of the CA judgment under the oft-repeated rule that the Rules of Court shall be liberally construed in order to promote its object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding 10 We cannot therefore say that the MTCC cut procedural corners in this case. The form of the writ was in substantial compliance with the Rules. No substantial right of petitioner was transgressed thereby. Petitioner was duly notified and heard on the motion for issuance of the writ of demolition and was given reasonable time to remove his houses, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Section 14, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court. He was even heard on a motion for reconsideration of the order of December 19, 1988. When Does a Motion for Reconsideration Not Suspend the Period to Appeal? The third objection to the execution of the judgment against petitioner is that the demolition of his houses was allegedly carried out before the expiration of the thirty-day period granted in the December 19, 1988 Order. In computing the thirty-day period, petitioner started from January 3, 1989 when he received a copy of the December 19, 1988 Order, and deducted the time during which his motion for reconsideration was pending, i.e., from January 4, 1989, the day he filed the same, to February 6, 1989, the date he received a copy of the January 27, 1989 Order denying his motion for reconsideration. He further deducted from the said thirty-day period the time between February 6, 1989 when he received notice of the January 27, 1989 Order, and February 12, 1989 when he actually received a copy of the Writ of Demolition dated February 2, 1989. He said that with the interruption, only a total period of 15 days had elapsed from January 3, 1989 to the demolition of his houses on February 20, 1989. Suffice it to say that the period subject to interruption by a motion for reconsideration is the period to appeal 11 The order of December 19, 1988 is an interlocutory order because it required the parties to perform certain acts for final adjudication of certain incidents in the case 12 . I Being an interlocutory order, it was not appealable and, therefore, there was no period to suspend or interrupt. Pendency of Parallel Case Involving Ownership Does Not Affect Ejectment Case. The last objection of petitioner to the execution of the judgment against him is based on the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 25 in Civil Case No. 8983 which, inter alia, declared herein private respondents, Spouses Lim Liong Kang and Lim Pue King as intervenors therein, buyers in bad faith of the same land involved in the case at bench and ordered the cancellation of the title issued to the latter and the issuance of a new one in favor of therein plaintiff Maura So 13 . The RTC decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals 14 on September 13, 1989, and finally by this Court 15 on August 2, 1991. Petitioner contends that the decision in Civil Case No. 8983 has changed the situation of the parties in the instant case, as would justify a suspension of the final and executory judgment of the Court of Appeals, as Maura So had undertaken to allow him to continue occupying the lot under consideration. Verily, the rule that once a judgment has become final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the courts to order its execution, is not absolute but admits of certain exceptions, as in cases of special and exceptional nature where it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice to suspend its execution; or whenever it is necessary to accomplish the aims of justice or when certain facts and circumstances transpired after the judgment became final which render the execution of the judgment impossible or unjust 16 . This Court has held in numerous cases 17 that a change in the situation of the parties was considered a circumstance that would render execution inequitable and unjust. It must be stated, however, that at the time respondent court issued the order to vacate in the ejectment case, the RTC decision in Civil Case No. 8983 had not yet become final and executory, it being on appeal before the Court of Appeals. In fact, the Writ of Demolition had been fully enforced months before the appellate court promulgated its decision in the appealed case, which decision was further appealed to this Court. On these facts alone, it is evident that the RTC decision in Civil Case No. 8983 could not serve to stay the execution of the final and executory judgment in the ejectment case, the right of Maura So to the land in question being still undetermined by final judgment. To say that the RTC decision in Civil Case No. 8983 has changed the situation of the parties in the ejectment case is incorrect because petitioner is not a party to Civil Case No. 8983. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that Civil Case No. 8983 is between the same parties as in the ejectment case, still, the situation of the parties is not changed. As explained in Ang Ping vs. Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 40 18 , quoting De la Cruz vs. Court of Appeals 19 : An unlawful detainer action has an entirely different subject from that of an action for reconveyance of title. What is involved in unlawful detainer case is merely the issue of material possession or possession de facto; whereas in an action for reconveyance, ownership is the issue. So much so that the pendency of an action for reconveyance of title over the same property does not divest the city or municipal court of its jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case, nor will it preclude or bar execution of judgment in the ejectment case where the only issue involved is material possession or possession de facto. (Ramirez v. Bleza, L-45640, July 30, 1981, 106 SCRA 187). Besides, an ejectment action can lie even against the owner of the property 20 . WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur. Separate Opinions DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring: I vote to DISMISS this petition for utter want of merit and for being unquestionably a dilatory scheme, camouflaged as one raising an important issue to warrant a direct recourse to this Court in disregard of the hierarchy of courts. The records disclose that the writ of demolition was issued by the municipal trial court on 2 February 1989 and fully implemented on 20 February 1989 with the demolition of the petitioner's houses. The possession of the premises was effectively turned over to the private respondents on 21 February 1989. And the instant petition was filed only on 2 March 1989. Any relevant issue arising out of the issuance of the writ of demolition had thus been rendered moot and academic. The petitioner is thus wasting the precious time of this Court. Footnotes 1 Rollo, pp. 50-54. 2 Rollo, p. 57. 3 Sixth Division, composed of J. Floreliana Castro-Bartolome, chairman and ponente, and JJ. Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr. and Bonifacio A. Cacdac, Jr., members. 4 Rollo, pp. 61-62. 5 Rollo, p. 66. 6 Rollo, pp. 16-18. 7 Rollo, p. 85. 8 Rollo, pp. 87-88. 9 Rollo, pp. 87-88. 10 Rule 1, Sec. 2. 11 Section 4, Rule 40, Revised Rules of Court. 12 Philippine Coal Miner's Union vs. Cebu Portland Cement Co., 10 SCRA 784 (April 30, 1964). 13 Rollo, p. 130. 14 Rollo, pp. 183-191. 15 Rollo, pp. 247 et seq. (Annex "P", Motion filed by petitioner on May 22, 1992). 16 Lipana vs. Development Bank of Rizal, 154 SCRA 257 (September 24, 1987); Philippine Veterans Bank vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 178 SCRA 645 (October 23, 1989). 17 Limpin, Jr. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 147 SCRA 516 (January 30, 1987); Luna vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 137 SCRA 7 (June 18, 1985); Cabrias vs. Adil, 135 SCRA 354 (March 18, 1985); Central Textile Mills, Inc. vs. United (CMC) Textile Workers Union-TGWF, 94 SCRA 883 (December 27, 1979); Ang vs. Navarro, 81 SCRA 458 (Jan. 31, 1978), citing City of Cebu vs. Mendoza, 66 SCRA 174 (August 19, 1975); Laurel vs. Abalos, 30 SCRA 281 (October 31, 1969); De los Santos vs. Rodriguez, et al., 22 SCRA 451 (January 31, 1968), just to name a few cases. 18 154 SCRA 77 (September 17, 1987). 19 133 SCRA 520 (November 29, 1984). 20 Manuel vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 603 (July 25, 1991). The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation