Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-16135             February 25, 1961

NAPOLEON R. MALOLOS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANDRES REYES, ET AL., respondents.

Leandro C. Sevilla and Ramon C. Aquino for petitioner.
San Juan, Africa and Benedicto for respondent.
Benito Macrohan for respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

In special proceedings instituted for the settlement of the estate of the late Dr. Jose L. Elchico before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, his 15 heirs employed several counsel among whom was Atty. Emiliano Navarro, who represented the group of Florencia Elchico. In the course of the proceedings, Florencio Elchico terminated the services of his lawyer Navarro and, joining his co-heirs, filed with the court a motion to disqualify him on two grounds: advocacy of a cause diametrically opposed to that of his former client and revelation of his client's secret. The motion was granted on July 7, 1959.

Meanwhile, Mrs. Estrella Elchico Serrano, one of the heirs, filed a written statement dated June 23, 1959, the pertinent portions of which read: .

In view of the fact that most of the proceedings of the probate court in relation to the hearing of several motions . . . were oral and held in chamber and, therefore, no record was kept, this representation is submitting this manifestation o a record thereof

x x x           x x x           x x x

4. On June 12, 1959, a conference was held in the Judge's :chamber for the purpose of amicable settlement. The undersigned were without counsel while the adverse parties were present with their respective lawyers, Atty. Jose Africa and Atty.. Jovito R. Salonga.

The undersigned caged the attention of the Judge to the offer of the opposing side that the former buy the latter out of the whole estate for P20,000.00. each member of the opposing group. The undersigned expressed willingness to buy them out but the opposing side must submit an inventory of assets of the Angat Transportation so that the backers of the undersigned could decide on the reasonableness of the price that should be paid. The Judge found the proposed settlement and the necessity of an inventory reasonable and suggested that the inventory be made. Atty. Salonga, however, raised the question of his client Atty. Eduardo Elchico, being entitled to two shares and should be paid P40,000.00, to which the undersigned answered that this whole group would hold a meeting and would let him know of their decision shortly.

The Judge then suggested that the undersigned should not retain counsel anymore but should see Attys. Africa and Salonga whom he said he knew very well.

x x x           x x x           x x x

5. The opposing group represented by Messrs. Eduardo Elchico and Florencio Elchico filed another motion of June 15, 1969, this time enclosing a deed of sale and scheduled the for bearing on June 17, 1959.

6. On June 17, 1959, the undersigned filed, having no counsel, a motion for postponement, explaining why they were unable to retain one, and stating that the sale was illegal and inimical and that they had not abandoned the idea of buying ant the opposing .

The Judge, again, called the parties in this chamber. He told them that Judge Antonio E. Aspillera of the Public Service Commission called him up by phone earlier that morning to tell him that the Angat lines proposed to be sold would be cancelled. He told that undersigned that he would approve the sale unless they were able to present an assurance from Judge Aspillera that the lines would be cancelled. The assurance was to be presented the next day.

The undersigned, without counsel, protested and requested at least one week of postponement to no avail. . . .

On June 18, 1959, the case was heard. The undersigned were then represented by Atty. Arturo G. Mojica . . .

x x x           x x x           x x x

Even before the case was called, the undersigned and their lawyer, then, Atty. Mojica, informed the Judge in chambers that the assurance that the lines will not be cancelled was secured the day before. The Judge, however, said that Judge Aspillera has just called him up to tell him that unless the proposed sale is approved, the lines would be cancelled. The Judge asked Atty. Mojica whether the latter has the assurance in writing to which Atty. Mojica replied that all that the Judge has to do was to lift the phone and call up Judge Aspillera. This the Judge did not do and insisted that Judge Aspillera has just called him up. The Judge, then, said that he was sorry and that he would call the case in open court.

In open court, the Judge declared that the day before Judge Aspillera called him up by phone informing him that the lines would be cancelled. Atty. Mojica, once more stated that he was able to secure an assurance that the lines would not be cancelled. Atty. Salonga reminded the Court that the assurance must be in writing. At any rate, said the Judge, inasmuch as he was called up by phone by Judge Aspillera that unless the proposed sale is approved the lines would have to be cancelled, he has no alternative. Whereupon, Atty. Mojica said that he happened to be in the office of Judge Aspillera when the Presiding Judge called the former, and that it was not Judge Aspillera who called up. Atty. Mojica then recounted the telephone conversation that took place wherein Judge Aspillera told the Presiding Judge that the former would not cancel the lines.

After the foregoing manifestation, the Judge said: 'Is that so? At this juncture, Atty. Salonga was starting to say that the undersigned promised to present a written and formal assurance. He was interrupted by a question from the Judge who asked him 'Submitted?' The matter, then was declared by the Judge as submitted. However, Atty. Mojica implored the Presiding Judge that if a written assurance is indispensable, then he (Atty. Mojica) be given until Monday, June 22, 1959, within which to present the same and, in the meantime, the consideration of the motions of June 9 and 15, 1959, be postponed. The Judge, then and there denied the request for postponement and the matter was ended in that note." .

