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PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE - FULL TEXT
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation G.R. No. L-36554 December 14, 1981 PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. vs. JOVITO AGUEL |
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Accused |
Date Arraigned |
Remarks |
Status |
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1. Exequiel Cibrian |
July 3l, 1975 |
Not Guilty |
Prisoner |
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2. Rodrigo Deluvio |
Jan. 29, 1976 |
-do- |
Bonded |
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3. Anecito Deluvio |
-do- |
-do- |
-do- |
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4. Hector Hortellano |
-do- |
-do- |
-do- |
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5. Renato Asegurado |
-do- |
-do- |
-do- |
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6. Ramon Guevarra |
-do- |
-do- |
CIS Custody |
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7. Edilberto Campo |
-do- |
-do- |
-do- |
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8. Magdaleno Tigbao, Jr. July 30, 1981 |
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-do- |
Prisoner |
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9. Emiliano Paez |
March 12, 1976 |
Guilty |
Prisoner |
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10. Sergio Carampatan |
- |
- |
At large |
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It appears further that in a 3rd Indorsement dated July 10, 1978 of District State Prosecutor Arzadon to the Chief State Prosecutor, from the evidence consisting of sworn statements of the witnesses and extra-judicial confessions of some of the accused in CCC-XIV-1151, the crime was committed by said accused and no mention was made of the participation of Shem Jakosalem.
Said 3rd Indorsement reads:
From the evidence consisting of sworn statements of the witnesses and extra-judicial confessions of some of the accused, in the latter case (CCC-XIV-1151), the crime was committed by said accused and NO MENTION WAS MADE OF THE PARTICIPATION OF SHEM JAKOSALEM and his three coaccused in the commission of the robbery for which Jakosalem was charged and found guilty by Judge Cupin in Criminal Case No. CCC-XIV-613.
If, as claimed by Shem Jakosalem, he was wrongly charged by the City Fiscal of Cebu and he was unjustly convicted by Judge Cupin because he did not commit the offense imputed to him, this matter should be looked into by the Office of the Solicitor General who handles the side of the government in the appealed case of Jakosalem considering that during the pendency of the appeal the case is subjudice. '(Italics supplied, words capitalized, in parenthesis, ours for emphasis; Annex "F" of Annex "A", motion)
The foregoing circumstances, we submit, happened after appellant's trial and conviction and while his case was pending before this Honorable Court. There was, therefore, no way by which these developments could have been known by appellant during his trial.
It is our submission that the above circumstances constitute newly discovered evidence which justify a reopening of this case to erase all doubts, if any, relative to appellant's guilt or innocence.
It may not be amiss to point out that while 'according to Sgt. Josefino Pilapil, Head of the Control Area Zone, Theft and Robbery Section, the basis of the police for pinpointing the accused was the information given by an informer, a police character named Jolly Amameo alias Boy Alias, who was killed a week after the appellant was arrested on June 18, 1972, that the persons responsible for the robbery were Shem Jakosalem, a certain Umpad, Romeo Estrada alias Carlito, and Roberto Sastrillo alias Boy' (italics ours, pp. 4-6, Decision dated May 19, 1980, SC), other persons different from the above were charged aside from appellant, namely: Jovito Aguel, Silverio Aguel and Ramon Jalico who were thereafter Identified as the John Doe, "Peter Doe" and "Richard Doe" in the original information. The aboved named individuals were subsequently arraigned and found innocent of the crime charged.
It is also to be stressed that the issue of Identification assumes importance after taking into consideration the foregoing circumstances coupled with the extra-judicial confession as well as the judicial admission of Emiliano Paez that he was the one who shot Restituto Ira. It is axiomatic that, as basic and elemental as proof of the essential elements of the crime charged itself, positive proof of the Identity of the alleged offender is an indispensable prop to any judgment of conviction for said crime.
