Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-17791             April 30, 1963

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,
vs.
JOSE TAN, accused.

Office of the SoIicitor General for plaintiff.
Elviro Peralta for accused.

CONCEPCION, J.:

Appeal by the prosecution from an order of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, dismissing this case with costs de officio.

On January 27, 1960, a complaint charging Jose Tan with homicide was filed with the Justice of the Peace Court of Laoag, Ilocos Norte, and docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 3176. After conducting the first and second stages of the corresponding preliminary investigation, on August 5, 1960, said court dismissed the complaint and forwarded the records to the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. Subsequently, the Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Norte conducted his own preliminary investigation, and then filed with the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, on September 16, 1960 an information charging Jose Tan with the same offense, which information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 3618 of the latter Court. Soon thereafter, or on October 1, 1960, the defendant moved to dismiss this information, upon the ground that, in view of the dismissal of said complaint by the Justice of the Peace Court, the Provincial Fiscal could not, under Republic Act No. 1799, amending Republic Act No. 732, file a new information with the court of first instance "without first obtaining an order directing the Justice of the peace to conduct another preliminary investigation." On November 27, 1960 said court of first instance issued the order appealed from, dismissing in the aforementioned information. A reconsideration of this order having been denied, the prosecution interposed the present appeal.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët

The only issue in this appeal is whether the provincial fiscal could validly file said information, after a preliminary investigation made by him, in which he found that a probable cause exists against the accused, considering that the complaint filed with the Justice of the Peace Court had been dismissed by the same, after conducting the second stage of the preliminary investigation. The Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte resolved the question in the negative, relying upon the cases of U.S. vs. Marfori (33 Phil., 666) and People vs. Magbanua (C.A. G. R. No. L-19544-R, 54 Off. Gaz., 4500). We agree with the appellant herein that said Court has erred in reaching its aformentioned conclusion.

The Marfori case is not in point for no preliminary was conducted therein by the provincial fiscal. The decision of the Court of Appeals in the Magbanua case was, also, innvoked by the accused in People vs. Pervez, L-15231 (November 29, 1960), which is identical to the one at bar. Like the lower Court in the present case, the court of first instance granted the motion to dismiss, the information in the Pervez case. Yet this Court reversed the orderof the dismissal therein upon the ground that:

... if the charges for a crime cognizable by the Court of First Instance filed by a competent party or officers in the Justice of Peace Court, and the accused waives preliminary investigation therein, or the Justice of the Peace, after regular preliminary investigation, finds that a prima facie caseexists, and consequently, elevated the records in the Court of First Insatnce, the Provincial Fiscal is not called upon to conduct another preliminary investigation, and may forthwith file the information in the Court of First Instance. Republic Act 732 does not apply in such a case. But if the Justice of the Peace, after due investigation, dismissed the charge, then, the case stands as if no charge has been made, and the Provincial Fiscal may thereafter conduct his own investigation of the same charge under the aforementioned Republic Act 1799 (amending R.A. 732), making it in the presence of the accused if and when the latter so requests.

Upon the authority of our aformentioned decision in Pervez case, which was reiterated in People v. Reginaldo, L-15960 (April 29, 1961,) and Abubakar v. Area, L-14916 (December 29, 1962), the order appealed from should, therefore be as it is hereby set aside, and the records of the present case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, with the costs of this instance against defendant-appellee, Jose Tan. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.


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