On July 15, 1959, Atty. Navarro moved the court to reconsider its order of disqualification stating in his motion that from what he may gather from the statement made by Mrs. Serrano the "Honorable Presiding Judge had shown external signs of partiality which renders him unable to administer justice with an even heart and hand." After hearing the parties in connection with said motion, the court denied it, and finding some of his remarks derogatory in character, punished him for contempt. Atty. Navarro in due time filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.

On July 15, 1959, Atty. Napoleon Malolos took over as counsel of the group of Mrs. Serrano, and when Florencio Elchico filed a motion to defer the evaluation of the estate on the ground that some of the documents are in the possession of Mrs. Serrano, Atty. Malolos filed a written opposition dated July 31, 1959, praying for its denial as well as for the disqualification of Judge Andres Reyes who was presiding the court on the ground that he was partial to the co-administrators of the estate using to that effect the following language: .

Moreover, the Manifestation of June 23, 1959, disclosing, all the facts occurring between June 11 to June 18, 1959, show that the Presiding Judge is partial to the so-called 'co-administrators and the oppositors herein believe that they can no longer secure a fair and even justice from him.

Thereupon, upon the insinuation of Judge Reyes, the attorney of Florencio Elchico filed a petition to hold Atty. Malolos in contempt of court, and after the latter was given an opportunity to be heard, Judge Reyes found him guilty of contempt sentencing him to suffer 10 days imprisonment and pay a fine of P100.00. This prompted Atty. Malolos to file the present petition for certiorari.

Petitioner's main theme in advocating for his exoneration is that the alleged derogatory statement, being supported by the record, does not constitute contempt and that, even if it were contemptuous, he cannot be held liable because he acted in good faith and was merely motivated by his duty to defend the interest of his clients.

There is no point in the claim that the alleged derogatory statement charging respondent judge with partially in his actuation concerning the settlement of the estate is not contemptous because it finds support in the written statement submitted by Mrs. Estrella Elchico Serrano, firstly, because said statement merely contains the opinion Mrs. Serrano relative to the proceedings that has taken place before respondent judge and, secondly, because there is nothing in said statement that may serve as basis for the claim that respondent judge acted with partiality or with the purpose of helping the side advocated by opposing counsel. The impression we gather from a perusal of the whole statement is that respondent judge has become impatient in acting on the case in view of the bickerings and quarrels that have ensued arising from the conflicting interest of the heirs to the extent that he took a direct intervention with a view to bringing about an amicable settlement of the estate. The alleged of respondent judge in contacting Commissioner Aspillera relative to an important point of controversy is neither improper nor improvident. If true, he merely did it to expedite the settlement. There is not a scintilla of proof that he acted imbued by an improper motive. The charge, therefore, of partiality is uncalled for, and having been in a pleading submitted to the court, constitutes direct contempt. Being in the nature of direct contempt, no formal charge is necessary. The proceeding is summary in nature which, after proper hearing, can be immediately acted upon. We see nothing irregular in the actuation of respondent judge. (De Joya v. Rilloraza, 52 O.G. No. 14, 6150;) Salcedo v. Hernandez, 61 Phil.. 724; Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil. 86.) .

In the circumstances, finding no abuse of discretion in the action of respondent judge, we are persuaded to affirm his order of September 28, 1959, without pronouncement as to costs. Petition is denied.

Bengzon, Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., took no part.


Separate Opinions

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

In a decision rendered on February 25, 1961, this Court affirmed the judgment entered by respondent judge Sentencing petitioner to suffer 10 days imprisonment and pay a fine of P100.00 incident to his conviction for direct contempt. He now moves, pleading for mercy, that this Court reconsider its sentence by eliminating the 10 days imprisonment even if he cannot be entirely acquitted of the charge for which he was convicted by the lower court.

In support of his plea for mitigation, he avers that soon after he was adjudged guilty by respondent judge he withdrew the alleged contemptuous statements and readily apologized and asked for his forgiveness, but his Honor sternly denied his plea; that he has been a member of the bar of good standing since 1940, is presently a professor of law in San Sebastian College and Arellano University, and a registrar and faculty member of the last mentioned institution, and that this is the first incident he has ever had as practitioner since he engaged in the practice of the law. He hopes that, considering the attendant circumstances, this Court might see its way to sparing him from the jail sentence which would forever be a stigma on him and on his family.

Considering that the utterance made by petitioner which respondent court found to be contemptuous are not as serious and derogatory as those made in other cases of similar nature wherein respondents were merely sentenced to pay a fine ranging from P100.00 to P200.00,1 and the fact that this is the first incident he has ever run into since he engaged in the practice of the law, this Court resolved, not without dissent, to accede to his plea of leniency by eliminating the sentence of imprisonment imposed posed on him. In this sense, we hereby modify our decision rendered on February 25, 1961.

Bengzon, Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Parades and De Leon JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., reserves his vote.


Footnotes

1 Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil., 86; Salcedo v. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724; In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595; Intestate of Olba, In re Franco, 67 Phil. 312.


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