Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

It is entirely in the discretion of courts to allow or refuse adjournments and postponements, in the exercise of which all the attendant circumstances and the rights of all the parties should be taken into account; and the exercise of that discretion will not ordinarily be interfered with unless the trial court's action is clearly in abuse of that discretion or is otherwise clearly erroneous. ¹ The firmly established policy is that postponements may be granted only upon meritorious grounds, ² and no party has a right to assume that his motion therefor will be granted. ³ Delays in court proceedings must of course be avoided. Withal, the desideratum of an expeditious disposition of cares is obviously not an absolute proscription of postponements of hearings. The court's discretion on the matter "should always be predicated on the consideration that more than the convenience of the courts or the parties of the case, the ends of justice and fairness would be served thereby. When no substantial rights are affected and the intention to delay is not manifest, the corresponding motions to transfer the hearing having been filed accordingly, it is sound judicial discretion to allow the same" to the end that the merits of the case may be fully ventilated. ⁴

In Padua v. Ericta, et al., decided early last year, ⁵ this Court set aside a trial Judge's order denying the plaintiff's motion for postponement and declaring him non-suited for his and his counsel's failure to appear at the first of three (3) previously scheduled hearings. As against the circumstance that the three (3) hearing dates had been previously scheduled by the parties' agreement, the Court appreciated in plaintiff's favor the fact that his counsel's motion for postponement was the very first such application made by him and that the motion was not entirely unmeritorious, it appearing that the lawyer had another commitment to appear in a case before another court on the same date and time as the first hearing.

What transpired at the trial in Padua v. Ericta is also pretty much what happened in the case at bar. The Garces Spouses (herein petitioners) were sued in the Court of First Instance of Bacolod by Hernan Maglupay (herein respondent). Maglupay claimed that he had been forcibly ejected from the land belonging to the Garces Spouses and his house illicitly demolished, in consequence of which the latter had become liable for the payment of damages. In their answer, the Garceses denied liability, and asserted that under their lease agreements with Maglupay and the other tenants in the premises, the latter were obliged to vacate and surrender the same upon demand, said tenants had been notified well in advance of the owners' need of the premises and of the impending demolition of the structures thereon to give way to the construction of a cinema complex, but Maglupay had refused without cause whatever to surrender the area occupied by him.

Trial ensued on the issues thus joined. On June 20, 1980, the lawyer of the Garces Spouses commenced but was unable to complete his cross-examination of plaintiff Maglupay's witness. Before adjournment, the parties agreed to resume the trial on three (3) dates: August 14, 22 and 28, 1980. However, on August 13, 1980, one day before the first of the three scheduled hearing dates, the Garces Spouses filed a motion for the postponement of the hearing scheduled on said first day, August 14, on the ground that their counsel had "a hearing at the sala of ... Judge Coscolluela ..." ⁶ (where he was required to give expert testimony). The motion was denied by respondent Judge, when the case was called for continuation of trial on August 14, 1980. The Judge dictated the following order in open Court subsequently transcribed. ⁷

Footnotes