Delineating the criterion on this point, the Supreme Court has very-cogently declared —
... The Identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The question of Identification of an accused as the perpetrator of an offense might seem to be the simplest that could possibly come before a court. But the fact is precisely the reverse. The question of Identification has proved itself over and over again, by far, instead the most perplexing. As one court has observed: There are few more difficult subjects with which the administration of justice has to deal. The carelessness or superficiality of observers, the parity of powers of graphic description, and the different force with which peculiarities of form or color or expression strike different persons, make recognition or Identification one of the least reliable of facts testified to even by actual witnesses who have seen the parties in question ... (People vs. Beltran, 61 SCRA 246, 250 citing Estate of Bryant, 176 Pa. 309, 318, 35 Atl. 571, 577 cited in Wall, Eyewitnesses Identification in Criminal Cases 1965 ed.).
For this reason, this Honorable Court has warned that-
The courts should exercise caution in weighing evidence of Identity. As Wharton observed, under conditions that generally surround the commission of a crime, there is sometimes a predisposition to connect an accused with a crime on the basis at times of fancied resemblances, depending upon the prejudgment or bias of the declarant' (People vs. Jimenez, et al. 71 SCRA 186, 192).
It is noteworthy that when appellant was brought by the police authorities to the residence of Mrs. Ira on July 5, 1972, the latter, after taking a look at him, told the police that the former was not one of the robbers (p. 9, SC decision) although later on she Identified appellants as one of the robbers with the explanation that when appellant was brought to her, she was afraid to Identify him because she had no confidence in the person of Lt. Ponciano Gacho (p. 12, SC decision).
If only to satisfy the requirement that the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, appellant should be given the leeway to prove his innocence.
It has been held that the authority of the appellate court over an appealed case is broad and ample enough to embrace situations as the instant case where the court may grant a new trial or retrial based on grounds other than those provided in Section 13 of Rule 124 or Section 2 of Rule 121. While Section 13, Rule 124 and Section 2, Rule 121 provides for specific grounds for a new trial, i.e. newly discovered evidence, and errors of law or irregularities committed during the trial, Section 11 of Rule 124 which provides:
Power of appellate court on appeal.—Upon appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance, the appellate court may reverse, affirm, or modify the judgment and increase or reduce the penalty imposed by the trial court, remand the case to the Court of First Instance for new trial or retrial, or dismiss the case.
does not so specify, thereby leaving to the sound discretion of the court the determination, on a case to case basis, of what would constitute meritorious circumstances warranting a new trial or retrial (Jose vs. CA, 70 SCRA 264).
This Honorable Court, in the aforecited case of Jose vs. CA, lbid, ruled that:
Surely, the Rules of Court were conceived and promulgated to aid and not to obstruct the proper administration of justice, to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispense justice, for otherwise, courts win be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn or judicial discretion.
Thus, admittedly, courts may suspend its own rules or exempt a case from them for the purposes of justice or, in a proper case, disregard them. In this jurisdiction, in not a few instances, this court ordered a new trial in criminal cases on grounds not mentioned in the statute, viz: retraction of witness, negligence or incompetency of counsel, improvident plea of guilty, disqualification of an attorney de oficio to represent the accused in the trial court, and where a judgment was rendered on a stipulation of facts entered into by both the prosecution and the defense.
Characteristically, a new trial has been described as a new invention to temper the severity of a judgment or prevent the failure of justice.
It is, therefore, our position that 'the rigid application of the rules of procedure must bow to the overriding goal of courts of justice—to render justice where justice is due—to secure to every individual all possible legal means to prove his innocence of a crime of which he is charged (Jose vs. CA, supra).
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that the decision of this Honorable Court dated May 19, 1980 be set aside and the case be remanded to the court a quo for new trial and for the purpose of allowing appellant to present his alleged newly discovered evidence.
WHEREFORE, as prayed for, Our decision of May 19, 1980, is hereby set aside and this case is hereby remanded to the court a quo for new trial so that the accused can present his alleged newly discovered evidence. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., De Castro, Ericta and Escolin JJ., concur.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
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