G.R. No. L-6335




Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-6335 July 31, 1954 GLICERIA ROSETE, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF ZAMBALES, SIMPLICIO YAP and CORAZON YAP, defendants-appellants. Ricardo N. Agbunag for appellants. Jorge A. Pascua for appellee. BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: In criminal case No. 2897 for murder of the Court of First Instance of Zambales, Epifanio Fularon was convicted and sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P2,000. On February 10, 1949, to satisfy said indemnity, a writ of execution was issued and the sheriff levied upon four parcels of land belonging to the conjugal partnership of Epifanio Fularon and Gliceria Rosete. These parcels of land were sold at public auction as required by the rules for the sum of P1,385.00, leaving an unsatisfied balance of P739.34. On March 8, 1950, Gliceria Rosete redeemed two of the four parcels of land which were sold at public auction for the sum of P879.20, the sheriff having executed in her favor the corresponding deed of repurchase. On April 10, 1950, an alias execution was issued to satisfy the balance of the indemnity and the sheriff levied upon the two parcels of land which were redeemed by Gliceria Rosete and set a date for their sale. Prior to the arrival of this date, however, Gliceria Rosete filed a case for conjunction to restrain the sheriff from carrying out the sale praying at the same time for a writ of preliminary injunction. This writ was issued upon the filing of the requisite bond but was later dissolved upon a motion filed by defendants who put up counter-bond. The dissolution of the injunction enabled the sheriff to carry out the sale as originally scheduled and the property was sold to one Raymundo de Jesus for the sum of P970. This development prompted the plaintiff to amend her complaint by praying therein, among other things, that the sale carried out by the sheriff be declared null and void. After due trial, wherein the parties practically agreed on the material facts pertinent to the issue, the court rendered decision declaring the sale null and void. The defendants appealed, and the case was certified to this court on the plea that the appeal involves purely questions of law. The question to be decided is whether the sale made by the sheriff on May 9, 1950 of the two parcels of land which were redeemed by Gliceria Rosete in the exercise of her right of redemption is valid it appearing that they formed part of the four parcels of land belonging to the conjugal partnership which were originally sold to satisfy the same judgment of indemnity awarded in the criminal case. The lower court declared the sale null and void on the strength of the ruling laid down in the case of Lichauco vs. Olegario, 43 Phil., 540, and this finding is now disputed by the appellants. In the case above adverted to, Lichauco obtained a judgment against Olegario for the sum of P72,766.37. To satisfy this judgment, certain real estate belonging to Olegario was levied in execution and at the sale Lichauco bid for it for the sum of P10,000. Olegario, on the same day, sold his right of redemption to his cousin Dalmacio. Later, Lichauco asked for an alias writ of execution and the sheriff proceeded with the sale of the right of redemption of Olegario whereat Lichauco himself bid for the sum of P10,000. As Lichauco failed to register the sale owing to the fact that the sale executed by Olegario in favor of his cousin was already recorded, Lichauco brought the matter to court to test the validity of the latter sale. One of the issues raised was, "Whether or not Faustino Lichauco, as an execution creditor and purchaser at the auction in question was entitled, after his judgment had thus been executed but not wholly satisfied, to have it executed again by levying upon the right of redemption over said properties." The court ruled that this cannot be done for it would render nugatory and means secured by law to an execution debtor to avoid the sale of his property made at an auction under execution. Said this Court: We, therefore, find that the plaintiff, as a judgment creditor, was not, and is not, entitled, after an execution has been levied upon the real properties in question by virtue of the judgment in his favor, to have another execution levied upon the same properties by virtue of the same judgment to reach the right of redemption which the execution debtor and his privies retained over them. Inasmuch as the Lichauco case refers to the levy and sale of the right of redemption belonging to a judgment debtor and not to the levy of the very property which has been the subject of execution for the satisfaction of the same judgment, it is now contended that it cannot be considered as a precedent in the present case for here the second levy was effected on the same property subject of the original execution. But this argument falls on its own weight when we consider the following conclusion of the court, "... what we wish to declare is that a judgment by virtue of which a property is sold at public auction can have no further effect on such property." (Emphasis supplied) Nevertheless, when this case came up for discussion some members of the Court expressed doubt as to the applicability of the Lichauco case considering that it does not decide squarely whether the same property may be levied on an alias execution if it is reacquired by the judgment debtor in the exercise of his right of redemption and as on this matter the requisite majority could not be obtained the injury turned to another issue which for purposes of this case is sufficient to decide the controversy. The issue is: Since it appears that plaintiff redeemed the two parcels of land in question with money obtained by her from her father, has the property become paraphernal and as such is beyond the reach of further execution? We are of the opinion that the question should be answered in the affirmative for the following reasons: (a) Gliceria Rosete, the wife, redeemed the property, not in behalf of her husband, but as successor in interest in the whole or part of the property, it being then conjugal. The term "successor in interest" appearing in subdivision (a), Section 25, Rule 39, includes, according to Chief Justice Moran, "one who succeeds to the interest of the debtor by operation of law" or "the wife as regards her husband's homestead by reason of the fact that some portion of her husband's title passes to her (Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed., Vol. 1, pp. 841-842); and (b) a property is deemed to belong exclusively to the wife (1) when acquired by her by-right of redemption, and (2) with money belonging exclusively to her (Article 1396, old Civil Code). The interest which a wife has in conjugal property in this jurisdiction may be likened to that of a wife in a homestead in American jurisdiction. That interest is known as "inchoate right of dower", or a "contingent interest." By virtue of this inchoate right, a wife has a right of redemption of a homestead as successor in interest of her husband. Thus, in Hepfner vs. Urton, 12 Pac., 486, it was held that by the declaration of homestead by the husband of the property sold a portion of his title passed to his wife, and "she had the right of residence thereon with him and the family during their joint lives, with some rights in case she should survive him. She had a right of redemption as his successor in interest." (Emphasis supplied) In Taylor vs. Taylor, 92 So., 109, where a mortgage was executed on a homestead and the husband refused to pay the indebtedness, it was held that "the wife's "inchoate right of dower", which is more than a possibility and may well be denominated a contingent interest, was a sufficient interest in the lands to confer the right of equitable redemption under the mortgage." And in Malone vs. Nelson, et al., 167 So., 714, it was declared that "the right of the wife of redeem is rested upon her interest — inchoate right of dower — a right subject to a monetary valuation." These authorities have persuasive effect considering the source of our rule on the matter. The property in question has therefore become the exclusive property of the plaintiff. She has acquired it by right of redemption as successor in interest of her husband. It has ceased to be the property of the judgment debtor. It can no longer therefore be the subject of execution under a judgment exclusively affecting the personal liability of the latter. The conclusion reached by the lower court on this matter is therefore not warranted by law. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is modified as follows: the sale of the two parcels of land executed by the sheriff on May 9, 1950 in favor of Raymundo de Jesus for P970 is hereby declared null and void, and the deed of repurchase executed by the sheriff in favor of the plaintiff on March 8, 1950 is hereby revived and maintained. The rest of the decision is declared without effect. No pronouncement as to costs. Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Labrador, Concepcion and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation