G.R. No. L-1959




Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-1959 December 13, 1948 EL PUEBLO DE FILIPINAS, querellante-apelado, vs. FERNANDO GONZALES Y SOL, querellado-apelante. D. Ignacio B. Alcuaz en representacion del apelante. El Procurado General Auxiliar Sr. Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., y el Procurador Sr. Jose G. Bautista en representacion del Gobierno. BRIONES, J.: Ante el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila se formalizo querella contra el acusado, Fernando Gonzales y Sol, por posesion de una pistola automatica, calibre 45, serie No. 429651, con algunas municiones. Al llamarse a vista la causa, el acusado, previo permiso del juzgado, retiro su anterior declaracion de no culpable y, en su lugar, presto otra confesandose culpable del delito querellado. En consecuencia el juzgado, apreciando como circunstancia atenuante la declaracion de culpabilidad, condeno al acusado a sufrir una pena indeterminada de 1 año y 1 dia a 3 años de prision, y a pagar las costas, amen de la confiscacion de los objetos que constituian el corpus delicti y se hallaban en poder de la policia. De la sentencia asi dictada el acusado ha interpuesto la presente apelacion. El apelante no suscita mas que una cuestion, a saber: que, habiendose el mismo declarado culpable, la pena debiera ser la minima de 1 ano y 1 dia de prision, en vez de la indeterminada de 1 año y 1 dia a 3 años impuesta por el juzgado. La pretension del apelante carece de fundamento. La pena impuesta se halla ajustada a la ley que señala para el delito querellado y enjuiciado una pena no menor de 1 ano y 1 dia de prision ni mayor de 5 años, o dicha pena de prision y una multa de no menos de P1,000 ni mas de P5,000, a discrecion del tribunal. (Articulo 2692 de Codigo Administrativo Revisado, tal como ha sido enmendado por la Ley de la Republica No. 4.) Es evidente que la pena impuesta se halla perfectamente dentro del marco de la ley. Se arguye, en virtud de la declaracion de culpabilidad, el acusado "merece una pena menor que la impuesta," a tenor del articulo 13, inciso 7 de Codigo Penal Revisado. Pretension erronea. Con respecto a infracciones castigadas por leyes especiales, no cabe invocar ni tener en cuenta como atenuante la declaracion de culpabilidad bajo la disposicion citada del Codigo Penal. (Articulo 10, Codigo Penal Revisado; Pueblo contra Isabelo Noble.)¹ De todas maneras, se advierte que en la presente causa el juez sentenciador tuvo en cuenta como atenuante la declaracion de culpabilidad y, en consecuencia, condeno al acusado al minimum de la pena senalada por la ley.lawphil.net En meritos de lo expuesto, se confirma la sentencia apelada, con las costas a cargo del apelante. Asi se ordena. Moran, Pres., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Tuason and Montemayor, MM., estan conformes. Separate Opinions PERFECTO, J., dissenting: We cannot agree with the theory that the plea of guilty as a mitigating circumstance under the Revised Penal Code (article 3, paragraph 7) cannot be considered in offenses punishable under special laws, meaning, all penal laws other than the Revised Penal Code. Appellant having pleaded guilty prays that the indeterminate penalty of one year and one day to three years of imprisonment imposed by the trial court should be reduced to the fixed penalty of one year and one day, the minimum allowed by Commonwealth Act No. 56, as amended by Republic Act No. 4, punishing illegal possession of firearms. The pronouncement made in People vs. Noble, L-289,²upon further consideration, appears to be wrong and must be reversed. The pronouncement was based on an incomplete understanding of the provisions of article 10 of the Revised Penal Code. Said article provides: ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. — Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary. It can be seen that the article is composed of two clauses. In the first it is provided that offenses under special laws are not subject to the provisions of the Code. The second makes the code supplementary to such laws. Apparently, the two clauses are contradictory, but a sensible interpretation will show that they can perfectly be reconciled. The first clause should be understood to mean only that the Penal Code is not intended to supersede special penal laws. The later are controlling with regard to offenses therein specifically punished. Said clause only restates the elemental rule of statutory construction that special legal provisions prevail over general ones. As a matter of fact, the clause can be considered as a superfluity, and could have been eliminated altogether. The second clause contains the soul of the article. The main idea and purpose of the article is embodied in the provision that the "code shall be supplementary" to special laws, unless the latter should specifically provide the contrary. Under this clause, which inadvertently has not been considered in the laconic decision in the Noble case, in the absence of contrary provision in the special laws, these shall be supplemented by the general provisions in the Revised Penal Code that, by their nature, are applicable. Among them are articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15. The provisions in the above-mentioned articles of the Penal Code have been enacted in consonance with the conviction among the most enlightened penologists that they are necessary to render substantial justice in criminal cases. If the modifying circumstances provided in the Revised Penal Code could not be considered in the trial of offenses punished under special penal laws, what standard shall the courts consider in order to determine if the accused should be punished with lighter, moderate or heavier penalty within the range provided by law? Without considering such modifying circumstances, the determination of which is the result of deep legal thought and centuries of experience in the administration of criminal laws, the only standard that can be taken into consideration as to the more or less severe penalty to be imposed will be the discrimination and unjust results, as the discretion of each judge will be differently exercised from that of the others. The general practice in trial courts has been to consistently consider voluntary surrender and voluntary plea of guilty as mitigating circumstances. Even in this case, as stated in the prosecution's brief, the lower court considered the plea of guilty as a mitigating circumstance, although it failed to grant appellant all the benefits of it. Undoubtedly, the practice is intended to make effective the provision of article 10 of the Revised Penal Code to the effect that the same is supplementary to special penal laws. Appellant is undoubtedly entitled to the benefits of the mitigating circumstance for his voluntary plea of guilty and, accordingly, the appealed decision should be modified as prayed for in appellant's brief. Footnotes 1 77 Phil., 93. PERFECTO, J., DISSENTING: 1 77 Phil., 93. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation