Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

It appears that in 1929, Severo Ungriano took possession of a parcel of land consisting of thirty (30) hectares located at Barrio Libo, Panukulan, Quezon. He cleared and cultivated the holding and introduced improvements thereon. Subsequently, he filed Homestead Application No. 145134 (E-86406) for a 24-hectare property, which application was approved by the Director of Lands. ¹

In 1942 and on various dates subsequent thereto, Ungriano transfered his right to possess the aforementioned parcel of land to the herein plaintiffs-appeallants. These transferees continued to clear and cultivate the land and to introduce improvements over the portions respectively occupied by them. The holding, however, was forest land, being part of Timberland Block B. LC Project No. 19-C Polillo, Quezon, per BF Map LC 2066. ² Therefore, to perfect their titles over th land, plaintiffs-appllants made representations with the authorities for the release of the same from the Forest Zone. One of the persons they approached was then President of the

Senate, Eulogio Rodriguez Sr., who, upon teaming of the situation, wrote the then Director of the Bureau of Forestry, Felipe Amos, and requested the latter "to find ways and means for the immediate release of this land so that the present occupants thereof could perfect their titles over the said land." ³

The land was finally released from the Forest Zone sometime in May, 1958: ⁴ On October 5, 1959 plaintiffs-appellants were advised by the Director of Lands, to file appropriate public land applications and to have the land surveyed so that their claims thereto may be perfected. ⁵

Meanwhile, and prior to its release from the Forest Zone, the land in controversy was part of a timber concession held by defendant-appellee Josefa Dyogi by virtue of an Ordinary Timber License (O.T. Lic. No. 84- '55) granted to her in 1950. ⁶ At the instance of defendant-appellee Josefa Dyogi, a criminal information was filed on May 29, 1958 against three of the herein appellants — namely, Exequiel Pagadora, Luciano and Angel Pestanas - for unlawful possession and destruction of public forest before the Justice of the Peace Court of Polillo, Quezon. On November 29, 1958, the three accused appellants were convicted and sentenced to suffer one (1) month imprisonment, but on appeal to the Court of First Instance, all the cases against them were dismissed. ⁷ Josefa Dyogi nevertheless did not cease in her attempt to have the ownership of the 24-hectare lot in controversy declared in her name. She filed with the Bureau of Lands Free Patent Application No. 8-2103 covering the portions occupied by the appellants. The Director of Lands approved said free patent application on the strength of the report submitted by public lands inspector Joaquin Lacorte, one of the defendants, to the effect that the land was free from claims and conflicts, and that there was no person occupying or claiming the land other than Josefa Dyogi. ⁸ On March 20, 1961, free patent No. V-166123 was issued to Josefa Dyogi by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. ⁹

On September 13, 1961, plaintiffs-appellants filed with the Bureau of Lands a petition for cancellation of free patent No. V-166123 issued to Josefa Dyogi.

On March 17, 1962, or six months thereafter, while the foregoing petition for cancellation was pending investigation by the Bureau of Lands ¹⁰ they filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon, to have the Identical free patent No. V-166123 declared null and void and prayed that they be declared the owners of the portions of land possesed by them and/or that they be declared as having the preferential right to acquire the said land. The complaint alleged, among other things:

Defendants, now appellees, moved to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (1) that the complaint states no cause of action, and (2) that the filing thereof was premature, because of the pendency of the administrative case for cancellation of free patent No. V-166123. ¹¹

Plaintiffs-appellants answered that their complaint states sufficient cause of action and that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not necessary "Since the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources has not acted on the Petition of the plaintiffs for cancellation of the said Free Patent 'title, notwithstanding the lapse of a period of more than one year from the date it was flied ... ¹²

Defendant-appellee Dyogi filed a Rejoinder wherein she reiterated the need to exhaust all administrative remedies in this case. ¹³

The lower court sustained the defendants' contentions. By an order dated June 21, 1963, it dismissed the complaint as to Lacorte on the ground that he "has no personality in this case and that there is no cause of action against him. ¹⁴ After hearing defendant Dyogi's motion to dismiss," ¹⁵ the lower court granted it and by an order dated March 29, 1965, dismissed plaintiff 's complaint. Said order reads in part:

On April 30, 1965, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a motion for reconsideration ¹⁷ which was denied by the lower court by an order dated September 9, 1965 because said motion was "without merits. ¹⁸

Hence this appeal, on the following assignment of errors:

1. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS COMPLAINT.

2. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PLAINTIFFS HAVE TO WAIT FOR THE OUTCOME OF PETITION THEY FILED WITH THE BUREAU OF LANDS FOR CANCELLATION OF THE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. V-166123 BEFORE TAKING THIS CASE TO COURT.

3. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO CAUSE OF ACTION UNTIL THEY 'EXHAUSTED THE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IN THE INSTANT CASE. ¹⁹

The three errors assigned actually raise one issue only, i.e. whether or not the lower court properly applied the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. As aptly put by the appellee, the "sole issue in this case involves a purely legal question which may be stated briefly as follows: Whether or not a party, aggrieved by a decision of the Director of Lands, may file an action in court for the cancellation of a free patent granted under the provisions of the Public Land Jaw (Commonwealth Act No. 141) without waiting for the outcome of a petition previously filed with the Director of Lands praying for the same relief. ²⁰

This appeal is clearly without merit. The order of dismissal — on the grounds of lack of cause of action and non-exhaustion of administrative remedy, and the order denying the motion for reconsideration thereof, are in order. It is now well-settled that where a party seeks for the cancellation of a free patent with the Bureau of Lands, he must pursue his action in the proper Department and a review by the Courts will not be permitted unless the administrative remedies are first exhausted. ²¹ Thus We held that:

There is merit also in the lower court's finding that the plaintiffs-appellants have no cause of action. For it is also a settled rule in this jurisdiction that there can be no cause of action for filing a complaint in court unless the administrative remedies provided for by law shag have been exhausted. ²⁴

Wherefore, the order of the lower court dismissing the plaintiffs-appellants' complaint is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against the appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Footnotes